Reconciling Rwanda: Unity, Nationality and State Control by Melvin, Jennifer
Downloaded from the Humanities Digital Library
http://www.humanities-digital-library.org
Open Access books made available by the University of London Press
 
*****
Publication details:
Reconciling Rwanda: Unity, Nationality and State Control
by Jennifer Melvin
http://humanities-digital-library.org/index.php/hdl/catalog/book/
reconciling-rwanda
DOI: 10.14296/0420.9781912250400 
*****
This edition published 2020 by
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSORTIUM
INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES
Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU, United Kingdom
ISBN 978-1-9122504-0-0 (PDF edition)
 
This work is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. More 
information regarding CC licenses is available at 
 https://creativecommons.org/licenses

RECO
N
CILIN
G
 RW
A
N
D
A
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In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) set out to stabilise and 
secure Rwanda, a country decimated 
by genocide.  This mandate was later 
extended to include the herculean task 
of promoting unity and reconciliation 
to a population torn apart by violence.  
More than two decades later, these goals 
appear to have been achieved.  
Beneath the veneer of reconciliation 
lies myriad programmes and legislation 
that do more than seek to unite the 
population – they keep the RPF in power.  
In Reconciling Rwanda: Unity, Nationality 
and State Control, Jennifer Melvin analyses 
the highly controversial RPF and its vision 
of reconciliation to determine who truly 
bene ts from the construction of the new 
post-genocide Rwanda. “How does a country reconcile in the wake of genocide? In Rwanda 
in 1994 neighbour killed neighbour; 
dehumanising propaganda stirred up 
unresolved grievance, and one in ten of 
the population died. Melvin examines 
how the Rwandan government has tried 
to eradicate impunity while nurturing 
national unity. Her understanding of 
the gacaca process, where courts based 
on traditional justice provided swift 
justice, is ground-breaking. Her objective 
analysis shines a much-needed light on 
a modern challenge: how do fractured 
and traumatised societies come to terms 
with individual responsibility for atrocities 
while  nding a shared truth?
Rebecca Tinsley, founder of 
Waging Peace
“Jennifer Melvin’s meticulous critical analysis of the post-genocide Rwandan 
regime’s policies for national unity, 
reconciliation and justice shows that 
in reality they served rather di erent 
functions. It deserves to be widely read.
Martin Shaw, author of What is 
Genocide?
Jennifer M
elvin
Spectators listen to testimonies given by defendants 
at gacaca in Burema, Kigali Province, Rwanda, 
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Abstract 
In the 1990s, a number of countries including Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina implemented conflict resolution mechanisms 
to confront legacies of past violence. This ‘paradigm shift’ away from the 
traditional judicial methods of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals sought to 
engage directly with personal experiences of those who were affected by mass 
human rights abuses and violations (Kritz, 1996, p. 128). Growing academic 
interest in this approach to conflict resolution is evident in literature about 
truth commissions and the concepts of unity and reconciliation more broadly. 
This volume contributes a case-specific analysis of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme in post-conflict Rwanda to the broad sociological 
study of reconciliation and human rights.  
This book seeks to uncover and interpret how Rwanda’s official 
reconciliation programme functions in social and political practice. It utilises 
a social constructionist framework to provide a nuanced, theoretical and 
empirical understanding of how the stated commitments, power dynamics and 
political interests of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government inform 
this programme. Moreover, this book critically analyses the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme according to its own internal logic, international 
human right standards, and the theory and practice of reconciliation as a 
peacemaking paradigm. Rwanda’s official programme is shaped by three 
major themes: justice; nation-building; and an interpretation of Rwandan 
history referred to in this work as the ‘victor’s narrative’. The volume examines 
how these themes reflect changing political interests and conceptions of 
unity, identity, and ‘national reconciliation’ as defined by the RPF. It argues 
that Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Programme is far from an 
exercise in equality and engagement in the legacies of past violence. Instead, 
it promotes a singular national identity secured by a distorted narrative of the 
past and ambitious vision of future development. As such, this programme 
is best understood as a nation-building and state-legitimisation project that 
bolsters the political control of the current RPF regime.
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Acronyms and abbreviations
AFDL  Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération 
du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo)
AI  Amnesty International
ASF  Avocats sans Frontières (Lawyers without Borders)
CDR  Coalition pour la Défence de la République (Coalition 
for the Defense of the Republic)
CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
CLADHO  Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (Collective of Leagues 
and Associations for the Defense of Human Rights in 
Rwanda)
CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National 
Congress for the Defense of the People)
COPORWA  Community of Potters of Rwanda
DFID  Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC  East African Community
EDPRS  Economic, Development, and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy
FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FARG Fonds d’Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide 
(Fund for the Support of Genocide Survivors)
FDLR  Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FHAO  Facing History and Ourselves
GNU  Government of National Unity
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia
IDP  Internally Displaced Persons
INGO  International non-governmental organisation
IRJ Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
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LIPRODHOR Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense 
des Droits de l’Homme (Rwandan League for the 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights)
MDR-Parmehutu Mouvement Démocratique Républicain – Party of the 
Hutu Emancipation Movement (see separate entry for 
Parmehutu)
MRGI Minority Rights Groups International
MONUC UN Peacekeeping Mission in DRC, now referred to as 
MONUSCO
MRND  Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le 
Développement (National Revolutionary Movement 
for Development)
MSM Mouvement Social Muhutu (Muhutu Social 
Movement)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NRA  National Resistance Army
NSGJ  National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions
NUR  National University of Rwanda
Parmehutu  Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu 
(Movement for the Emancipation of Hutu Party)
PRI  Penal Reform International
RANU Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RDF  Rwandan Defense Force
RPA  Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM  Radio et Télévision Libres des Milles Collines (Free 
Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills)
TNA Transitional National Assembly
TIG  Travail d’Intérêt Général (Work of General Interest)
TO Theatre of the Oppressed
TRC  [South African] Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAMIR  UN Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda during the 1994 
genocide
UNAR  Union Nationale Rwandaise (National Union of 
Rwanda)
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government departments
Minaffet  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 
Minaloc  Ministry of Local Government
Minecofin  Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Mineduc  Ministry of Education
Minijust  Ministry of Justice
MOD  Ministry of Defence
NCDC  National Curriculum Development Centre
NURC  National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
PBCM  Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Department  
of the NURC
RALGA  Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities
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Glossary of Kinyarwanda words
Banyarwanda  national identity shared by all Rwandans
Gacaca  community genocide courts
Ibigiye  value of hard work and pride
Igikingi  land contracts in pre-colonial Rwanda
Imidugudu  subsidised resettlement scheme for survivors and 
citizens living in rural areas after the 1994 genocide
Impuzamugambi  militia attached to the CDR party
Indongozi  participants at itorero ry’igihugu civic education camps 
who best reflect Rwandan social and cultural values
Ingando  mandatory live-in civic education camp
Inyangamugayo  gacaca judges
Inyenzi  term for ‘cockroach’ used to refer to Tutsi civilians and 
officials in 1994 genocide propaganda
Interahamwe  militia attached to MRND party
Intore  participants at itorero ry’igihugu 
Imihigo performance contracts publicly signed by district 
mayors and President Kagame
Itorero Ry’igihugu  mandatory live-in civic education camp mandated 
to teach the population about social values and 
development
Jenocide Yakorewe 
Abatutsi Genocide against the Tutsi
Kugandika  action of interrupting everyday activities to reflect upon 
and find solutions to challenges facing the nation
Kwihutura  rare opportunity in pre-colonial Rwanda through 
which a Hutu individual who owned sufficient cattle 
could change their social status from Hutu to Tutsi
Rizabara Uwarirage  a statement in 1994 genocide propaganda that roughly 
translates to, ‘The events, mainly negative, that 
occurred during the night will be narrated by the one 
who experienced them’
Rubanda 
Nyamwinshi/Bene 
Sebahinzi  the mass population
Ubuhake  cattle clientage system 
Ubuletwa  forced labour system
Ubumwe bw’
Abanyarwanda  the unity of Rwandans
Umuganda  mandatory community service one day per month for 
all Rwandan adults
Urugerero  mandatory national service for young people aged 
18−35
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Chronology of key events
1884 Germany takes possession of Rwanda and Burundi and 
governs them as a single state, Ruanda-Urundi.
1916 Ruanda-Urundi becomes a Belgian colony.
1933 Ethnicity is included in the national census for the first 
time.
1957 Nine Hutu intellectuals publish the ‘Bahutu manifesto: 
notes of the social aspect of the racial native problem in 
Rwanda’.
1 November 1959  Group of Union National Rwandaise (UNAR) 
militants attack a Hutu sub-chief in Gitarama, central 
Rwanda, leading to the anti-Tutsi violence of the 
‘Social Revolution’.
1 July 1962 Rwanda becomes independent and Grégoire Kayibanda 
becomes the country’s first president.
1972 Genocide in Burundi during which upwards of 
200,000 Hutu are killed.
1973  Coup d’état results in Juvénal Habyarimana becoming 
Rwanda’s second president.
1987  RANU, a group of Rwandan Tutsi in Uganda, renames 
itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
1 October 1990 The RPF invades Rwanda.
2 October 1990 RPF Colonel Fred Rwigyema is killed. He is replaced 
several weeks later by Paul Kagame.
October 1992 Habyarimana signs a power-sharing agreement with the 
RPF.
6 April 1994 President Habyarimana and Burundian President 
Cyprien Ntaryamira are assassinated by a missile attack 
on the plane in which they were travelling. 
7 April 1994 The 1994 genocide begins. Hutu opposed to 
Habyarimana’s regime are killed as are Tutsi civilians. 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian 
peacekeepers are also killed.
Mid June 1994  French authorities launch Opération Turquoise.
4 July 1994 The RPF seizes Kigali and the 1994 genocide officially 
ends. This day is commemorated every year as 
‘Liberation Day’.
19CHRONOLOGY
19 July 1994  The Government of National Unity (GNU) is formed 
as a transitional coalition government.
8 November 1994 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) is officially launched in Arusha, Tanzania, to 
try cases of genocide and crimes against humanity.
1996 Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers attack refugee 
camps in Zaire with the stated mandate to ‘flush out’ 
genocide perpetrators.
1997  The RPF works in cooperation with Alliances des 
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
(AFDL) to topple Zairian President Mobutu. The 
AFDL leader, Laurent Désiré Kabila becomes president 
of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).
August 1998−2003 The Second Congo War begins and ends. 
2002 Rwandan troops officially pull out of DRC amid 
rumours of continued clandestine presence well into 
2003.
2003 Paul Kagame is elected as Rwanda’s president amid 
allegations of election irregularities.
2005 Gacaca courts begin hearing cases of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.
September 2008 The RPF wins the parliamentary election with a 
majority of 78.8 per cent.
November 2009 Rwanda joins the Commonwealth.
April 2010 Victoire Ingabire is prevented from registering for the 
2010 presidential election and is arrested.
August 2010 Paul Kagame is reelected as the President of the 
Republic with a majority of 93 per cent.
October 2010 UN ‘Report of the mapping exercise’, describing 
human rights abuses in DRC 1993−2003, is published. 
It outlines crimes allegedly committed by RPA soldiers 
that may amount to genocide.
18 June 2012 Gacaca courts officially closed after trying more than 
1.2 million cases.
7 April 2014 The 20th annual commemoration of the Genocide 
against the Tutsi begins.

Introduction
Rwanda is a small land-locked country in the Great Lakes Region of central 
Africa. Bordering Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) (see image 1 below), it is the most densely populated country in 
sub-Saharan Africa with a population of 12 million in July 2015.1 The Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) won the parliamentary election in 2003 and continues to 
lead the country under the presidency of Paul Kagame. Although the current 
RPF government promotes a national identity that supersedes ethnicity, the 
population can be roughly divided into three major ethnic groups: the Hutu 
1 Rwanda’s total land mass measures 26,338 square kilometres. This densely populated 
country is approximately 5,500 square kilometres larger than Wales. See Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Rwanda (2015), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html (accessed 12 Mar. 2015).
Figure 1.1. Map of Rwanda (source: Wikimedia Commons)
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majority, Tutsi minority and indigenous Twa community. Kinyarwanda is the 
language most commonly spoken by all three groups.2 
Rwanda’s colonial history began in 1884 under German rule (Newbury 
1983, p. 257). Prior to the arrival of the German colonists, Rwanda was 
ruled by a Mwami or King of Bahindiro Tutsi lineage (Eltringham, 2004, p. 
13). A small number of Tutsi chiefs held most of the political power. While 
opportunities were rare for Hutu to gain such power during this period. 
Hutu civilians could only do so either by becoming Chiefs of Landholdings, 
whose responsibility it was to watch over agricultural land and production, or 
through improving their socio-economic status by accumulating cattle through 
the kwihutura process to become Tutsi (Mamdani, 1996, p. 10). But under 
colonial rule, even these limited prospects were lost, particularly that of the 
Belgians which began in 1916 (ibid.). 
As the colonial period progressed, the political, social and economic gap 
between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority widened. Forced labour was a 
key factor in the subjugation of the majority of Hutu pastoral workers under 
Belgian rule. It became clear in 1928 how brutal the forced labour system was 
when hundreds of thousands of Hutu peasants fled to Uganda (ibid., p. 11). A 
short time later the process of ethnic stratification was formally institutionalised 
with the inclusion of ethnic identities in the 1933 census (Straus, 2006, p. 
225). The final years of colonial rule were shaped by a transition towards 
independence and episodes of systematic brutality against civilians. The 1959 
‘Social Revolution’ was the first major instance of anti-monarchic political 
upheaval and anti-Tutsi violence in the colonial period (Uvin, 1999, p. 256). 
It resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Tutsi civilians and an exodus of many 
more Tutsi into neighbouring countries (ibid.).
Rwanda faced further political change in late January 1961 when the 
‘Coup of Gitarama’ resulted in Grégoire Kayibanda’s seizure of power 
(Eltringham, 2004, p. 21). The Social Revolution ended shortly thereafter and 
Rwanda became independent on 1 July 1962. Violent attacks against civilians 
pushed more Tutsi out of Rwanda during the early years of independence and 
Kayibanda’s presidency. The mass departure continued throughout the 1960s 
resulting in the migration of more than 100,000 Tutsi into other countries in 
the Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 172). However, these countries 
were not immune to conflict during this period. Burundi experienced genocide 
in 1972 when Tutsi soldiers in the national army attacked hundreds of 
thousands of Hutu civilians. Inside Rwanda, the political tide turned again 
when Juvénal Habyarimana seized power from Kayibanda’s MDR-Parmehutu 
party in 1973 (ibid.; Newbury and Newbury, 1999, p. 299). 
2 English and French are also official languages, although not as widely spoken as 
Kinyarwanda. In 2009, English became the official language of education for 
children above the age of nine. 
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As episodes of systematic brutality in Rwanda began to subside, Tutsi 
refugees in neighbouring countries faced forced expulsions and attacks. One 
such expulsion took place in 1982–3 when upwards of 40,000 Rwandan 
refugees were forced to return home or to flee to Tanzania following outbreaks 
of violence in Uganda (Mamdani, 1996, p. 25). These periodic conflicts in 
Uganda purportedly encouraged a group of Rwandan Tutsi fighting in the 
Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) to form the Rwandese Alliance for 
National Unity (RANU) to debate relevant issues – the Alliance was eventually 
abandoned and replaced with the RPF. The RPF’s stated mandate included 
the repatriation of Rwandan refugees and the creation of a power-sharing 
agreement with Habyarimana’s party, Mouvement Révolutionaire National 
pour le Développement (MRND) (ibid., p. 26).
The RPF later launched an invasion of Rwanda that changed the political 
landscape of the country. After allegedly growing impatient with Habyarimana’s 
promises to repatriate Rwandan refugees, the rebel group set its attack in 
motion. The first day of October 1990 marked the beginning of what would 
become a four-year civil war in Rwanda. This bloody period included attacks 
against Hutu and Tutsi civilians as well as an aggrandisement of the anti-Tutsi 
propaganda machine that had built up steam throughout Habyarimana’s 
rule. As the RPF advanced, militias attached to political parties, including 
the MRND, began to arm for further conflict (Melvern, 2000, pp. 44–5). 
Violence during this period took a severe turn for the worse on 6 April 1994. 
President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were 
killed when the plane in which they were travelling was shot down near Kigali 
international airport. Within 24 hours of the assassinations, the systematic 
killing of Tutsi civilians and Hutu opposed to the Habyarimana regime had 
begun (Jones, 2006, p. 238). The 1994 genocide lasted approximately one 
hundred days and resulted in an estimated 800,000 fatalities. This death toll 
remains highly contested, however, with estimates ranging from 500,000 to 
one million (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1; NSGJ, n.d.(a), p. 1). 
The RPF seized control of the capital city, Kigali, in early July and the 
genocide officially ended on 4 July 1994. The Government of National Unity 
(GNU), a transitional coalition government, was formed on 19 July 1994 
and with that the period of post-conflict governance began. The GNU, under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, began to conceive 
and articulate the transitional government’s early commitments to justice and 
repatriation.3 The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) 
3 The GNU identified the safe repatriation of refugees as paramount to the promotion 
of peace and social cohesion during the Nairobi Summit at the Bujumbura 
Conference, and during the trilateral agreements between Rwanda, the United 
Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and neighbouring countries in January 1995 
(UNSC, 1995, p. 2). 
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estimated in 2005 that the GNU facilitated the return of ‘millions of Rwandan 
refugees’ from DRC between 1994 and 1999 (2005, p. 13). With regard to 
justice, the sweeping arrests of suspected perpetrators shortly after the 1994 
genocide prompted the commencement of criminal trials in the domestic 
justice system and the restoration of traditional gacaca4 community courts 
in 2001 (Waldorf, 2007, p. 425). The reinvention of the gacaca system for 
genocide trials eventually facilitated the prosecution of 1.2 million cases of 
genocide and crimes against humanity (Bikesha interview, 20 July 2010). 
Pierre-Célestin Rwigema replaced Twagiramungu in 1995 following the 
latter’s exile in August of that year. This change of leadership coincided with 
the RPF’s restructuring of Parliament and its establishment of an executive 
presidency (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 180). These actions ensured the dominance of 
the RPF within the transitional GNU, which oversaw the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme until the NURC was launched in March 1999. The 
official reconciliation effort in Rwanda does not have a formal name, as such. 
Instead, the NURC refers to it as a crosscutting programme that includes all 
projects with the stated mandate to promote unity and reconciliation. This book 
refers to this undertaking as the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
to indicate the connections between such government-led projects as gacaca, 
demobilisation and reintegration, the Vision 2020 development programme, 
and civic education as well as the stated mandates that guide them. 
The NURC was created to act as an advisory body, research group and formal 
coordinator of government-level programming in unity and reconciliation 
across the country (MOD, 2003, p. 6). The NURC’s stated mandate includes: 
coordinating the programme of national unity and reconciliation; restoring 
and consolidating reconciliation among Rwandans; educating the population 
about unity and reconciliation; proposing measures to eradicate divisions 
between Rwandans; denouncing discrimination; and making annual reports 
which reference the country’s progress with regard to unity and reconciliation 
(ibid.). These responsibilities, as stated in Article 178 of the 2003 Constitution 
of the Republic of Rwanda, adopted on 26 May 2003, illustrate the scale of the 
NURC’s mandate, but fail to define clearly the government’s understanding of 
‘national reconciliation’.5 
An official policy regarding the promotion of ‘national reconciliation’ was 
not formally adopted in Rwanda until 2007. The National Policy of Unity 
and Reconciliation (hereafter referred to as the 2007 Reconciliation Policy) 
formally defines the government’s conceptions of unity and reconciliation. 
4 Pronounced ga-cha-cha. Gacaca will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.
5 The term ‘national reconciliation’ appears in inverted commas to demonstrate the 
RPF’s ownership of this complex term. The RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’ 
functions as both a theory and a practice guided by policy, legislation and stated 
commitments made by the Rwandan government. 
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Although relatively convoluted, it outlines some of the stated commitments 
that shape the government-led National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. 
They include: fighting ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’; prioritising 
citizenship and the common interests of all Rwandans over ethnicity, family 
relationships and religious groups; respecting the law and human rights; 
healing moral wounds by revealing the truth and asking and giving pardon; 
and preventing the recurrence of genocide (NURC, 2007, pp. 4–5).6 These 
stated commitments to promoting ‘national reconciliation’ appear in various 
NURC documents, the 2003 Constitution, and the documentation outlining 
the Vision 2020 development programme. They are also repeated in official 
reconciliation discourse disseminated by the government during presidential 
speeches, radio programmes, and at genocide commemoration ceremonies. 
The ‘national’ nature of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
emphasises the participation of the entire population in the initiative. Official 
discourse does not specifically refer to the reconciliation of Hutu and Tutsi 
groups; instead, it depicts ‘national reconciliation’ as a collective process that 
requires the action of all Rwandans. This employs a theory shaped by a number 
of concepts the government has constructed to portray the rebuilding of 
relationships between individuals, groups and the state after the 1994 genocide. 
These include ‘horizontal’ reconciliation between citizens and ‘vertical’ 
reconciliation between civilians and the government. Other relevant concepts 
include ‘genocide ideology’, ‘divisionism’, ethnicity and unity. Alongside the 
de facto banning of ethnic identities from public discourse, the RPF’s vision 
of ‘national reconciliation’ is put into practice through the pursuit of justice 
at gacaca; the reeducation of the population at mandatory civic education 
camps: ingando and itorero ry’igihugu; and development programming. The 
RPF’s vision of reconciliation theory and practice, as depicted by the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme, is referred to as ‘national reconciliation’ 
throughout this book.
This short summation demonstrates the scale of the RPF government’s 
official reconciliation programme. Its enormity and the absence of a clear 
definition of reconciliation creates a perception of the process being ‘vague 
or messy’ as described by Zorbas (2004, p. 29). The government’s stated 
commitment to promoting what appears to be a curious mix of ideological and 
pragmatic goals also creates a sense of murkiness as it raises questions about 
how the programme functions in social and political practice. As this book 
progresses, these stated commitments and the specific projects with which 
6 The terms ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’, as well as ‘good governance’, ‘bad 
governance’ and ‘sectarianism’, discussed later in the book, appear in inverted 
commas to indicate that they are constructed by the Rwandan government. These 
terms appear in policy, legislation, the ‘victor’s narrative’ and official reconciliation 
discourse.
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they are associated will be examined. The government’s vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ and the logic that informs it will be analysed with reference to 
the themes that emerge from the programme: justice; nation-building; and the 
‘victor’s narrative’. The entire National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
will be analysed to determine its economic, social and political function in 
post-conflict Rwanda.7 
Research questions
The research seeks to provide a nuanced interpretation of how the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme functions in social and political practice 
in post-conflict Rwanda. As such, this book is shaped by several broad questions. 
How does the government conceive and articulate ‘national reconciliation’? 
How have the military and political roles of the RPF during the 1990 invasion, 
civil war, 1994 genocide and post-conflict period shaped the design and 
implementation of the official programme? The GNU restored gacaca with the 
stated mandate to promote justice and reconciliation. Did it in fact promote 
the government’s conceptions of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation? As 
the stated commitment to building a strong and united nation features heavily 
in official discourse, how has the RPF’s nation-building agenda affected the 
promotion of ‘national reconciliation’? What are the implications of the RPF’s 
dissemination of a singular historical narrative, the ‘victor’s narrative’, upon the 
promotion of its vision of unity and ‘national reconciliation’? How does the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme function in social and political 
practice?
The analysis
This book defines ‘reconciliation’ as a peacemaking paradigm, a conceptualisation 
that draws on Lederach’s description of reconciliation as both a theory and 
practice that extends beyond the mechanisms of traditional peacebuilding 
processes and statist diplomacy. For Lederach reconciliation is the ‘meeting 
point between realism and innovation’ (1997, p. 25). It creates a social space in 
which opponents may come together to acknowledge the past and build a shared 
future (ibid., p. 27). More specifically, this book analyses reconciliation in the 
context of Rwanda’s official National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. 
The research examines how the programme’s ‘internal logic’, as defined by 
the RPF’s stated commitments to ‘national reconciliation’, as well as related 
7 This book uses the term ‘post-conflict’ rather than ‘post-genocide’ to describe 
Rwanda’s social, economic and political landscape since the the genocide ended in 
July 1994. The term ‘post-conflict’ encompasses the influence on the construction 
of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme of the October 1990 RPF 
invasion, and the civil war, as well as the 1994 genocide.
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policy and legislation, promotes the current RPF regime’s political dominance. 
The book also compares the programme against this logic in order to determine 
whether it meets its own goals. This particular examination sheds light on the 
gaps between rhetoric and reality in the post-conflict context. More generally, 
the research takes the post-conflict period, 1994 to the present,8 as its primary 
period of study. This temporal parameter facilitates the in-depth analysis of 
formal commitments, official reconciliation discourse and pertinent legislation 
in the social, political and economic contexts in which they were made, stated 
or published, and those in which they continue to function. As the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme was created after the violence of 1994, 
the research considers historical events relevant to this period including 
colonisation, independence, civil war and the 1994 genocide. 
This book views the official programme as a complex socio-political 
process. In its most basic form, it is an umbrella programme under which 
multiple state-sponsored projects seek to achieve the stated goal of promoting 
the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’ in post-conflict Rwanda. Such 
promotion is complicated, however, by conflicting priorities and legal 
constraints; the inclusion of the loosely defined concepts of ‘divisionism’ and 
‘genocide ideology’; a highly restrictive education remit; and the absence of 
a clear definition of reconciliation in policy and official discourse. As such, 
the complex and often conflicting nature of the RPF’s official programme 
requires an evaluative framework that facilitates the analysis of multiple 
priorities, commitments and concepts related to the RPF’s vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ in the post-conflict context.
David A. Crocker outlines a spectrum in which multiple concepts are defined 
according to their complexity. This framework of ‘thin to thick’ reconciliation 
formulations allows for the analysis of both theoretical and practical elements 
of post-conflict resolution programmes (2000, p. 108). Crocker describes the 
‘thinnest’ version as consisting primarily of peaceful coexistence in which both 
survivors and perpetrators abide by local laws and refrain from killing each 
other (ibid.). Crocker’s middle range of reconciliation includes the ‘thinner’ 
concept of non-violent coexistence, representation in national debate and 
public policy, and communication between conflict perpetrators and survivors. 
The ‘thickest’ version includes these practical elements and combines them 
with the promotion of ‘a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing and 
restoration, or mutual forgiveness’ (ibid., p. 108). 
Crocker warns that the latter form of reconciliation is not only difficult 
to achieve, but also difficult to defend in comparison with ‘thinner’ options. 
The ‘thickest’ version, commonly sought by truth commissions, is impractical 
because neither governments nor truth commissions can force agreement, 
forgiveness or love following mass human rights violations (ibid.). Short, who 
8 The present is defined according to the date this book was completed, July 2015.
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applies Crocker’s spectrum to the analysis of the post-colonial reconciliation 
process between indigenous Australians and the settler state, also finds 
‘thicker’ conceptions problematic. Short argues that the emphasis on mutual 
forgiveness and the creation of a shared vision of the future is inappropriate in 
the Australian context as it fails to deal with issues of sovereignty and colonial 
injustice (2005, p. 275). 
Crocker’s spectrum is well suited to the analysis of the RPF’s vision of 
‘national reconciliation’ in Rwanda since the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme is shaped by a number of stated commitments reflecting differing 
concepts and priorities that can be located across the spectrum. For instance, 
the GNU’s stated commitment to repatriate citizens and end violence reflects 
the understanding of reconciliation as peaceful coexistence at the ‘thinnest’ end 
of the spectrum. This relatively narrow description is a far cry from the stated 
objectives of ‘healing one another morally and edifying credibility among 
Rwandans based on recognising and proclaiming one’s atrocities, asking and 
giving pardon, to reveal truth and to build hope of the future’ as described 
in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy (NURC, 2007, p. 5). This commitment to 
moral healing, repentance and giving pardon resembles the ‘thicker’ conception 
as a process of mutual healing, restoration and forgiveness (Crocker, 2000, p. 
108). 
A social constructionist perspective also informs the analysis that shapes 
this book. Social constructionism is applicable to the study of post-conflict 
reconciliation processes for many of the same reasons that it is relevant to 
the study of human rights (Melvin, 2010, p. 934). The sociological study of 
human rights is a research field that has developed from the evaluation of rights 
within the citizenship framework to include contemporary debates regarding 
the social construction of rights (Morris, 2006; Short, 2008, p. 25). The latter 
analysis of human rights as socially constructed phenomena has questioned 
not only their meaning and use but also the intentions of social actors whose 
interests they serve and protect (Morris, p. 7; Short, 2009, p. 98). This form of 
inquiry engages with more than the legal conceptions of rights to analyse what 
Richard A. Wilson describes as the ‘social life of rights’ (2001, p. xvi; 1997, 
pp. 3–4). According to Short, the analysis of rights as socially constructed 
phenomena led to the conclusion that institutionalising human rights at the 
national level may in fact be detrimental to the realisation of particular rights 
within the context of an official reconciliation process. Short’s evaluation 
engages with the colonial structures, commercial interests and power dynamics 
that inform the government-led reconciliation programme in Australia with 
particular reference to native land rights (2009, p. 107). He argues that the 
methods the Howard government used to institutionalise native land rights 
further dispossessed indigenous peoples in an attempt to maintain the status 
quo (ibid.). This argument builds on Freeman’s assertion that institutionalising 
human rights may not lead to their full promotion, but to their protection in 
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a way that does not jeopardise the existing power structures in society (2002, 
p. 85).
Wilson also uses a social constructionist approach to uncover the meaning 
and use of human rights within the reconciliation framework (1997). In a 
later work, he explores how and why South Africa’s post-apartheid government 
applied human rights in promoting reconciliation at the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2001, p. 230). Wilson argues that 
human rights language was manipulated to promote a moral-theological 
discourse of reconciliation. This manipulation allegedly limited the ability 
of human rights to support the creation of lasting democracy and a non-
prejudicial justice system (ibid.). Moreover, he argues that government interests 
in fostering state-legitimacy and nation-building were pursued at the expense 
of accountability, justice and procedural fairness (ibid., p. 224). 
A social constructionist lens provides an analytical framework through 
which the actions, interests and dynamics that shape an official reconciliation 
programme can be interpreted. For instance, the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme was created, informed and institutionalised 
by its sponsor: the Rwandan government. The RPF formalised the official 
programme under the guise of the GNU until the party won the 2003 
parliamentary elections. The GNU and subsequently the RPF’s approaches 
to ‘national reconciliation’ continue to be top-down.9 A social constructionist 
lens facilitates the investigation of power dynamics between the programme’s 
authors and its participants within the social, political and economic contexts 
in which it was constructed and continues to function. Moreover, this 
perspective provides the tools necessary to transcend the formal definition of 
national unity and reconciliation as outlined in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy. 
It also makes it easier to investigate how the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme functions in social and political practice by determining whose 
rights it protects and whose interests it serves (Morris, 2006, p. 7). 
International human rights standards are an important analytical tool in 
this regard. They provide a benchmark against which the impact of particular 
laws, projects and norms related to the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme may be analysed. This book recognises the implications of applying 
9 The RPF’s top-down approach to reconciliation reflects Wilson’s interpretation of the 
South African government’s vision of the TRC. Wilson refers to the predominance 
of the religious elite since vengeance was officially renounced in favour of a 
religious-redemptive approach to reconciliation. Vengeance, although still popular 
with many citizens, was invalidated and replaced with an emphasis on confession 
and forgiveness (2001, pp. 119–20). In the Rwandan context, the government’s 
emphasis on justice for all those found guilty of acts of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, including those perpetrated against property, demonstrates a top-down 
approach to justice that greatly impacts on civilians through all social and economic 
levels of society. 
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what can be described as human rights’ ‘western imperialist values’ to the 
analysis of conflict and reconciliation in an African context. These standards are 
applicable to the Rwandan case, as human rights language features in official 
discourse and equal rights are included in the list of attributes purportedly 
shared by all Rwandans outlined in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy (NURC, 
2007, p. 3). Moreover, Rwanda has stated its adherence to pertinent human 
rights conventions and covenants including the (1948) Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the (1966) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (MOD, 2003).
This analysis of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme in the 
Rwandan context also draws on a number of dominant responses to collective 
violence discussed in the broad body of literature: truth, justice and forgiveness. 
As will become clear in the next chapter, the study of reconciliation is shaped 
by numerous understandings of the concept. By drawing on the perspectives of 
multiple authors, this research identifies, compares and analyses the differing 
concepts, assumptions and priorities that underpin the RPF’s promotion of 
‘national reconciliation’ and the official programme more generally. The aim 
of this research is not to prescribe a more effective model, but to provide a 
rigorously analysed interpretation of how the RPF’s official programme 
functions in the social, political and economic context of present-day Rwanda.
Scope of the book
The existing literature about the official reconciliation programme in Rwanda 
can be roughly divided into two categories. The first includes works that examine 
specific projects within the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. 
Those whose work falls into this group employ a range of analytical frameworks 
in their interpretations. These authors include Waldorf (2007, 2009, 2010), 
Clark (2008, 2010a, 2014), Thomson (2011) and Mgbako (2005), who 
examine such projects as gacaca, ingando civic education camps, as well as 
the demobilisation and reintegration of convicted genocide perpetrators and 
ex-combatants. The second category includes literature that examines themes 
emerging from the programme such as memory, identity and ethnicity. Selected 
publications from relevant authors include those by Hintjens (2008), Zorbas 
(2009) and Buckley-Zistel (2009). This book falls into the second category of 
analysis, sharing a primary focus on themes that emerge from the programme 
while comprehensively examining, from a broad sociological perspective, the 
entire official programme.
The National Unity and Reconciliation Programme is shaped primarily 
by a stated commitment to address the wrongs committed during the 1994 
genocide.10 The 2003 Constitution’s preamble states:
10 See Jones (2006), Shaw (2003), Melvern (2000), Uvin (2001), Gatwa (2005), 
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We, the People of Rwanda,
(1) In the wake of the genocide that was organised and supervised by 
unworthy leaders and other perpetrators and that decimated more than 
a million sons and daughters of Rwanda;
(2) Resolved to fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations 
and to eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions;
(3) Determined to fight dictatorship by putting in place democratic 
institutions and leaders freely elected by ourselves;
(4) Emphasizing the necessity to strengthen and promote national 
unity and reconciliation which were seriously shaken by the genocide 
and its consequences;
(5) Conscious that peace and unity of Rwandans constitute the essential 
basis for national economic development and social progress;
(6) Resolved to build a State governed by the rule of law, based on 
respect for fundamental human rights, pluralistic democracy, equitable 
power sharing, tolerance and resolution of issues through dialogue; 
(7) Considering that we enjoy the privilege of having one country, a 
common language, a common culture and a long shared history which 
ought to lead to a common vision of our destiny;
(8) Considering that it is necessary to draw from our centuries-old 
history the positive values which characterized our ancestors that must 
be the basis for the existence and flourishing of our Nation; (MOD, 
2003, p. 1).11
Crimes of genocide and against humanity committed between 1 October 
1990 and 30 December 1994 may be tried in gacaca community genocide 
courts. These include the murder and rape of Tutsi civilians and the destruction 
of their property. Official reconciliation discourse has a much wider scope, 
however, as it highlights the ‘wrongs’ of ‘bad leadership’ and ‘negative ideology’ 
in the colonial era, and the governments of Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal 
Habyarimana.
‘Unworthy leaders’, ‘genocide ideology’, and ‘divisionism’ are cited in the 
2003 Constitution’s preamble as the causes of the 1994 genocide (MOD, 
2003). These political and ideological concepts represent the sources of conflict 
Human Rights Watch (1994) and in particular Des Forges (1999) for analyses of the 
horrific events of the 1994 genocide. These texts, among others, will be discussed in 
chapter 2 regarding the context of the 1994 genocide and the development of the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme.
11 I have omitted the preamble’s final four stated commitments from this quotation as 
they fall outside the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s direct remit. 
These assurances include adhering to the principles described in key human rights 
statutes, promoting equal rights for all Rwandans, developing human resources and 
advancing social welfare. All four will be discussed in chapter 4 with reference to the 
RPF’s nation-building agenda.
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around which the RPF’s official reconciliation programme is constructed.12 
This book endeavours to provide a nuanced interpretation of these concepts 
and how they relate to the broader structure of the RPF’s vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ in Rwanda. As such, its analytical scope extends beyond 
the 1994 genocide to include the social, political and historical contexts 
that informed the construction of these concepts. The widening of these 
parameters is particularly important given the role of historical narrative in the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. This particular interpretation 
of Rwandan history is referred to herein as the ‘victor’s narrative’. Like the 
term ‘victor’s justice’, used by authors including Tiemessen (2004), Sarkin 
(2001) and Waldorf (2010) to describe the RPF’s impunity at gacaca,13 the 
‘victor’s narrative’ denies RPF involvement in cases of genocide and crimes 
against humanity in Rwanda and DRC. Covering historical events from the 
pre-colonial era to the present day, this narrative includes a strong focus on 
unity, identity and social relations before, during and after the colonial period 
as interpreted by the RPF government. The 1994 genocide events and the 
concept of ethnicity (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) are integral elements of the ‘victor’s 
narrative’. 
The importance of genocide and ethnicity in how the government depicted 
the events of 1994 is evident in the name ‘Genocide against the Tutsi’. This 
became the new official name of the Rwandan genocide in the run-up to 
the 15th Commemoration Ceremony of the 1994 genocide held on 7 April 
2009. The RPF stated that newspapers, radio broadcasts and government 
documents would no longer refer to the 1994 events as ‘the genocide’, ‘the 
Rwandan genocide’ or ‘the Tutsi genocide’. This change was allegedly made to 
prevent confusion about which group was targeted during the 1994 genocide 
(interview with son of returnee,14 6 April 2009). ‘The Genocide against the 
Tutsi’ will hereafter be referred as ‘the 1994 genocide’.15
As the term ‘Genocide against the Tutsi’ indicates, genocide is defined 
as the attempt to destroy the Tutsi population in Rwanda, a description that 
12 See Short (2009), Lederach (1998), Minow (1998) and Daly and Sarkin (2007) for 
discussions concerning the role of acknowledging sources of conflict in promoting 
reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm.
13 The impact of victor’s justice upon ‘national reconciliation’ at gacaca will be 
discussed in chapter 3.
14 The term ‘returnee’ refers to Tutsi refugees who fled during periods of violence in 
the 1950s and 1960s and returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Returnees 
are also referred to as ‘old caseload’ refugees.
15 The 1994 genocide was not the only one in the Great Lakes Region. To prevent 
confusion, the Burundian genocide will be referred to as the ‘1972 genocide in 
Burundi’. The relationship between the genocide in Burundi and violence in 
Rwanda will be discussed in chapter 2.
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resembles the definition in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention states:
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (1948, 
p. 1).16
The inclusion of ‘intention’ and ‘ethnical’ group in the Convention presents 
several issues with regard to categorising the 1994 events as genocide. The fact 
that Hutu militias, local officials and civilians did not have a single motive for 
massacring enormous numbers of Tutsi civilians frustrates the definition of 
genocide relating to the intention to destroy the Tutsi group because of who 
they are. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the ‘victor’s narrative’ emphasises the 
unity of all Rwandans and the non-existence of ethnic identities in present-
day Rwanda. It points to the colonial era as the period during which ethnic 
identities were constructed in Rwanda and states that prior to the arrival of 
German and Belgian colonists, these identities reflected social status and were 
relatively flexible in nature (NURC, 2007, p. 4; Ingando lecture, 3 July 2009). 
The emphasis on the shared history, language and culture of all Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa in official reconciliation discourse raises questions about whether the 
Tutsi ought to be considered an ‘ethnic group’. As Eltringham states, these 
identities do not meet the requirements of commonly accepted definitions of 
ethnicity (2004, p. 5). For instance, these groups are not culturally distinct 
from one another, nor are they distinguished according to a collective belief in 
a ‘distinctive origin’ as described by Banton (2000, p. 482). Weber also outlines 
criteria according to which an ethnic group may be defined, highlighting the 
role of a ‘subjective belief ’ in common descent stemming from shared physical 
types, customs and memories of colonisation and migration (1968, p. 389). 
Although Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups may not be easily characterised by 
distinct physical attributes, customs or memories, they may share a subjective 
belief or ‘presumed identity’ of ethnic distinctiveness (ibid.). As Fardon states, 
‘ethnic boundaries are between whoever people think they are between’ (1987, 
p. 176, as cited by Eltringham, 2004, p. 8).
16 This definition of genocide is of particular importance in Rwanda. A very similar 
description is included in Law no. 33 ‘Repressing the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes’ (2003, pp. 1–2). 
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Abed also posits a form of subjective self-definition, which he describes 
as group members’ consent to live a life in common. He stipulates however 
that consent alone is insufficient to determine whether a particular group is 
susceptible to genocide. Instead, he suggests three criteria according to which 
a group may be considered a genos: the group culture must be comprehensive, 
including customs and practices that are required for the culture to flourish; 
extracting oneself from the group must be difficult; and the group’s members 
must consent to living a common life together (2006). Furthermore, Abed 
argues that genocide may occur when the group members are deprived of 
the culture and ethos that shape their particular community (ibid., p. 329). 
He builds on Claudia Card’s conception of social death, which she defines as 
the loss of social vitality, identity, and the ‘meaning for one’s existence’, as the 
characteristic distinguishing genocide from mass murder (2003, p. 63). 
According to Abed’s criteria, neither Hutu nor Tutsi may be considered 
capable of being genocide victims. Although exiting these groups was most 
certainly arduous, due to the assignment of identity cards17 and insiders’ and 
outsiders’ continued perception of a person’s identity as either Hutu or Tutsi, 
these groups are not culturally distinct from one another; which in itself could 
make the events of 1994 an example of so-called ‘auto-genocide’.18 Moreover, 
group membership is passed along patrilineal lines rather than consent of the 
group’s members to live a life in common.19 Abed’s emphasis on the relationship 
between culture and genocide demonstrates the difficulties associated with 
analysing and categorising the type of violence that took place in Rwanda in 
1994. 
The trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1996 attempted to clarify whether the massacres of Tutsi in 
1994 constituted acts of genocide. Akayesu, the then mayor of Taba commune, 
was found guilty of nine counts of genocide and crimes against humanity (The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, case no. ICTR-96-4-T). Akayesu’s case was the 
first at the ICTR to interpret the definition of genocide as outlined in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Scharf, 2008, p. 2). The court decided that Rwandan Tutsi did constitute a 
distinct group and that systematic brutality against this group met the crimes 
of genocide criteria. It cited the widespread nature of the violence against Tutsi, 
the use of ID cards to identify Tutsi prior to the massacres, the systematic nature 
of the murders, and the killing of newborn children and fetuses thought to be 
17 The GNU ordered the removal of the request for ethnic identity from Rwandan 
identity cards in 1995 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2001), p. 1.
18 In a theoretical paper, Dirk Moses uses the term ‘auto-genocide’ with reference to 
Cambodia. See Moses (2008) for more detail on his analysis.
19 See Eltringham (2004) for a discussion of the patrilineal descent of ethnic identities 
in Rwanda.
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Tutsi as evidence of the intention to destroy the ‘Tutsi group’ (The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, case no. ICTR-96-4-T, pp. 35–7).20 
This judgment indicates that the ICTR sidestepped issues of ethnicity by 
considering the Tutsi to be a distinct group susceptible to genocide because 
they were targeted as such. If we assume that Tutsi are a distinct group, then we 
could reasonably assume that Hutu also qualify as one. As such, the systematic 
murder of Hutu ‘moderates’21 reflects the intention to destroy a distinct group’s 
subset. This book recognises the complications and contradictions inherent 
in the definition of genocide and the rhetorical use of ‘ethnicity’ in official 
reconciliation discourse.22 It does, however, refer to the 1994 anti-Tutsi violence 
as genocide, as per the Akayesu trial findings.
Central threads
The analysis of issues related to ethnicity and identity forms one part of 
this book’s larger examination of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme. More broadly, it seeks to provide a nuanced interpretation of 
larger thematic elements in order to understand how the official programme 
functions in social and political practice. These themes, which include 
justice, nation-building and the ‘victor’s narrative’, are examined through the 
book’s two central threads. The first focuses on the institutionalisation and 
dissemination of the RPF’s ‘national reconciliation’ vision in Rwanda, which is 
the book’s central focus since the programme is analysed as both a normative 
and legal framework through which the RPF promotes its own political 
interests. The institutionalisation of ‘national reconciliation’ is evident in how 
justice and repatriation are prioritised. These activities were facilitated through 
establishing gacaca courts and ingando civic education camps to demobilise 
ex-combatants and refugees returning from other countries in the Great Lakes 
Region after the 1994 genocide. ‘National reconciliation’ institutionalism is 
also evident in the formal establishment of the NURC and the National Service 
of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ). It is also apparent in the legal statutes that 
shape the RPF’s official programme. These laws include the 2008 Law Relating 
to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology and the 2001 Law on 
20 Eltringham makes a similar point with regard to the ICTR’s decisions in the 
Akayesu case. He criticises the ICTR, however, for ignoring genocide perpetrators’ 
perception of Tutsi as a racially distinct group arguing that the tribunal missed 
the opportunity to uncover and grapple with the ‘ideational nature’ of ‘genocide 
ideology’ (2004, p. 30). 
21 The term ‘moderate Hutu’ is used in official reconciliation discourse to describe 
Hutu who were targeted during the genocide because they opposed Habyarimana’s 
regime. It is also used on occasion in relation to Hutu who refused to participate in 
anti-Tutsi violence before and during the 1994 genocide. See Des Forges (1999).
22 Chapter 2 discusses how ethnic identities have evolved in Rwanda and how they 
have been manipulated by colonial rulers and genocide propaganda.
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Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and 
Sectarianism.
Dissemination of the RPF’s ‘national reconciliation’ vision is achieved 
through both overt and covert measures. In its most blatant form, ‘national 
reconciliation’ promotion is a stated mandate of the curricula taught in 
government-led mandatory live-in civic education, community service and 
demobilisation camps. The RPF’s stated commitments to promoting unity and 
‘national reconciliation’ are repeated in radio broadcasts, presidential speeches 
and commemoration ceremonies during the annual official mourning period 
(7–14 April). This vision and the concepts that shape it are promulgated 
in a covert fashion through the dissemination of accurate history. The RPF 
depicts the ‘victor’s narrative’ as the only correct version of the nation’s history, 
a narrative that is rife with concepts related to the government’s interpretation 
of ‘national reconciliation’. They include ‘divisionism’, ‘genocide ideology’, 
ethnicity and singular national identity. Presenting this narrative as historically 
accurate legitimises the government’s aim of promoting what it deems to be 
the ‘good’ elements of unity and reconciliation and of eradicating the ‘bad’ 
elements of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ that purportedly led to the 
1994 genocide. The pervasive nature of the government’s condemnation of 
these ‘negative ideologies’ is evident in the fear several interviewees expressed 
to me of being accused of acts of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’. Those 
who mentioned such serious concerns did so in terms of publicly questioning 
the 1994 genocide’s ‘victor’s narrative’ and the government’s approach to 
reconciliation. All these informants have been given anonymity in this research. 
The second thread is that of the government’s role in creating and 
monitoring the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. Central to the 
book, it investigates the top-down structure of the RPF’s official programme 
and the multiple roles the RPF plays in this project. The scope of this analysis 
extends beyond the post-conflict period. The RPF’s actions as a rebel group that 
invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990 and fought Habyarimana’s forces during 
the ensuing civil war are integral to understanding the RPF government’s stated 
commitment to ‘national reconciliation’ in the post-conflict context. Moreover, 
the RPF’s transition from invading rebel group to political party when the 1994 
genocide ended informs the ways in which its ‘national reconciliation’ concept 
has been institutionalised and promulgated in Rwanda. For instance, the RPF’s 
roles as ‘liberators of the nation’ in 1994 and invading force in DRC in the 
late 1990s inform the post-conflict period’s social and political landscape. The 
term ‘liberator’ refers to Liberation Day, 4 July 1994, commemorated every 
year on the 1994 genocide’s final day during which the RPF seized the capital 
and ended the violence. With regard to the official programme, the party has 
played the roles of creator, monitor and disseminator of official reconciliation 
discourse. 
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Methodological issues
This book draws in part on qualitative research conducted in Rwanda 
throughout 2009 and the summer of 2010. I chose these particular time 
periods as they coincided with the 15th anniversary of the 1994 genocide 
and the run-up to the controversial 2010 presidential elections in which the 
incumbent President Paul Kagame won a 93 per cent majority. The book began 
as a deductive research project investigating whether the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme could be made more effective with the inclusion 
of Augusto Boal’s Forum Theatre.23 As a trained Forum Theatre practitioner, I 
endeavoured to test this hypothesis by using its techniques with a small group 
of Rwandan actors to investigate experiences of the government’s efforts to 
promote ‘national reconciliation’. At the same time, I began interviewing 
officials at the NSGJ and visiting gacaca trials in a suburb of Kigali and Butare 
in southern Rwanda. I realised that, although the participant observation and 
interviews I had conducted with actors and directors had been fruitful, no 
comprehensive sociological study had ever been made of the entire National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme in Rwanda − a major gap in the research.
This realisation was confirmed as I attended more official reconciliation 
events including the 1994 genocide’s 15th Commemoration Ceremony 
and further gacaca hearings. I decided to forgo my attempt to create Forum 
Theatre in order to focus on collecting detailed primary data about how the 
official programme functions in Rwanda. Through my contacts with officials 
and participants at gacaca, and with artists and performers in Kigali, I sought 
out government representatives and events related to the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
government officials directly involved in monitoring or leading projects 
including the Gacaca Sensitisation Programme, the development of curricula 
at mandatory live-in ingando and itorero ry’igihugu education camps, and the 
everyday operations of community service or Travail d’Intérêt Général (TIG) 
23 Forum Theatre is a form of Theatre of the Oppressed (TO), devised and directed 
by the late Augusto Boal while living in Brazil during the 1970s dictatorship (Boal, 
1998, p. 4). Like other TO forms, it is participatory in nature and tackles issues 
pertinent to the communities in which it is performed. Forum Theatre involves 
writing and performing a play about an issue to which the audience can relate. It 
is performed twice and, during the second run-through, the audience is invited 
to stop the action at any point and replace the protagonist on stage in an attempt 
to create a positive outcome or find solutions to the play’s negative ending. There 
may be multiple stops and starts until many solutions have been found, or the 
actors and audience are exhausted. Boal’s interest in community-level resistance to 
oppression was greatly influenced by Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972). 
For more detail about Boal’s work, see Boal (1979, 1995, 1998). For information 
about community theatre more generally, see van Erven (2001), Fisher and Shelton 
(2001) and Taylor (2003).
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camps for convicted genocide perpetrators. I also interviewed a number of 
participants in these projects. 
I used the purposive sampling technique to gather a variety of perspectives 
from officials and participants and to develop a nuanced understanding of 
each project’s objectives. The iterative nature of this research strategy created 
flexibility to review and reshape research questions, follow emerging themes, 
and speak with a range of informants including government representatives, 
directors of, and participants in, specific reconciliation projects, and citizens 
taking part in grassroots reconciliation organisations. The latter projects 
included plays dramatising events related to the 1994 genocide, religious 
ceremonies and talks given by survivors. These interviews provided a wider 
breadth of perspectives to add to the analysis of the RPF’s official programme. 
I also collected further data through observing participants at major 
reconciliation events including multiple gacaca trials and appeal cases and 
ingando live-in civic education camp for students entering university, and through 
visits to TIG camps for convicted genocide perpetrators, commemoration 
ceremonies, demobilisation and reintegration camps and genocide memorial 
sites. The decentralised nature of gacaca courts and locations of TIG sites and 
ingando camps outside Kigali provided opportunities to conduct interviews 
and observe participants at events in both rural and urban areas. I selected these 
examples to provide a cross-section of the official programme. In many cases, I 
made several visits in order to gather a nuanced understanding of the scope and 
scale of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. 
I triangulated the primary data collected through interviews and 
participant-observation with the textual analysis of relevant policy documents 
and legislation. These range from syllabi of ingando and itorero ry’igihugu 
education camps and NURC evaluation reports to legal texts related to 
genocide prevention and ‘genocide ideology’, as well as gacaca Organic Law. 
In addition to these texts, I conducted extensive documentary analysis of 
numerous state policies and reports including the 2007 National Policy of 
Unity and Reconciliation, Vision 2020 development programming and the 
2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. I maintained its relevance by 
continually updating the project data. This includes recently published primary 
sources, such as government documents and presidential speeches, in addition 
to academic and policy literature. 
The sensitive nature of research about conflict, ‘national reconciliation’ and 
government programming raised multiple ethical and pragmatic issues during 
my fieldwork. My interest in interviewing government officials required formal 
letters from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and significant patience. 
In several instances, my attendance at events related to the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme including gacaca cases, ingando, demobilisation 
and community service camps required identification and formal letters of 
permission from government departments overseeing the projects. In many 
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cases, I was obliged to state my research objectives and declare that I would not 
make ‘divisionist’ statements or participate in ‘genocide ideology’. 
With regard to ethical issues, many of my informants requested anonymity, 
particularly those critical of the RPF government. I was careful to comply and 
chose my interview questions conscientiously to prevent undue harm or being 
perceived as ‘divisionist’ or supportive of ‘genocide ideology’ in any form. More 
generally, I took a reflexive approach to the research in order to review my 
judgement regarding questions related to the 1994 genocide and government 
programming. This method was particularly important during 7−14 April 
2009, the official mourning week, although I found the entire period of 7 
April to 4 July to be a particularly sensitive time. It was also pertinent during 
my third fieldwork visit prior to the presidential election following the murder, 
on 14 July 2010, of André Kagwa Rwisereka, the Democratic Green Party’s 
vice-president.24 
Restricted freedom of speech in Rwanda impacted the data collection 
process on several occasions during my fieldwork. In three separate instances, 
interviewees retracted their statements in full, citing the risk of being accused 
of ‘divisionism’, and in one case the risk perceived to their own personal safety. 
These participants feared that anonymity would be insufficient to prevent them 
from being identified. The retractions relate to statements touching on negative 
experiences of the de facto banning of ethnic identities as well as freedom of 
press and political participation in the weeks leading up to the 2010 presidential 
election. In a similar vein, I did not include extended quotations from another 
research participant’s statements, which criticised government programmes, 
President Kagame and political freedom in Rwanda. For instance in chapter 
6, I included just one sentence from an entire interview transcript, as I feared 
a longer quotation would identify the speaker. Although the book does not 
include these extended quotations or retracted statements, the interviews from 
which they arose informed my analysis. The necessity to omit entire interviews 
speaks volumes about the restrictions facing not only research participants, but 
also researchers who engage with issues relevant to the current government and 
its programmes. 
Organisation of the book
The next seven chapters of this volume are organised according to a thematic 
structure. Although at many points chronological, the book seeks to facilitate 
24 André Kagwa Rwisereka was found dead on 14 July 2010. A dispute about money 
was initially rumoured to have been the reason for his murder. There was significant 
but quiet debate about the potential of political motives for his assassination. See 
BBC News, 14 July 2010, for more information. Rwisereka’s murder followed that 
(on 24 June 2010) of Jean-Leonard Rugambage, editor of suspended newspaper 
Umuvigizi (BBC News, 25 June 2010).
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the identification and analysis of the three major themes that emerge from 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme: justice, nation-building 
and the ‘victor’s narrative’. Chapter 1 engages with relevant literature in order 
to locate the book within past and current scholarship and demonstrate its 
contribution to the study of reconciliation and sociology more generally. It 
begins by identifying key concepts and theories that emerge in the literature. 
The chapter then critically evaluates the methodological assumptions that shape 
the relevant academic work about reconciliation, and assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of these assumptions and publications more broadly. This analysis 
highlights pertinent gaps in the literature and specifies how this work seeks to 
fill those gaps.
Chapter 2 investigates the historical context that shaped the 1994 genocide 
and subsequently gave rise to the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
as devised by the GNU. It discusses the meaning of relevant themes including 
ethnicity throughout the eras of pre-colonial and colonial rule as well as after 
Rwanda achieved independence in 1962. The chapter engages with rising 
tension during the lead-up to the civil war and 1994 genocide, and analyses 
issues related to political dominance and exclusion during this period. It also 
considers the impact of events in eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo) on the RPF’s official reconciliation programme and Rwandan politics 
more generally. In conclusion it outlines the development of the programme. 
This discussion seeks to make connections between the social, economic 
and political landscape after the 1994 genocide and the construction of the 
government’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’. 
Chapter 3 analyses justice: the first of this book’s three key themes, which 
are also those of the RPF’s official programme. Gacaca courts were mandated to 
prosecute all perpetrators accused of crimes of genocide and against humanity. 
They were also devised to promote the government’s ‘national reconciliation’ 
vision. As such, this chapter applies the government’s own definitions of 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation to analyse the potential of these courts 
to help rebuild relationships between individuals, groups and the state in the 
post-conflict context.
Chapter 4 examines the second theme of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme − nation-building − by analysing the relationship 
between the RPF’s conceptions of national unity, nation-building and 
‘national reconciliation’. The RPF’s nation-building agenda is informed by two 
overarching priorities: uniting all Rwandans, and restoring the social and cultural 
values that allegedly promoted social cohesion prior to European colonists 
beginning to arrive in the late 19th century. This chapter investigates how the 
commonality and national identity concepts relate to the RPF’s interpretation 
of national unity. It also examines the effects of this interpretation and the 
RPF’s nation-building agenda on its own ‘national reconciliation’ vision.
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Chapter 5 analyses the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s 
third theme: the ‘victor’s narrative’. It builds on the preceding analysis 
to examine the ways in which mandatory civic education camps and the 
NURC’s history book disseminate the government’s conception of ‘national 
reconciliation’. The chapter looks at the impact of the ‘victor’s narrative’ on free 
speech and critical analysis at live-in education camps ingando and itorero ry-
igihugu. It also analyses the role of the history textbook, Histoire du Rwanda: 
des origines à la fin du xxe siècle, published by the NURC in 2011, within the 
programme’s overarching education remit. 
Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme’s social and political functions. It utilises a more holistic gaze 
to investigate the ways in which the RPF uses the official programme to 
project images of the nation and its leadership to different audiences. These 
interrelated images are disseminated both to the domestic population and to 
the international community of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
donors and foreign investors. This analysis seeks to uncover the ways in which 
the programme bolsters political support, promotes state-legitimisation and 
advances development programming among these different groups.
Finally, chapter 7 summarises the findings presented throughout this 
book. It suggests that the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
functions to bolster political support for the current regime and legitimise the 
state and people constructed by the RPF’s nation-building and development 
programmes. It ends by describing this book’s specific contribution to the 
broad sociological study of human rights and reconciliation.

Chapter 1
Contribution and engagement
[N]o response can ever be adequate when your son has been killed by police 
ordered to shoot at a crowd of children; when you have been dragged out of 
your home, interrogated, and raped in a wave of ‘ethnic cleansing’; or when 
your brother who struggled against a repressive government has disappeared 
and left only a secret police file, bearing no clue to his final resting place. 
Closure is not possible. Even if it were, any closure would insult those whose 
lives are forever ruptured (Minow, 1998, p. 5). 
Martha Minow’s assertion that closure is undesirable, inappropriate and 
ultimately impossible speaks to the devastation caused by mass violence and 
genocide. Although closure for those most deeply affected by mass human 
rights abuses and violations may not be possible, formal responses to conflict 
have developed throughout the 20th century (ibid., p. 1). In a later work, 
Minow traces the establishment of the international military tribunals of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War Two; the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR); and truth 
commissions such as that in South Africa (2001). 
The development of the latter mechanisms, particularly truth commissions, 
reflects what Kritz refers to as a ‘paradigm shift’ (1996, p. 128). This shift 
represents a change in attitudes and priorities with regard to how nations deal 
with the violence of the past and its consequences in the present. Such changes 
are exemplified by the move beyond primarily punitive tribunals to commissions 
that focus on issues of forgiveness, accountability and rehabilitation following 
mass human rights violations (ibid., p. 127). Jean Paul Lederach captures the 
impetus to engage directly with experiences of violence following conflict: 
Contemporary conflicts necessitate peacebuilding approaches that 
respond to the real nature of those conflicts. While contemporary 
conflicts are indeed hard-core situations – the ‘real politics’ of hatred, 
manipulation, and violence – and require grounded political savvy, 
traditional mechanisms relying solely on statist diplomacy and 
realpolitik have not demonstrated a capacity to control these conflicts, 
much less transform them toward constructive, peaceful outcomes. 
Contemporary conflict thus demands innovation, the development 
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of ideas and practices that go beyond the negotiation of substantive 
interests and issues. This innovation, I believe, pushes us to probe into 
the realm of the subjective – generationally accumulated perceptions 
and deep-rooted hatred and fear (1997, p. 25). 
Lederach does not entirely forgo the traditional approaches of past conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Instead, he offers the notion of reconciliation as the 
meeting point between realism and innovation after mass violence (ibid.). 
These changing priorities, as highlighted by Kritz and Lederach, reflect 
elements of Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov’s understanding of reconciliation as a 
peacemaking paradigm. Bar-Siman-Tov describes reconciliation as a process 
that engages directly with the emotional and cognitive obstacles which prevent 
the normalisation and stabilisation of peace following international conflicts 
(2004, p. 4).1 Bar-Tal and Bennink examine reconciliation as both an outcome 
of peacemaking and a process through which conflicting parties build a peaceful 
relationship (2004). The authors briefly discuss the development of academic 
interest in the conception of reconciliation, which they argue is informed by 
a need to expand the study of peacemaking beyond issues related to conflict 
resolution. They contend that studying reconciliation from the political science 
and political psychology perspectives expands the scope of peacemaking to 
include the analysis of relationships between society members (2004, p. 11). 
Reconciliation study is not limited to a single paradigm or discipline; 
rather, it is analysed from multiple methodological perspectives. Although 
multidisciplinary in nature, the literature is shaped by a major controversy: the 
lack of agreement about how reconciliation ought to be understood. Much of 
it engages with similar concepts including truth, justice and forgiveness. These 
discussions have produced what Hermann describes as ‘theoretical fluidity’, 
rather than consensus about how reconciliation ought to be understood, 
pursued or evaluated (2004, p. 41). Indeed, as the next sections will show, 
reconciliation study is shaped by a range of competing definitions and theories, 
some having been weakened by a lack of conceptual and contextual clarity.
Converging concepts
The reconciliation concept, as it applies to post-conflict contexts, has inspired an 
impressive body of literature from different perspectives and disciplines.2 These 
1 Bar-Siman-Tov qualifies this point by stating that not all international conflicts 
require reconciliation. Instead, he focuses on what he calls ‘protracted and zero-sum’ 
conflicts that more closely reflect civil war dynamics (2004, p. 4). The application 
of reconciliation processes to different forms of violent conflict will be discussed 
later in this review with reference to methodological assumptions and gaps in the 
literature. 
2 I specify the post-conflict context in this review in order to clearly delineate 
between conceptions of reconciliation in the purely social realm, such as individuals 
reconciling after divorce or disagreement and that which takes place between 
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fields of study include philosophy, political science, theology, sociology, legal 
studies and psychology. Multiple perspectives and disciplines have influenced 
many authors in this review. Charles Villa-Vicencio’s analysis of reconciliation 
as a political goal is influenced by both political science and theology (2000b), 
while psychology and political science shape Long and Brecke’s assessment 
of the impact of reconciliation events on the development of future conflicts 
(2003). The literature’s multidisciplinary nature has not led to the construction 
of a single comprehensive definition of the term ‘reconciliation’ in the post-
conflict context. Instead, it has led to myriad competing concepts and images 
being created, ranging from reconciliation spectrums to webs of relationships, 
discussed in a later section of this review.
The literature, both case-specific and theoretical in nature, addresses 
reconciliation’s connections with three main concepts: truth, justice and 
forgiveness. They are informed by an array of meanings, commonly shaped 
by the particular procedures through which they are pursued, such as amnesty 
processes at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Relationships between these concepts are, in some cases, fraught with conflict 
and contradiction. Forgiveness is the most contentious concern; some authors 
deem it vital to the pursuit of reconciliation between individuals, while others 
perceive it to be unattainable or unnecessary.
Truth
Truth played multiple roles in the pursuit of reconciliation after apartheid at 
the TRC. The commission included an amnesty process that was predicated on 
the act of full disclosure. Wilson argues that the exchange of ‘truth’ for amnesty 
favoured the pursuit of national reconciliation and nation-building over that 
of justice in the post-apartheid period (2001). This prioritisation raises issues 
related to truth’s relative value with regard to justice and reconciliation.3 
Multiple conceptions of truth and the perceived roles of truth-seeking 
procedures in the post-conflict context complicate the relationship between 
justice and reconciliation. Clark identifies the processes of ‘truth-telling’, 
‘truth-hearing’ and ‘truth-shaping’ as being related to the discovery of truth 
(2010a, p. 34). He argues that truth-telling and truth-hearing constitute one 
half of a dialogue between individuals after mass conflict (ibid.). The other half 
includes truth reception and reshaping by persons who did not participate in 
individuals and/or large groups following mass human rights abuses and violations. 
The latter context includes intrastate and interstate wars and genocide, as described 
by Adelman (2005), and colonial dispossession as analysed by Short (2008).
3 Hayner clarifies that many truth commissions acknowledge truth about events 
rather than discover it. She argues that the population commonly knows the facts 
of what happened to whom, but does point to the value of officially recognising and 
recording truth that may previously have been denied (1994, p. 607). 
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the original exchange. These individuals may reshape the truth to serve their 
own interests (ibid., p. 35). 
The differing processes used to uncover the truth may influence the type 
of truth produced. For instance, as Wilson argues, truth delivered through 
testimony may be ‘forensic’ in nature as it focuses on legal evidence, whereas 
truth shared through emotional expression outside a legal setting may have 
a narrative quality (2001, p. 36–7). Borer builds on Wilson’s two ‘truth 
paradigms’ in order to draw attention to the potential implications of how 
truth is gathered and reported (2006, p. 24). Borer warns that the types of 
truth revealed, whether forensic or narrative, and the ways in which they are 
manipulated may negatively impact victims’ healing, contending that multiple 
types of truth ought to be collected in order to promote lasting peace (ibid.).
The potential for truth to delay or prevent healing raises the question: is 
truth-telling appropriate in the post-conflict context? Rigby acknowledges the 
importance of remembering victims, but raises a concern about the impact of 
‘too much memory’ on existing divisions in society and the ability of victims 
to heal (2001, p. 2). Daly and Sarkin also warn that revealing the truth may 
prevent reconciliation between victims and perpetrators if the facts presented 
intensify social divisions and impede forgiveness (2007, p. 6). If we take this 
concern seriously, what are the alternatives to telling the truth? Govier discusses 
the ability of individuals and groups to deny the truth, warning that self-
deception most commonly results from collusion among individual or groups. 
Purposely avoiding the truth in this way may include denying or ignoring 
unpleasant details about one’s own history (2003, p. 75). 
Whether we deny the truth to avoid acknowledging harm or to prevent 
further social divisions, the refusal to tell or hear the truth negatively impacts the 
pursuit of justice. General agreement about the past is vital to correctly identify 
and prosecute individuals suspected of having committed human rights abuses 
or violations. It is also integral to providing compensation to victims (Crocker, 
2003, p. 45). Incentives to lie in court and the narrow parameters of criminal 
trials make independent investigation and due process all the more important 
following mass human rights abuses. 
Acknowledging truth at criminal trials, truth commissions and other public 
events is a particularly salient concept in the literature. Authors including Allen 
(1999), Borer (2006), Lederach (1997) and Minow (1998) argue that truth is 
also vital to reconciliation procedures. Lederach considers acknowledgement 
of the past through telling and hearing the truth integral to the reconciliation 
process after conflict, arguing that the act of listening to the truth acknowledges 
and validates emotions and represents the first step in rebuilding relationships 
damaged by the conflict (1997, p. 2). The act of granting acknowledgement 
adds another step to the process as it includes admitting one’s complicity in 
the harmful act and committing oneself to positive change (Govier, 2003, pp. 
71, 81). 
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In cases of past wrongs, there is much to be acknowledged. That those 
wronged are human beings with human dignity and moral worth. That 
these things did happen and were wrong. That the people in question 
deserved better. That their feelings of hurt, anger, or resentment are 
natural and legitimate. That those who harmed them or who have 
been complicit in these harms should feel guilt and shame about such 
things. Significantly, such acknowledgement carries with it an implied 
commitment that these and similar wrongs should not be perpetrated 
again (ibid., p. 79).
Hayner contends that officially acknowledging and recording the truth at a 
commission can support healing (1994, p. 607). Although multiple conceptions 
of the truth may exist, she argues in a later work that truth commissions can 
successfully debunk lies and foster the acceptance of a ‘generally accurate’ 
narrative informed by fundamental facts of the conflict (2011, p. 189). 
The notion of apology merges those of acknowledgement and truth with 
forgiveness. Apologising includes personally acknowledging the transgression 
and one’s responsibility for it, expressing genuine sorrow and regret, seeking 
forgiveness and agreeing to abide by social norms (Tavuchis, 1991, pp. 8, 
121). The ‘painful re-membering’, as Tavuchis describes it, sees the perpetrator 
become aware of his or her own membership in the moral community (ibid., p. 
8). The act of apologising, whether between individuals, groups, or individuals 
and groups, culminates in granting forgiveness. Tavuchis contends that in this 
context forgiveness symbolises reconciliation between the perpetrator and 
victim and facilitates the return to normal social relations (ibid., p. 121).
Justice
There is general consensus in the literature that some form of justice is 
necessary following mass human rights abuses or violations. The type necessary 
and its compatibility with reconciliation is less clear, however. This lack of 
clarity stems primarily from differing understandings of both concepts and 
the perceived roles of justice and reconciliation procedures in post-conflict 
contexts. Daly and Sarkin suggest that retributive justice, democracy and 
reconciliation ought to be perceived as mutually reinforcing values (2007, 
pp. 15, 30). Other authors understand justice as a process that may result in 
reconciliation. Biggar argues that retributive justice will result in reconciliation 
between the victim and wrongdoer if the process eradicates advantages acquired 
by those who committed crimes and expresses the community’s condemnation 
of the wrongdoing. Biggar’s conception of justice also includes repentance, 
reparations and reassuring the victim (2001, pp. 13, 18). Villa-Vicencio 
concedes that criminal trials are often necessary following mass conflict, but 
argues that they are insufficient to prevent future human rights abuses or 
violations in politically driven conflicts (2000a, p. 70). 
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Restorative justice is commonly posited in opposition to retributive justice 
as it includes what could be considered elements of reconciliation processes 
such as dialogue and relationship rebuilding. Villa-Vicencio and Llewellyn both 
assert that restorative justice can be a comprehensive and viable alternative to 
retributive justice following conflict (Villa-Vicencio, 2000a, p. 69; Llewellyn, 
2006, p. 91). Kiss’s conception of restorative justice merges elements of 
reconciliation and retributive justice. She emphasises the opportunities 
facilitated by restorative justice for victims to tell their stories, hold perpetrators 
accountable and receive compensation for emotional and material losses 
(2000, p. 83). Graybill and Lanegran offer a slightly different configuration of 
restorative justice when they argue that it favours reconciliation between former 
enemies over punishment (2004, p. 2). This prioritisation can be identified 
in its emphasis on restoring relationships between victims and perpetrators 
and between communities affected by the conflict (Llewellyn, 2006, p. 91). 
Villa-Vicencio argues that the opportunity to rebuild relationships fostered by 
restorative justice processes will prevent human rights abuses recurring (2000a, 
p. 70). As truth commissions have pursued this form of justice, it raises the 
question: do material redress and relationship rebuilding reflect a sufficient 
form of justice for survivors? 
Survivors of violence often ache for retribution against identifiable 
perpetrators, and for public acknowledgement of what happened. 
Some want financial redress; psychological or spiritual healing seems 
crucial to others. Some survivors, and their fellow citizens, place higher 
priorities on moving ahead with life, building or rebuilding trust 
across previously divided groups, and establishing or strengthening 
democratic institutions. Many believe that the entire society needs to 
stand behind efforts to punish the wrongdoers, and to deter any such 
conduct in the future. People understandably may have great trouble 
sorting out priorities among these possibilities (Minow, 1998, p. 4).
Compensation and reparations may support victims’ abilities to move 
forward following restorative or retributive trials. Providing material support, 
returning stolen property, or enabling access to medical and educational services 
may help to restore the status quo that was transformed during the conflict 
(Crocker, 2003, p. 51). Nesiah contends that reparations have an emotional 
element as they symbolise a public declaration of the perpetrator’s guilt. 
Moreover, reparations look to both the past and future as they acknowledge 
harm and increase opportunities for the future (2005, p. 276). Both Crocker 
and Galtung posit reparations as a way of ‘righting’ past wrongs (Crocker, 
2003, p. 51; Galtung, 2001, p. 6). Galtung warns however that reparations 
are only appropriate following harm that can be reversed or ‘undone’ by 
restoring the material circumstances of the past (2001, p. 6). He contends 
that offering financial or material restitution would insult survivors of mass 
violence or deep trauma (ibid.). The TRC did not heed the potential insult 
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inherent in reparations as the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee 
sought to facilitate national reconciliation by compensating apartheid victims. 
Wilson states that Reparations and Rehabilitation was the weakest of the TRC’s 
three committees as its lack of funds left it able to do little more than make 
recommendations about compensation to the President’s Fund (2001, p. 22). 
Forgiveness
The relationship between reparations and forgiveness is unclear in the literature. 
Although Bar-Tal and Bennink state that accepting compensation may indicate 
a survivor’s readiness to forgive, the connection between compensation and 
forgiveness is not a common theme in the field of study (2004, p. 30). In 
fact, there is little agreement about the relationship between the forgiveness 
and reconciliation processes more generally. Literature about forgiveness can be 
roughly divided into two groups. The first considers it to be critically important 
following collective violence. The second understands its benefits but deems it 
to be either unattainable or unnecessary for reconciliation promotion. Hannah 
Arendt wrote in The Human Condition,
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we 
have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one 
single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the 
victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer’s apprentice 
who lacks the magic formula to break the spell (1958, p. 237).
Arendt captured the perceived power of forgiveness to release perpetrators 
from the cycle of guilt and free victims from the grip of suffering. Its value 
in this context is immense as it may undo the wrongs of the past. Abu-
Nimer stipulates that elements of forgiveness, although vital to the process of 
rebuilding the relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim, need not 
result in forgetting the violence of the past. Instead, remembering victimhood 
experiences and sharing history will help to address the conflict and promote 
equality between both parties (2001, pp. 245–6).
Arendt posits forgiveness as the opposite of vengeance (1958, p. 240). This 
forgiveness/vengeance dichotomy reflects what Minow describes as an ‘implicit 
pair of goals’ following collective violence (1998, p. 10). Minow warns that 
vengeful responses ought to be constrained and recast as retributive justice used 
to administer punishment proportional to the crime committed (ibid., p. 12). 
Like Minow, Arendt depicts vengeance as an automatic and natural reaction 
to violence, arguing that the freeing quality of forgiveness is born out of its 
unpredictability. The highly personal and unexpected act of forgiveness relies 
on the harmed individual’s willingness to change his or her mind and start 
again (1958, pp. 240−1). 
The particular form of reconciliation pursued after mass violence affects how 
relevant forgiveness is in the post-conflict context. Political reconciliation, for 
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instance, forgoes forgiveness yet demands more than whatever can be achieved 
by state diplomacy alone (Villa-Vicencio, 2005, p. 60). Villa-Vicencio’s 
approach to political reconciliation advocates creating a process that prioritises 
justice and facilitates discussion between former enemies (ibid.). Morever, 
reconciliation conceived as the rebuilding of trust may not require forgiveness. 
Worthington Jr. concedes that although forgiveness may smooth the path to 
reconciliation, it is not necessary to rebuild relationships damaged by conflict 
(2006, p. 221). Forgiveness is not fundamental to Dwyer’s understanding 
of reconciliation as constructing coherent and mutually tolerated conflict 
narratives. She advocates for a realist understanding of reconciliation that is 
not dependent upon forgiveness (2003, p. 108).
Images and models of reconciliation
Forgiveness may be located at the ‘thick’ end of David A. Crocker’s spectrum 
of ‘thin to thick’ reconciliation conceptions after violent conflict. He places 
non-violent coexistence at the ‘thinnest’ end (2000, p. 107). The ‘middle’ of 
the spectrum adds discussion and requires former enemies to participate in 
public policy decisions as well as compromise on areas of mutual concern. He 
compares the ‘thickest’ end, which includes forgiveness, healing and creating 
a shared future, with the stated mandates of truth commissions in Chile and 
South Africa. Crocker rejects the ‘thickest’ conception in favour of political 
reconciliation, a multidimensional concept, which more closely resembles the 
‘middle’- range description (ibid., pp. 60, 107). 
Adelman also uses the notion of the ‘thick’ end to describe and advocate 
for his ‘modern-liberal’ reconciliation model, applicable to the resolution 
of intrastate conflicts (2005, p. 288).4 Wilson applies the range of ‘thin to 
thick’ conceptions to describe the transformation of the South African TRC’s 
stated mandate over time. This progression was shaped by a shift away from a 
predominantly religious or ‘thick’ understanding of reconciliation, advocated 
by Archbishop Tutu, towards a ‘thinner’ conception that sought to promote 
nation-building and national identity. Wilson, like Crocker, includes forgiveness 
in the ‘thickest’ vision but adds confession, sacrifice and redemption to what 
he calls a ‘religious-redemptive approach’ to reconciliation (2001, pp. 121–2). 
Govier and Verwoerd reject using a spectrum to analyse relationships in 
the post-apartheid context. They argue that a spectrum’s linear arrangement 
4 Adelman argues that this ‘thick’ form relates to the ‘polis’ in which the conflicting 
parties are included after war (2005, p. 304). Modern-liberal reconciliation includes 
systematic recognition of conflict events through testimony, restorative justice, 
redress for victims and reconstruction or healing. Adelman argues that this model 
is not appropriate following genocide, an issue that will be discussed later in this 
review.
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is too simple to grapple with the nuanced intersections between interpersonal 
reconciliation (among individuals) and national reconciliation (between large 
groups). Instead, they suggest a web of connections to accommodate the 
complex network of relations between individuals, groups and communities 
in post-apartheid South Africa (2002, pp. 178, 187). Contrary to Govier and 
Verwoerd’s conclusion, a spectrum is still a valuable evaluative framework 
for analysing reconciliation programmes after collective violence. Crocker’s 
spectrum, in particular, facilitates the analysis of a wide array of conceptions, 
stated commitments and changing priorities over time. As in the case of 
Rwanda, these commitments reflect both ‘thinner’ and ‘thicker’ understandings 
of reconciliation after genocide. 
Like Govier and Verwoerd, Lederach emphasises the role of relationship 
rebuilding between former opponents after conflict. His book, The Moral 
Imagination: the Art and Soul of Building Peace, published in 2005, builds 
on his influential work, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (1997), to focus on human beings’ capability to transcend violence 
in the peacebuilding context. Lederach describes this capacity as the ‘moral 
imagination’ through which we envision ourselves in a web of relationships 
with our former enemies (2005, p. 34). He contends that the web concept 
is vital to the moral imagination because it involves everyone taking personal 
responsibility for their own role in the violence and acknowledging the 
connection between conflicting groups and individuals (ibid., p. 35). 
Methodological assumptions
Much of the multidisciplinary literature concerning reconciliation after mass 
conflict is shaped by similar methodological assumptions. These are broad in 
nature and affect the literature in a variety of ways. Most prominent is, first, 
that reconciliation is achievable following violent conflict and, second, that it 
is desirable in this context. A smaller proportion of literature is informed by a 
third assumption that reconciliation can be prescribed to a nation or nations 
that have experienced mass violence. 
The sense of urgency in the quotation, ‘Reconciliation is not a luxury or 
an add-on to democracy. Reconciliation is an absolute necessity’ (Bloomfield 
et al., 2003, p. 12), is predicated on the notion that reconciliation procedures 
are vitally important after conflict. This assertion is reflected in the authors’ 
assurance that ‘effective reconciliation is the best guarantee that the violence of 
the past will not return’ (ibid.). Underlying this assertion is the supposition that 
this process is achievable after conflict. Bloomfield et al. (2003) are not alone 
in this expectation; see Villa-Vicencio (2000a; 2000b), Govier and Verwoerd 
(2002), Lederach (1997) and Nesiah (2005). This assumption raises questions 
about what is to be achieved when we discuss reconciliation. Is it the end goal 
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of a process? Alternatively, is reconciliation a process that will result in benefits 
for society after it has been completed successfully?5 
There is no consensus in the literature more generally, about whether 
reconciliation ought to be viewed as a process or end goal. For instance, Rigby 
describes it as a process that includes what he deems to be conflicting values 
including truth, justice, mercy and forgiveness (2001, p. 184). Clark takes a 
different approach, seeing reconciliation as both a process and an end goal. 
He argues that both these configurations seek to address the causes of past 
violence and the emotions surrounding it as well as to create a positive future 
for all (2010a, pp. 44–5). Villa-Vicencio contends that reconciliation ought to 
be understood as a political goal (2000b, p. 199). He stipulates that although 
the prerequisites for reconciliation often change, the paradigm still includes 
building or rebuilding trust, respect for human rights, and democracy (ibid., 
p. 208). 
The assumption that reconciliation as a process, end goal, or both, is 
achievable is bolstered by a lack of retrospective analyses about how particular 
reconciliation programmes functioned or continue to function in social and 
political practice. Achievability, in this sense, refers to the particular reconciliation 
concept on which the programme is centred. For instance, the TRC initially 
employed a religious-redemptive approach to reconciliation that emphasised 
truth and forgiveness between individuals; see Wilson (2001). Wilson’s work 
and that carried out by Hayner (1994; 2011) are rare exceptions to the general 
dearth of analyses about how specific programmes have functioned. Hayner 
directly questions the possibility of achieving reconciliation in the context of the 
TRC. She contends that although forgiveness and reconciliation were achieved 
between some individuals, the TRC did not meet public expectations in this 
regard (2011, p. 185). This belief had allegedly been fostered by the TRC’s 
stated commitment to achieve ‘full’ reconciliation, at both the interpersonal 
and national levels, in two-and-a-half years (ibid., pp. 183, 185).6 
The notion that reconciliation either nationally or between individuals 
is achievable is also supported by the absence of systematic criteria against 
which to judge whether it has in fact been achieved. The comparative nature 
of Hayner’s analysis of 15 truth commissions is helpful here as she suggests 
three criteria against which a truth commission’s success can be measured. 
These conditions include the process, product and eventual impact of the truth 
commission (Hayner, 1994, as cited by Graybill and Lanegran, 2004, p. 4). 
5 Chapter 4 analyses the implications of this form of conceptual ambiguity in the 
context of ‘national reconciliation’ in Rwanda. 
6 Hayner contends that the TRC’s failure to achieve this stated goal led to Archbishop 
Tutu’s suggestion that the commission’s objective be changed to the promotion of 
reconciliation rather than the achievement of it (2011, p. 184). 
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The degree to which the commission’s work contributes to long-term 
reconciliation, healing, and reform will be determined in large part by 
whether perpetrators or state officials acknowledge and apologize for 
wrongs, whether and how the commission’s report is distributed and 
put to use, and whether its core recommendations are implemented 
(ibid.). 
Although Hayner’s comparative evaluation provides insight into what she 
deems important for the success of long-term reconciliation, its scope is limited 
to truth commissions (1994). Further retrospective studies, comparative or 
individual in nature, that clearly define ‘successful reconciliation’, explicitly 
state the criteria against which they measure this success. They also expect the 
asssumptions shaping these criteria to shed light on reconciliation’s achievability 
in contexts other than those related to truth commissions. 
The supposition that reconciliation is achievable is also supported by 
the lack of differentiation between post-conflict contexts. Although some 
authors analyse the meaning of reconciliation after specific events such as 
apartheid, see Villa-Vicencio (2000a; 2000b), Govier and Verwoerd (2002), 
Van der Merwe (2001) and Daye (2004), many others suggest more general 
conceptions without reference to specific circumstances, see Lederach (1997) 
and Gloppen (2005). Neither group considers the multitude of post-conflict 
contexts nor the potential implications of differing forms of mass violence on 
the achievability of reconciliation as an end goal of a process. For instance, 
failing to differentiate between distinct forms of violent conflict implies that 
societies recovering from interstate wars face the same pressures, constraints 
and needs as those attempting to rebuild after genocide. 
Adelman is the only author in this review to state explicitly that his 
understanding of reconciliation is inappropriate following some types of 
mass violence. He distinguishes between three forms of conflict that may 
lead to social divisions: interstate wars, intrastate or civil wars, and wars, such 
as genocides, sponsored by governments against their own people (2005, p. 
287). Adelman argues in favour of a form of modern-liberal reconciliation 
that seeks to replace violence with peaceful coexistence (ibid., p. 288). This 
vision includes officially recognising wrongdoers as civil society members 
after interstate or intrastate war. Adelman stipulates that recognising genocide 
perpetrators as equal members of society legitimises their crimes. Moreover, 
including genocide perpetrators in the process of modern-liberal reconciliation 
would render it unsuccessful as perpetrators and survivors could not peacefully 
coexist with ‘proper respect for each other’ (ibid., p. 301). 
This inability to coexist peacefully raises the question: is reconciliation 
appropriate or desirable in all post-conflict contexts? Works such as those by 
Bloomfield et al. (2003), Villa-Vicencio (2000b), Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), 
and Long and Brecke (2003) envision the positive outcomes of reconciliation 
as a process or end goal after conflict. These descriptions sound appealing 
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in theory, but little consideration is given to their desirability in practice. 
Minow touches upon this issue in the long quotation earlier in this review 
in which she outlines survivors’ various interests including financial redress, 
acknowledgement of the truth and rebuilding trust (1998, p. 4). 
Authors ought to consider more seriously whether governments and/
or civilians perceive reconciliation to be a worthwhile pursuit. For instance, 
as Reyntjens and Vandeginste argue, political leaders’ and survivor groups’ 
aversion to the notion of national reconciliation following the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda resulted in the concept being considered taboo until the end of 1998. 
They contend that constructing a formal national reconciliation programme 
was undesirable in the years immediately after the 1994 genocide because 
the transitional government viewed it as promoting power-sharing with the 
Hutu majority (2005, p. 102). The authors argue that the government did not 
deem reconciliation to be advantageous until the perceived threat of internal 
opposition and military action by former members of the national army and 
genocide militias based in DRC was eradicated (ibid., p. 103).7 
Multiple works portray reconciliation as being both achievable and 
desirable after conflict. Several of these contributions suggest frameworks 
or steps through which ‘successful reconciliation’ may be achieved. They are 
informed by the methodological assumption that reconciliation processes can 
be prescribed. Prescription, in this context, refers to a range of recommendations 
varying from specific solutions in response to perceived deficits in existing 
strategies to proposed models seeking to achieve the end goal of ‘successful 
reconciliation’. Although many authors such as Bar-Tal and Bennink include 
the caveat that reconciliation is never assured, they press on with suggested 
approaches to achieving it after mass violence (2004). Several commentators, 
including Gloppen (2005), Bloomfield et al. (2003) and Van der Merwe 
(2001), argue that no single strategy will bring about reconciliation following 
mass human rights violations. Instead, each writer suggests a different set of key 
elements that must be present if reconciliation is to be achieved. For instance, 
Gloppen contends that although every post-conflict context is different, 
several minimum requirements must be met for a programme to achieve its 
goals. They include addressing the conflict’s context, introducing institutional 
support at the appropriate time, encouraging local ownership and legitimacy of 
the project, and applying multiple strategies such as justice, truth, restitution 
and reform (2005, pp. 18, 45).  
Van der Merwe suggests a different set of key elements in his analysis of 
the legislation and strategies that sought to promote national reconciliation 
at the TRC. He argues that a single national programme is insufficient 
7 Literature analysing reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm in post-conflict 
Rwanda has not been included in this review as it will be discussed in detail in later 
chapters. 
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following mass human rights violations (2001, p. 102). Instead, he frames 
his recommendations around the inclusion of communities in designing and 
leading multiple projects that are informed by needs at the local level. Van 
der Merwe also outlines several key features that ought to be implemented 
at the national level in order to facilitate community projects focused on 
reconciliation. They include stated commitments to political transparency, 
support for survivors and criminal prosecution of those accused of 
having committed human rights violations (ibid., p. 104). Both Gloppen 
(2005) and Van der Merwe (2001) make practical recommendations for 
constructing reconciliation processes in separate contexts. These suggestions 
are informed by different objectives and reconciliation concepts. Although 
these contributions differ in many ways, both raise questions about the 
relationship between theoretical interpretations of the concept and the 
practical implementation of reconciliation programmes. For instance, how 
generalisable are the suggested approaches? Do analyses of specific strategies 
have any practical implications for other nations seeking reconciliation 
following mass violence?
Bloomfield et al. outline practical suggestions for policymakers seeking to 
design and implement reconciliation programmes in post-conflict contexts. 
Bloomfield et al. reject a universal model as they argue that processes must 
always be specific to the context in which they are invoked. Instead, they 
suggest basic requirements that will support policymakers in developing a 
programme that is appropriate for a specific post-conflict context. 
Basic principles which should underpin the design of every 
reconciliation process, and which may assist readers as they work 
through the handbook:
– Begin early, when attitudes are most receptive to change and 
challenge.
– Stick to the commitment and deal with the hard issues; they will only 
get harder with time.
– Give it sufficient time: it cannot be rushed.
– Be transparent about the goals, the difficulties, the time span and the 
resources (2003, p. 17).
The practical nature of Bloomfield et al.’s Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: 
a Handbook is evident in the suggested three-stage process outlining the 
‘essential ingredients for lasting reconciliation’ (2003, p. 19). These stages 
include replacing fear with peaceful coexistence, building confidence and trust 
between survivors and perpetrators, and fostering empathy between victims 
and offenders (ibid., pp. 20–2). The authors maintain that every post-conflict 
context requires a new reconciliation process to be designed that includes more 
than one mechanism such as healing, justice or truth-telling. Moreover, they 
argue that national reconciliation projects should be understood as part of 
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larger peacebuilding and democratisation procedures and must be implemented 
alongside constitutional reforms (ibid., p. 167). 
Bloomfield et al.’s recommendations can be located in the suggested 
approaches to reconciliation that emerge in the literature ranging from basic 
requirements to explicitly recommending specific models. Bloomfield et al.’s 
suggestions include both minimum requirements and a full process. Authors, 
among them Daye (2004), Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) and Adelman (2005), 
propose specific models or list recommendations that they argue will promote 
particular reconciliation concepts. These are in conflict with Gloppen (2005) 
and Bloomfield et al.’s (2003) assertions that no single model is sufficient to 
bring about reconciliation. For instance, Daye proposes a working model of 
political forgiveness or ‘deep reconciliation’ at the socio-political level (2004, 
p. xiii). This is partly shaped by research conducted in South Africa, but is 
designed to be applicable in other contexts including societies implementing 
truth commissions and nations recovering from civil war or mass violence (ibid., 
p. 172). Daye’s suggested model includes five acts: truth-telling; apologising 
and claiming responsibility; building a transitional justice framework; finding 
ways to heal; and embracing forgiveness (ibid., p. 9). Although the sequence of 
several acts is flexible, Daye contends that the process must begin with truth-
telling and end with embracing forgiveness (ibid.). 
The entire range of prescriptive works begs questions related to 
generalisability and how appropriate suggested approaches to reconciliation 
are as a process or end goal. For instance, how do key elements or suggested 
models account for the varying constraints, pressures and needs of different 
post-conflict societies? The generalisability issue is diminished somewhat 
by the flexibility of certain suggested approaches. For instance, the basic 
recommendations put forward by Van der Merwe and Gloppen do not 
prescribe how minimum requirements, such as encouraging local ownership 
and supporting survivors, should be accomplished. The relatively open-ended 
nature of these suggestions creates the leeway necessary for the approaches 
to be adopted in societies facing different constraints after mass violence. In 
contrast, the relatively inflexible methods described by Daye and Adelman 
present problems with regard to their applicability in different post-conflict 
situations. As discussed above, Adelman states that his model of modern-
liberal reconciliation is not appropriate following genocide. Daye suggests the 
application of his own model of political forgiveness to any and all societies 
in transition following mass conflict. The absence of contextual specificity in 
the work of both authors is worrying. This concern stems from the notion 
that the nature of violence and the social, economic and political landscape it 
creates will most certainly affect the ways in which reconciliation processes are 
constructed and pursued. 
Prescriptive notions of reconciliation are also at risk of appearing implausible 
when applied in differing post-conflict societies. The recommendations 
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put forward by Van der Merwe largely escape this concern due to the case-
specific nature of the analysis (2001). For instance, his suggested inclusion 
of community-level projects relates directly to perceived deficits in the TRC’s 
promotion of reconciliation outlined in his analysis. Van der Merwe’s evaluation 
of the TRC and community reconciliation processes in South Africa support 
these suggestions. Conversely, the models proposed by Daye and Adelman are 
not related to perceived deficits in specific programmes. Daye discusses the 
influence of field research conducted in South Africa on his proposed model 
of political forgiveness, but presents no empirical evidence to support it. 
Adelman does not state the empirical foundations of his proposed model of 
modern-liberal reconciliation or provide evidence of its potential effectiveness, 
thus limiting its plausibility. The lack of empirical evidence and sufficient 
plausibility limits Daye and Adelman’s highly prescriptive models to purely 
theoretical interpretations of reconciliation.
Weaknesses, gaps and alternative solutions
The breadth of interest in reconciliation as a response to mass violence has 
yielded many understandings of the concept. As we have seen, numerous 
disciplines, theoretical frameworks and methodological assumptions have 
shaped these interpretations, creating the problem that ‘seldom is anyone 
talking about the same thing when using the term’ (Borer, 2006, p. 31). 
Many authors including Borer (2006), Hermann (2004) and Nesiah (2005) 
raise the issue that consensus has yet to be reached regarding the meaning of 
reconciliation in the post-conflict context. Although its ‘theoretical fluidity’ 
has facilitated interesting debates, it has the potential to negatively affect 
the implementation of reconciliation programmes in post-conflict contexts 
(Hermann, 2004, p. 41). 
A great deal of the difficulty of putting the theory into practice stems from 
disagreement and conceptual confusion in the literature. Some elements have 
been touched on earlier in this review including disagreement about whether 
reconciliation ought to be conceived of as a process or an end goal. This issue 
raises significant questions with regard to construction and implementation. 
For instance, how can reconciliation be brought about if there is no consensus 
about what form it should take? Should it be supported as a long-term process 
as suggested by Bloomfield et al. (2003)? Or can we expect it to be promoted 
from the work of mechanisms such as ad hoc criminal tribunals or truth 
commissions, as Archbishop Tutu suggested with regard to the TRC? Although 
some authors argue that reconciliation ought to be conceived of as both a 
process and an end goal, see Clark (2010a) and Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), 
the fact that there is no general agreement about what the term means could 
make the pursuit of reconciliation more difficult.  
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The notion that reconciliation can be understood as either a process, end 
goal, or both, implies that it requires some form of intervention to take place 
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 5). Although several writers, including Van der 
Merwe (2001), Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) and Bloomfield et al. (2003), 
agree that procedures ought to include participation from the bottom-up 
and top-down simultaneously, each author outlines how this is achieved 
differently. For instance, Van der Merwe describes the bottom-up approach to 
reconciliation as one led from the community-level that prioritises individuals’ 
health and wellbeing and their relationships with each other (2001, p. 90). The 
top-down vision, he argues, seeks to foster conditions of reconciliation that 
will filter down through all levels of society (ibid., p. 91). Bar-Tal and Bennink 
argue that top-down and bottom-up approaches ought to spread the notion 
of reconciliation at the community level. They contend that disseminating the 
reconciliation message among the grassroots will support positive changes in 
individuals’ beliefs, motivations, goals and emotions following mass violence 
(2003, p. 27). 
The notion of processes operating in opposite directions fails to answer 
some important questions related to desirability and achievability. If the 
reconciliation paradigm is perceived to be inappropriate or undesirable at 
either the community or the governmental level, is the process doomed to 
fail? Moreover, can reconciliation be forced in either direction in the hope 
that it will become more attractive to its opponents over time? Bloomfield et 
al. argue that reconciliation cannot be imposed from the top-down alone and 
that authorities can never force individuals to trust, feel empathy, or forgive 
those who have harmed them (2003, p. 26). This assertion is confounded by 
the distinctions made in the literature between the interpersonal and national 
forms of reconciliation. 
Borer sees interpersonal reconciliation as taking place at the individual 
level either with oneself or between two persons such as a survivor and a 
perpetrator (2006). She contends that such procedures are commonly guided 
by either a religious narrative emphasising forgiveness or a therapeutic narrative 
prioritising healing and the restoration of relationships (ibid., p. 32). Borer 
goes on to describe national unity and reconciliation as taking place at the 
political level between socio-political institutions and processes; the end goal of 
which amounts to little more than peaceful coexistence (ibid., p. 33). 
Donna Pankhurst depicts this distinction differently. She outlines five 
different meanings most commonly associated with the verb ‘to reconcile’ 
including: establishing or reestablishing friendly relations between two or more 
people; settling a quarrel; making oneself or another no longer opposed to 
something; acquiescing to something unpleasant; and making two conflicting 
things compatible with each other (1999, p. 240). Pankhurst argues that 
these definitions are most commonly associated with reconciliation between 
individuals (interpersonal reconciliation). They are, however, increasingly 
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being transposed to political contexts following mass conflict. At the political 
or national level, these definitions take on different meanings including 
peaceful coexistence (making two things compatible with each other) and 
political compromise (making oneself no longer opposed to something) 
(ibid.). Pankhurst contends that applying these conceptions of reconciliation 
to political contexts transforms what was once an effort between individuals 
into a collective process (ibid., p. 241).
The distinction between interpersonal and national reconciliation raises 
questions about individual agency in pursuing the latter. For instance, must all 
individuals participate in the ‘collective process’ of national reconciliation? This 
question is particularly pertinent with regard to national programmes imposed 
from the top-down. It also raises questions about interpersonal reconciliation. 
Should this be led by the individuals directly affected by the damaged 
relationship as Bloomfield et al. (2003) suggest, or can it be encouraged by 
a religious-redemptive narrative disseminated by religious or political leaders? 
Also can a single process promote both understandings of reconciliation, 
interpersonal and national? If we are to assume that the former ought to be 
pursued by individuals, who should be expected to lead it? Should perpetrators 
initiate the process and apologise or should those affected negatively by the 
violence be the first to act?8 
These unanswered questions complicate implementation of the programmes 
in a number of ways. Firstly, they contribute to confusion about the type of 
reconciliation that ought to be pursued, be it interpersonal, national, or both. 
Secondly, these questions neglect issues related to agency and the roles of 
individuals and groups in pursuing reconciliation as a process or end goal. 
Thirdly, they fail to get to grips with the potential obstacles posed by issues 
related to desirability and achievability of these procedures. Part of this problem 
may relate to what Wilson identifies as an overemphasis of philosophical 
discussions about elements of the reconciliation process. 
The study of transitional truth and justice has been too dominated by 
philosophical discussions abstracted from specific texts, and we should 
instead examine how the politics of punishment and the writing of 
a new official memory are central to state strategies to create a new 
hegemony in the area of justice and construct the present moment as 
post-authoritarian when it includes many elements of the past (2001, 
p. xvi).
Wilson’s interest in how the creation of a new official memory and act of 
punishment relate to state strategies refers to the function of truth and justice 
in the socio-political context of post-authoritarian rule in South Africa. The 
themes of power and political dominance detectable in this quotation point 
8 See Tavuchis (1991) for a sociological investigation of the meaning and function of 
apology at the individual and community levels.
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to understanding reconciliation as a strategy that ought to be examined 
with reference to the regime seeking to pursue it. Short also analyses the 
political function of reconciliation processes in his work about the Australian 
programme under the Howard and Keating governments. Short argues that 
during Keating’s leadership, the official reconciliation programme functioned 
to construct a new ‘ethical’ image of the non-indigenous population’s promise 
of future social justice for aboriginal communities (2008, p. 317). He states 
that during Howard’s time as prime minister, the programme functioned to 
encourage cultural assimilation and the ‘sanitisation’ of the country’s colonial 
past (ibid., p. 319).
Some authors including Van der Merwe (2001), Hayner (1994; 2011) 
and Villa-Vicencio (2000a; 2000b) locate their analyses in the context of the 
TRC or truth commissions more generally; further context-specific analyses are 
necessary to understand reconciliation programmes’ theory and practice within 
the socio-political realms in which they are pursued. Analyses of this type may 
potentially uncover how social, economic and political contexts inform how 
these programmes function. 
The fluid nature of theoretical understandings of reconciliation, as discussed 
by Hermann (2004), makes analysing how it is conceived by those invoking 
it all the more pertinent. Similarly, Nesiah argues that its meaning ought to 
be uncovered by ‘concrete political tasks’ rather than ‘tautological’ exposition 
(2005, p. 271). 
Reconciliation is a difficult and ambiguous concept – often stripped of 
any meaning by the fact that it is invoked by so many people, to justify 
so many different goals. In giving value and dimension to the notion 
of reconciliation we need to have a more historically grounded sense 
of the tasks that specific truth commissions typically address (ibid.,  
p. 280).
Although Nesiah specifically refers to truth commissions, the impetus to 
understand the ways in which reconciliation programmes are pursued in 
relation to different political goals is similarly relevant in other post-conflict 
contexts. Vital to this investigation is the analysis of reconciliation as a process 
or end goal informed by the interests, relationships and power dynamics of 
those involved in it. As such, the case-specific study of reconciliation as a 
socially constructed phenomenon may be a particularly helpful alternative to 
purely philosophical discussions of the subject.
Social constructionism is appropriate in this context as it makes it easier 
to investigate the historical and cultural specificity of concepts we use (Burr, 
2003, p. 4). Moreover, it facilitates a critical understanding of our knowledge 
of the social world, a perspective that assists the investigation of the actions, 
interactions and power relations informing how we understand the world 
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in our everyday lives (ibid., pp. 5–6).9 It also allows us to be critical of the 
interests, objectives and power dynamics that inform particular phenomena, 
including reconciliation. Hacking presents six grades of social constructionism 
that facilitate the investigation of the meaning of different phenomena. They 
range from relatively uncritical historical analyses to those that actively seek to 
change phenomena identified as being unnecessary or detrimental to society 
(1999, pp. 19–21).10 Hacking employs Karl Mannheim’s (1952) conception 
of the ‘unmasking of the mind’ to demonstrate how the social constructionist 
perspective can expose the function of particular phenomena.
Social constructionist analyses of the ways in which particular phenomena 
function have the potential to find solutions to many questions left unanswered 
by the literature discussed in this review. For instance, social constructionism’s 
critical perspective of the status quo facilitates in-depth analyses of the political 
interests and dynamics that inform reconciliation programmes in different 
post-conflict contexts. These interests and dynamics relate directly to the 
desirability of formal reconciliation procedures following mass violence. 
Social constructionism also facilitates the analysis of the objectives, 
interests and relationships that shape the construction and implementation of 
reconciliation projects in specific post-conflict contexts. This form of analysis 
not only investigates whether reconciliation is conceived as a process, end 
goal, or both, but also why it is understood this way. Social constructionism’s 
emphasis on historical and cultural specificity makes it easier to investigate how 
the social, economic, political and cultural context informs the construction 
of particular phenomena. This form of contextual specificity is particularly 
important with regard to the differing pressures, constraints and needs of 
individuals and groups following mass violence. It also facilitates the analysis 
of why particular individuals and groups participate in the process or seek to 
support the end goal of reconciliation. 
More generally, these analyses seek to uncover the discourses, narratives and 
official definitions that shape how reconciliation programmes are constructed 
and put into practice. As outlined in the introduction, Wilson uses a social 
constructionist framework to explore how and why South Africa’s post-
apartheid government applied human rights to promoting reconciliation at 
the TRC (2001, p. 230). Wilson argues that the manipulation of human rights 
language to promote moral-theological reconciliation discourse limits rights’ 
ability to support the creation of lasting democracy and a non-prejudicial 
justice system (ibid.). Moreover, he argues that government interests in 
9 See Berger and Luckmann (1966) for an in-depth analysis of knowledge as socially 
constructed in everyday life.
10 Hacking’s grades of constructionism include: historical; ironic; reformist; unmasking; 
rebellious; and revolutionary (Hacking, 1999). Revolutionary constructionists refer 
to activists who attempt to radically change or eradicate the phenomena they deem 
to be harmful to society (Marshall and Scott, 2005).
RECONCILING RWANDA42
fostering state-legitimacy and nation-building after conflict are pursued at the 
expense of accountability, justice and procedural fairness (ibid., p. 224). 
Social constructionist analyses of reconciliation’s meaning and function in 
different post-conflict contexts uncover details that may be useful in evaluating 
individual programmes. Although there is no consensus in the literature about 
how to evaluate the success of a reconciliation process, the inclusion of data 
about interests, objectives and power dynamics may reveal who does and does 
not benefit from it. Bloomfield et al. argue that it is inappropriate to judge the 
success or failure of entire programmes. Instead, they suggest the evaluation 
of the progress of individual processes and initiatives that operate as part of 
the overall reconciliation project (2003, p. 167). This investigation may also 
facilitate the analysis of why a programme promotes the interests and rights of 
some individuals and groups more than others. 
In the chapters to come, a social constructionist framework is used 
to analyse how Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
functions in social and political practice. This investigation includes analyses 
of the social, political and historical contexts in which the programme was 
constructed and implemented. It also includes analysis of the political interests, 
actions and power dynamics that shape the government’s vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ as well as discussions about who does and does not benefit from 
the programme. As such, the book seeks to provide a detailed interpretation of 
how ‘national reconciliation’ is envisioned, constructed and put into practice 
in post-conflict Rwanda. 
Conclusion 
The multidisciplinary nature of the literature reveals myriad understandings of 
reconciliation after violent conflict which are expressed using different images 
including relationship spectrums and webs. Although there is no consensus as 
to the definition of reconciliation, there is general agreement that justice and 
truth are important following mass violence. The connections between justice, 
truth and reconciliation is complicated however, by different understandings 
of justice − retributive and restorative − as well as different processes of 
telling, hearing and manipulating the truth. Methodological assumptions that 
reconciliation is achievable and desirable also inform the literature. The lack of 
context-specific analyses of existing programmes supports these suppositions. 
Other analyses in this review are shaped by the methodological assumption that 
specific reconciliation models can be prescribed and it is one that appears in the 
recommendations related to the perceived deficits in specific programmes and 
to models of how the procedures ought to be pursued. The latter prescriptions 
do not provide the flexibility or contextual specificity necessary for their 
application in varying post-conflict contexts. 
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Overall, the most significant gaps in knowledge relate to nuanced 
understandings of how specific reconciliation programmes are constructed and 
implemented and how they function in different post-conflict contexts. This 
book provides a comprehensive theoretical and empirical study of the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme in Rwanda that will help to fill this gap. 
Informed by a social constructionist perspective of reconciliation, it examines 
the context, political interests and power dynamics that shape the RPF’s official 
programme and how it functions in social and political practice. 

Chapter 2
Conflict in context
On the morning of 7 April 1994, members of the national army, the Forces 
Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and the pro-government Interahamwe militia began 
firing at the homes of Tutsi living in the Kigali neighbourhood of Kimicanga.1 
A ten-year-old girl named Angélique and her older brother Emmanuel survived 
the attack but their parents and siblings were killed.2 Angélique was struck 
on the head with a machete and repeatedly clubbed by neighbours who had 
joined in the growing violence outside the house. They dragged her through 
the street by her legs to a mass grave that had been dug nearby. A passing 
group of Red Cross volunteers spotted the bodies and rescued the young girl. 
She was brought to a clinic but fled after being threatened by another patient. 
Eventually Angélique found her way to a house belonging to a member of 
the church she attended with her family, a woman named Claudette and her 
husband, a Chief of the Interahamwe in a Kigali district. 
Angélique remained uneasily in the house for many weeks until the family 
decided to flee to Zaire in an attempt to escape the approaching RPF rebels. 
She was taken across the border to Goma, eastern Zaire, where the family 
gave her no food or water. The young girl eventually fled from Goma and 
the Interahamwe and walked across the border into Gisenyi, western Rwanda. 
Once there, RPF rebels approached her and gave her shoes, clean clothes and 
cake. They returned with her to Kigali where she was reunited with Emmanuel 
and continues to live today.3 
Angélique’s experience of the 1994 genocide highlights several themes 
that are pertinent to understanding how the violence took place. In 
discussion, Angélique pointed to the deliberate search for Tutsi civilians in 
her neighbourhood. She described the weapons the militia members carried 
and the efficiency with which they attacked the area. The second theme is the 
participation of civilians in the attack. She talked about her neighbours’ use of 
1 Pronounced Ki-mee-chon-ga. 
2 All names and locations have been changed.
3 This story is paraphrased from Angélique’s experience of the 1994 genocide. I met 
her during the 15th Annual Commemoration Ceremony at Amahoro Stadium in 
Kigali.
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machetes and clubs in their assault against her family and in looting her home. 
The third theme concerns issues of identity and group membership. Angélique 
claimed that the neighbour who owned her family’s house identified them as 
Tutsi prior to the attack. This public naming of Tutsi transformed Angélique 
and her family into targets of violence. Lastly, Angélique’s story emphasises 
the perceived heroism of the RPF rebels, whom she lauded for her rescue 
in Gisenyi. Official reconciliation discourse promoted by the current RPF 
government also emphasises the rebels’ role as heroes after the 1994 genocide 
ended. Although Angélique’s account focuses solely on events between April 
and July 1994, themes of violence, popular participation and identity can be 
traced throughout Rwanda’s history (interview, 9 April 2009).
Identity from the pre-colonial era to independence 
In Mahmood Mamdani’s words, ‘the Batutsi were like a layer of cream spread 
over the entire society, administering a subject peasantry, the Bahutu’ (1996, 
p. 5).4 His observation concerning the administrative relationship between 
Tutsi and Hutu refers to the development of a hierarchical social, political 
and economic structure during the pre-colonial period in Rwanda in the latter 
part of the 19th century5 (ibid., p. 5; NURC, 2011a, p. 85).6 This system 
was initiated in conjunction with the expansion of the central kingdom ruled 
by a Mwami or King of Bahindiro Tutsi lineage. With the centralisation of 
power came the establishment of clientage systems led by chiefs appointed 
by the Mwami. The control of resources including land and cattle became 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small minority of individuals who 
held or were given ‘Tutsi status’ (Eltringham, 2004, p. 13). Access to political 
power and natural resources was further restricted with the introduction of the 
4 The prefix ‘Ba’ indicates the plural form of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities. The 
prefix ‘Mu’ refers to the singular form, such as ‘Mutwa’ or ‘Mututsi’. The ethnic 
identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa will be referred to without the prefixes throughout 
this book. 
5 This chapter focuses primarily on relations between Hutu and Tutsi civilians and 
political groups throughout Rwanda’s history. The experience of Twa civilians 
during the 1994 genocide and post-conflict period is closely examined in chapter 4 
with reference to nation-building and the RPF’s construction of a singular national 
identity.
6 The pre-colonial period is described in the history textbook, published by the 
NURC, as having begun in the 14th century (2011a, p. 85). Although official 
reconciliation discourse states that ‘social cohesion’ thrived during the entire pre-
colonial period (14th century up to 1884), particular emphasis is placed on the 
purportedly ‘positive relations’ between the Hutu and Tutsi during the 19th century. 
This emphasis on the end of the pre-colonial era may be due in part to the absence 
of historical data about how Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were understood prior 
to 1860 (Pottier, 2002, as cited by Eltringham, 2004, p. 13).
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ubuletwa forced labour system and the expansion of land contracts referred 
to as igikingi (Prunier, 1995, p. 21). This concentration of power did not 
take place consistently across the country. By the end of the 19th century, the 
majority of the population, both Hutu and Tutsi, had become impoverished 
and dependent on the highly inequitable clientage system (Vidal, 1974, as 
cited by Prunier, 1995, p. 22; Eltringham, 2004, p. 14). 
The development of this system and the hierarchy it represented reflects 
several important themes that began to emerge during the pre-colonial period, 
the first being political exclusion. As the clientage system became more 
restrictive, political power was limited to those with ‘elite’ Tutsi status − a 
small minority of Tutsi chiefs who had significant political influence during 
this period. Gérard Prunier, a French historian who has written extensively 
about countries in central Africa and the Horn of Africa, identifies this shift as 
a precursor to violence as it created ‘a centre versus periphery affair’ (1995, p. 
21). Prunier differentiates this understanding of political dominance from that 
of ‘Tutsi versus Hutu’, as many Tutsi were also repressed by the clientage system 
(ibid.; author’s italics). 
Mamdani offers a different understanding of political relations during this 
period. He refers to a ‘double domination’ in which Hutu were repressed by 
a pastoralist aristocracy and by the Tutsi minority as a whole (1996, p. 8). 
Mamdani points to the political distinction between subjects and non-subjects 
as well as that between Hutu and Tutsi. He clarifies that although many Tutsi 
did not have elite status, they maintained a favoured relationship with the state 
(ibid.). The second theme is that of ethnic exclusion since Hutu and Tutsi 
identities became more restrictive towards the end of this pre-colonial period. 
Eltringham argues that no distinct meaning was uniformly attributed to Hutu 
or Tutsi during that time (2004, p. 14). This began to change, however, with 
the arrival of first German and then Belgian colonists, who built a formal state 
apparatus upon the Tutsi minority’s perceived dominance (Mamdani, 1996, 
p. 10).
The colonial period began in 1884 when Germany took possession of 
Rwanda and Burundi and governed them as a single colony, Ruanda-Urundi 
(Newbury, 1983, p. 257). German colonial rule was maintained by 96 
German officials, creating the need for indirect rule.7 Colonial leadership relied 
heavily on the Mwami and Tutsi with elite status to enact its administrative 
responsibilities, resulting in the further stratification of political power in 
Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, p. 25). Germany lost the colony to Belgium in 1916.
Belgian colonial rule brought about additional institutional changes that 
further concentrated power in the hands of Tutsi chiefs. This hierarchical 
system was built upon a hypothesis of ethnic origin defined and promulgated 
by German anthropologists (Mamdani, 1996, p. 11). The ‘Hamitic 
7 This number includes missionaries and officials (Prunier, 1995, p. 25).
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Hypothesis’ states that the Tutsi had travelled from Ethiopia to Rwanda where 
they conquered the indigenous Hutu agriculturalists and Twa hunter-gatherers 
prior to the arrival of European colonists (ibid., p. 6). The Tutsi or ‘African 
Hamites’ purportedly brought with them ‘higher forms of African civilisation’ 
and German and Belgian colonists considered them to more closely resemble 
Europeans (Miles, 2000, as cited by Eltringham, 2004, p. 186).8 Although this 
theory has since been discredited, Mamdani (1996) and Eltringham (2004) 
agree that little consensus exists about the origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
people.9
Social and political disparity during Belgian colonial rule was reinforced 
by the continuation of the forced labour system,10 which was so harsh that in 
1928 hundreds of thousands of Hutu peasants fled to Uganda to search for 
work as coffee farm labourers (Mamdani, 1996, p. 11). The Belgians formally 
institutionalised the ethnic stratification system upon which the state apparatus 
functioned during the 1933 census. Every citizen was issued an identification 
card on which with his or her ethnicity was printed (Straus, 2006, p. 225). The 
recording of ethnic labels reflected ethnicity’s early ‘racialisation’.
The evolution of ethnic identities into status-based ethno-racial divisions 
relates closely to the development of anti-Tutsi violence associated with the 
1959 Social Revolution and Rwanda’s movement towards independence in 
1962. From the early 1950s, the UN pressured Belgium to support Ruanda-
Urundi’s transition into separate independent states (Van de Meeren, 1996, p. 
254). The impetus to prepare Rwanda for independence coincided with what 
French political scientist René Lemarchand describes as ‘a decisive heightening 
of expectations among Hutu intellectuals’ (1970, p. 146). These alleged 
expectations resulted in this group’s frustrations being publicly articulated with 
regard to the social and political conditions the Hutu in Rwanda were enduring 
(ibid.). This grievance was published in the 1957 ‘Bahutu Manifesto: notes 
of the social aspect of the racial native problem in Rwanda’, written by nine 
8 Miles states that German and Belgian colonists identified these purportedly ‘non-
African’ qualities as intellectual and political sophistication, and physical attributes 
such as narrow noses, thin lips and significant height (2000, as cited by Eltringham, 
2004, p. 186).
9 The exception to this statement is agreement among certain authors including 
Lewis (2000) and Jackson (2003) that the Twa were the first inhabitants of Rwanda. 
The implications of the Twa community’s efforts to be officially recognised as an 
indigenous people are discussed in chapter 4.
10 As political control and financial resources were stripped away from Hutu and Twa 
people and given to the minority of elite Tutsi controlling the country, ‘non-elite’ 
Tutsi received no noticeable financial gain for their shared Tutsi identity. Moreover, 
towards the end of the 1950s, non-elite Tutsi, 90 to 97% of those called Tutsi, 
earned the same family incomes as Hutu across the country (Linden and Linden, 
1977, as cited by Eltringham, 2004, p. 226).
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Hutu intellectuals who had studied in Catholic seminaries. The text disputed 
the clientage system and sought an end to the perceived social, economic 
and political injustices created by the Tutsi’s political monopoly. In its place, 
the authors suggested such initiatives as promoting Hutu individuals to 
public office, expanding educational opportunities for all Hutu children, and 
eradicating prejudice related to social class (ibid., p. 149). Grégoire Kayibanda’s 
political party the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM), established in June that 
year, outlined similar proposals. 
The relationship between Tutsi elites and Belgian authorities began to 
sour following the manifesto’s publication. Lemarchand contends that the 
Belgian authorities sought to maintain control over what they perceived to 
be an impending social transformation with regard to rising tension between 
Hutu and Tutsi groups. He states that Tutsi elites greatly underestimated the 
breadth of support within the Hutu population for social and political change. 
Instead, they sought to retain political control of Rwanda through pushing 
for independence from Belgium (1970, p. 153). In this pursuit, a monarchist 
party called the Union National Rwandaise (UNAR) was officially launched 
on 15 August 1959 (ibid., p. 158). On 1 November 1959 a small group of 
UNAR militants attacked a Hutu sub-chief in Gitarama, central Rwanda. 
Within several days, violence had spread across the country (ibid., p. 162). 
Spontaneous uprisings and localised anti-Tutsi violence continued under the 
guise of the Social Revolution, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Tutsi 
civilians, while many more fled into neighbouring countries (Uvin, 1999, p. 
256).
The so-called ‘Social Revolution’ was a major factor in the proliferation 
of later violence in Rwanda for several reasons. Firstly, it represented the first 
episode of systematic anti-Tutsi violence. The 1957 ‘Bahutu Manifesto’ had 
challenged the monarchy and feudal system, but the violence of the revolution 
was targeted at Tutsi civilians. Secondly, this period transformed the political 
power dynamic. Masses of Hutu civilians, long excluded from political 
authority through the ‘double domination’ of pastoral and minority rule were 
now one step closer to power (Mamdani, 1996, p. 5). Thirdly, the ideological 
impetus from which the violence sped became an integral element of genocide 
propaganda. The desire to protect the supposed ‘social gains’ made in 1959 by 
Hutu civilians became a rallying call against the RPF invasion in October 1990 
(Eltringham, 2004, p. 45). 
A radical shift in political structure took shape in Rwanda less than two 
years after the Social Revolution began with Grégoire Kayibanda’s party, MDR-
Parmehutu, taking control of the country during the ‘Coup of Gitarama’ on 28 
January 1961 (ibid., p. 21).11 The revolution ended nine months later with a 
11 Kayibanda converted the Mouvement Social Muhutu into a new party called the 
Parmehutu on 19 October 1959.
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referendum held in September. Rwanda was officially awarded its independence 
from Belgium on 1 July 1962 and Kayibanda was installed as the country’s first 
president (Mamdani, 1996, p. 16). The birth of an independent Rwanda and 
Kayibanda’s inauguration did not abate the exodus of hundreds of thousands 
of Tutsi from Rwanda into neighbouring countries, where many continued to 
live as refugees until after the 1994 genocide concluded (ibid.).
Rwanda’s history from the pre-colonial era to independence spans several 
years, yet these periods are related by the emergence of several themes. The 
pre-colonial period saw inequity and inequality proliferate in the form of 
clientage systems. Even at this early stage, the majority of the population, 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, were excluded from political power (ibid., p. 8). Access 
to political control became increasingly restricted throughout the colonial 
era. This exclusion erupted in violent anti-monarchist upheaval in 1959 that 
continued until independence in 1962. The narrowing understanding of the 
ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi exacerbated the reaction of some Hutu to 
this history of exclusion. By 1962, the ethnic identities had become race-like.12 
It would not be long before these identities, and the political power associated 
with them, would again become embroiled in mass violence. 
Refugees and the October 1990 invasion
Violent attacks against Tutsi forced large groups to flee Rwanda between 1960−7. 
Lemarchand estimates that by April 1960, the number of Tutsi refugees who 
had fled the violence reached 22,000. Three years later that number had risen 
to 130,000 (1970, p. 172). While exiled Tutsi refugees launched attacks against 
Kayibanda’s regime, Tutsi civilians inside the country faced the consequences of 
violent retaliation.13 One such attack took place in 1963 when several hundred 
Tutsi refugees launched what Mamdani refers to as the ‘Cockroach’ or ‘Inyenzi’ 
invasion (1996, p. 15).14 This attempt to seize political power from Kayibanda 
was thwarted in violent clashes with the Gendarmes National Rwandaises and 
resulted in thousands of deaths (ibid.).15 Tutsi-led violence outside the country 
12 The massacring of civilians during the 1994 genocide − both Hutu and Tutsi 
− because assailants deemed them to look like Tutsi, demonstrates the race-like 
distinction that had developed between both groups. Des Forges described the 
deliberate disfigurement during this period of women who allegedly looked 
Tutsi. As well as the amputation of breasts and mutilation of sexual organs, Des 
Forges pointed to how genocide perpetrators would cut off body parts that looked 
‘particularly Tutsi’ including long fingers and thin noses (1999, pp. 17, 164).
13 Kuperman estimates that between 1959−67 upwards of 20,000 Tutsi were killed 
inside Rwanda (2004, p. 64). 
14 Inyenzi, the Kinyarwanda word for cockroach would come to feature heavily in 
anti-Tutsi propaganda during the civil war and the 1994 genocide.
15 The estimated number of deaths following this invasion range from the UN’s 
calculation of between 1,000 and 3,000 to that of the World Council of Churches, 
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reached an apex during the 1972 genocide in Burundi when Tutsi soldiers in 
the Burundian national army killed up to 200,000 Hutu.16 
Burundi shares a similar colonial history with neighbouring Rwanda as it 
also achieved independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962. Although Burundi’s 
population is divided along the same ethnic lines as its neighbour, Hutu 
successfully deposed the Mwami in 1965. Tutsi members of the military seized 
political control in 1966 and maintained it until 1993. The exclusively Tutsi 
army launched numerous attacks on Hutu civilians between the mid 1960s 
and early 1990s. An invasion of Hutu refugees from Tanzania, intra-Tutsi 
tension and an internal Hutu insurgency culminated in genocide in 1972. 
Like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, ethnic conflict fuelled the violence. In 
Burundi members of the national army targeted Hutu government officials, 
civil servants and students (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 9). 
The Burundian genocide had violent implications for both Hutu and 
Tutsi inside Rwanda. Lemarchand argues that the systematic killing of 
Hutu men throughout 1972 bolstered an anti-Tutsi backlash in Rwanda. 
This hostile response in turn facilitated Juvénal Habyarimana’s coup d’état 
in 1973 (Newbury and Newbury, 1999, p. 299; Lemarchand, 1998, p. 6).17 
Lemarchand contends that the 1972 genocide against Hutu in Burundi also 
informed the extreme nature of anti-Tutsi violence following the assassination 
of Burundi’s President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, which was so brutal that it 
resulted in the migration of 300,000 Burundian refugees across the border into 
Rwanda (1998, p. 6). 
A reprieve from the violence inside Rwanda eventually came in 1974; a 
year after Habyarimana successfully deposed Kayibanda as president. Outside 
Rwanda, however, Tutsi refugees who had fled violence in Rwanda in 1959 
and 1967 faced periodic attacks in Uganda (Sibomana, 1999, p. 38).18 Anti-
Tutsi prejudice was allegedly encouraged by the state and accepted by much 
of society. In April 1979, a group of Tutsi refugees founded the Rwandese 
Alliance for National Unity (RANU) with the stated mandate to facilitate 
debate and discussion. The Alliance’s creation preceded the growing suspicion 
and xenophobia in Uganda that led to the expulsion of Rwandan refugees 
in 1982–3, a violent eviction that forced 40,000 refugees back into Rwanda 
before the borders were shut. A further 19,000 were expelled from Uganda in 
1983 (Mamdani, 1996, p. 25). Tutsi refugees faced further violent expulsions 
in 1986, which were not well received by Rwandan Tutsi fighting alongside 
which was between 10,000 and 14,000 (Mamdani, 1996, p. 15).
16 The number of estimated Hutu deaths between April and November 1972 ranges 
from 100,000 to 200,000 (Lemarchand, 1998, p. 6).
17 Habyarimana’s Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement 
(MRND) became Rwanda’s single political party in 1973.
18 Mamdani estimates that the total number of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda reached 
200,000 in 1990 (1996, p. 25).
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Ugandans in the National Resistance Army (NRA). The Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) cites the ongoing violent intolerance of refugees as the motive for 
RANU’s disbandment and the RPF’s creation in 1987 (ibid., p. 26). 
The RPF’s official mandate included the repatriation of Rwandan refugees 
and the establishment of a new power-sharing arrangement with Habyarimana 
(Kuperman, 2004, p. 68). Habyarimana attempted to avoid an impending RPF 
invasion by a joint agreement with Uganda to facilitate refugees’ safe return 
to Rwanda (ibid., p. 69). The RPF allegedly cited Habyarimana’s failure to 
repatriate 60,000 Rwandan refugees as the reason for its invasion (Sibomana, 
1999, p. 39). The rebels chose 1 October 1990, Ugandan Independence Day, 
to start what was purportedly planned as a swift attack. 
At the time of the October 1990 RPF invasion, President Habyarimana 
was facing increasing pressure from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the US, the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), as well as international aid organisations to adopt a multiparty 
democratic system (Andersen, 2000, p. 447). This pressure reflects a trend 
among peacebuilding missions at the time, which promoted democracy 
as a form of conflict management in countries that had experienced civil 
war. Democratisation, demonstrated by periodic elections, constitutional 
reforms limiting government control, and increasing respect for civil rights, 
were prioritised in the ‘liberalisation’ efforts of these missions in the 1990s. 
Liberalisation also included neoliberal economic reforms that championed 
market-oriented economic systems, minimised government intervention in 
the economy, and significantly increased investor and consumer freedom. 
Political scientist Roland Paris contends that these reforms were shaped by the 
assumption that rapid liberalisation would foster lasting peace (Paris, 2004, p. 
5).
In 1990, Habyarimana agreed to enact political reforms. In July of that year, 
the president formally announced the legalisation of multiple political parties. 
A commission was also established in September 1990 with the stated mandate 
to write a new constitution (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 19). Following continued 
pressure from the UNDP, the World Bank, the US and multiple international 
aid agencies, Habyarimana signed power-sharing agreements with the RPF in 
October 1992 and January 1993 as a further condition of aid (Andersen, 2000, 
p. 447). Andersen states that aid conditionality served as an important leverage 
tool with regard to democratisation and power-sharing agreements during this 
period (ibid., p. 451). In 1993, the US terminated most of its aid programmes 
in Rwanda and capped the remaining aid at US$6 million when Habyarimana’s 
government failed to comply with conditions of rapid democratisation, human 
rights protection and improved rule of law. At the same time, several European 
states and the World Bank threatened to suspend aid (Chossudovsky, 1996, 
as cited by Andersen, p. 451). This political pressure created what Andersen 
describes as a ‘virtual economic stranglehold’ which compelled Habyarimana 
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to compromise with regard to the power-sharing agreement with the RPF at 
the Arusha Accords (2000, p. 451). 
While participating in the Arusha Accords with RPF representatives, 
Habyarimana allegedly pursued a militarisation programme against the 
rebels. The arming of Hutu civilians was purportedly motivated by fear 
that Habyarimana’s MRND party would lose political control to the RPF 
(Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 20). By 1992, the MRND’s militia, the Interahamwe 
and the Impuzamugambi militia, affiliated with the Coalition pour la Défense 
de la République (CDR), were armed and ready to fight the RPF (ibid., p. 21). 
Pressure from foreign aid donors and multilateral organisations to create 
a multiparty system exacerbated ethnic and political tensions in Rwanda. As 
Paris states, liberalising Rwanda’s political system promoted the rise of political 
parties that were associated with anti-Tutsi militias such as the CDR. Moreover, 
liberalising media outlets created more opportunities for anti-Tutsi propaganda 
to be spread across the country in magazines and radio broadcasts. Paris goes 
so far as to say that the democratisation process provoked Hutu extremists to 
organise and launch the 1994 genocide (2004, p. 78). 
The RPF invasion in October 1990 and the civil war that followed took 
place amid economic decline in Rwanda. As civil war violence destroyed arable 
land, displaced civilians and increased military spending, the country plunged 
further into economic strife. Habyarimana’s government agreed to implement 
a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as prompted by the World Bank 
and the IMF (Andersen, 2000, p. 447). The programme included privatising 
public programmes, salary freezes, and decreased government spending 
(Waller, 1993, as cited by Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 23). It also included significant 
cuts to the funding of health and education initiatives (Klinghoffer, p. 24). 
These neoliberal economic reforms coincided with famine and plant disease 
that devastated coffee production, Rwanda’s main export. Coffee prices fell 
in 1989, as did farmers’ income. The SAP exacerbated this problem as the 
government cut state subsidisation and marketing for coffee and devalued the 
currency (ibid.). 
Hunger and poverty increased, particularly in the country’s southern 
regions, while military expenditure continued to rise. Foreign aid rolled in, yet 
was siphoned off by the military to fund the purchase of arms (Chossudovsky, 
1994, as cited by Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 24). According to the African Rights 
NGO, civil war, rapid economic liberalisation and famine severely limited the 
economic opportunities available to young Hutu men (1995, p. 18). Militias 
profited from young men’s desolation when recruiting Hutu civilians to fight 
the RPF. 
Despite the context of economic deterioration and political instability, 
Habyarimana made several concessions regarding the return of refugees to 
Rwanda in 1990. Contrary to the RPF’s assertion that the MRND would not 
repatriate exiled Tutsi; Habyarimana actively negotiated the return of refugees 
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who would be allowed to enter the country in November 1990 (Kuperman, 
2004, p. 69). Had the RPF delayed its attack, the repatriation programme 
could have been successful, thus negating the rebel group’s primary stated 
reason for invading (Sibomana, 1999, p. 40). Alan J. Kuperman explains that 
RPF officials have since confessed privately that they would still have continued 
their invasion if Habyarimana had allowed the return of all Tutsi refugees, but 
not offered the rebel group a significant amount of political control (2004, p. 
69).
The Habyarimana regime reacted swiftly to the attack with a wave of mass 
arrests following a reportedly ‘staged’ shoot out against the RPF in Kigali 
on 4 October 1990 that left no casualties (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 42–3). 
The government reportedly used this ‘staged’ attack to justify imposing an 
official curfew in the city and cracking down violently on those accused of 
supporting the RPF (Gatwa, 2005, p. 123). The notion of Tutsi civilians as 
RPF supporters or accomplices became a particularly salient concept during 
this period, featuring prominently in anti-Tutsi propaganda and reflecting the 
growing contention that all Tutsi were ‘the enemy’. As the civil war progressed, 
members of Habyarimana’s government began to refer to supporters of his 
regime as ‘Rwandans’ while Tutsi and Hutu opposed to his rule became known 
as ‘ibyitso’ or ‘accomplices of the enemy’ (Des Forges, 1999, p. 8).
Shortly after the RPF’s initial invasion, the rebel group met significant 
resistance from the Rwandan government army, FAR. The RPF leader, Colonel 
Fred Rwigyema, was killed on 2 October 1990 and replaced several weeks 
later by a fellow Tutsi refugee, Paul Kagame, a major in the NRA who was 
participating in a command training course in Kansas during the invasion 
(Kuperman, 2004, p. 71). While the RPF pressed forward with its military 
and increasingly political campaign, anti-Tutsi propaganda was surging not 
only in Habyarimana’s party, but throughout the country. Kangura newspaper 
published statements comparing the ‘biological’ distinction of Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnicities to that of gender (Chrétien et al., 1995, cited in Eltringham, 2004, 
p. 50).19 One such doctrine was the Hutu ‘Ten Commandments’, which it 
printed in December 1990.
‘The Ten Commandments’
1. Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever 
they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. 
Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor:
– Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman;
19 In March 1993, Kangura repeated the supposed ‘biological’ quality of ethnicity 
in Rwanda by stating that, ‘[s]pecialists in human genetics tell us that the small 
population of Tutsi is due to the fact that they only marry one another … a 
cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. A cockroach gives birth to another 
cockroach’ (Chrétien et al., 1995, p. 155, quoted in Eltringham, 2004, p. 22).
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– Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine;
− Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary 
or protégée.
2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more 
dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife and 
mother.
 Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!
3. Hutu woman, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and 
sons back to their senses.
4. Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in their 
business dealings. They are only seeking ethnic supremacy.
‘RIZABARA UWARIRAYE’ 20
Shall be consequently considered a traitor, any Hutu male:
–  Who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis;
– Who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company;
– Who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi;
– Who grants business favours to Tutsis [granting of import 
licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders...]
5. Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, 
military and security domain should, to a large extent, be 
entrusted to Hutus.
6. In the Education sector, (pupils, students, teachers) must be in 
the majority Hutu.
7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That 
is the lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier 
must marry a Tutsi woman.
8. Hutus must cease having any pity for the Tutsi.
9. –  The Hutu male, wherever he may be, should be united, in 
solidarity and be concerned about the fate of their Hutu 
brothers.
– The Hutus at home and abroad must constantly seek 
friends and allies for the Hutu Case, beginning with their 
Bantu brothers.
–  They must constantly be firm and vigilant towards their 
common Tutsi enemies.
10. The 1959 Social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu 
ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels.
Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology widely.
20 The Kinyarwanda words Rizabara Uwariraye loosely translate to, ‘The events, 
mainly bad, that occurred during the night will be narrated by the one who faced 
them’.
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Any Hutu who persecutes his brother for having read, disseminated 
and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor (pp. 46–7).21 
The ‘Ten Commandments’ clearly identified all Tutsi as the enemy during 
the four-year civil war. It also served as a rallying call for all Hutu to unite 
against the common foe. The Social Revolution of 1959 and the subsequent 
referendum are posited as social and political achievements that ought to be 
protected from the encroaching RPF rebels who were depicted in propaganda 
as wanting to reestablish a Tutsi regime (Mamdani, 1996, p. 30). 
In light of the civil war’s growing violence and the pressure from international 
aid agencies to adopt a multiparty democracy, Habyarimana was left balancing 
the RPF’s demands for a power-sharing agreement and the frustration that 
was purportedly growing within a Hutu wing of his own party. This ‘Hutu 
Power’ faction within the MRND was an extremist power base whose identity 
developed as an offshoot of the Hutu ‘counter-elite’ in the run-up to the Social 
Revolution (Mamdani, 1996, p. 14).22 Extremism in this context refers to the 
active propagation of what Des Forges described as the ‘determined’ slaughter 
of Tutsi and Hutu opposed to Habyarimana’s regime (1999, p. 9). Irrespective 
of these competing pressures, Habyarimana intensified Arusha Accords 
negotiations with the RPF in 1992 (Waugh, 2004, p. 54). 
As the RPF offensive continued through 1993, Habyarimana signed the 
Arusha Accords that would provide the rebels with the majority of seats in the 
interim cabinet and legislature prior to the upcoming elections (Kuperman, 
2004, p. 75). The extremist members of Habyarimana’s government gave a 
poor reception to these concessions. The Hutu Power Alliance brought together 
factions that were prepared to take radical measures to prevent the RPF and 
its Tutsi allies from controlling the country (ibid., p. 76). They included 
establishing Radio Télévision Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM), a privately 
owned radio station that actively encouraged brutality against Tutsi civilians 
(ibid., p. 77). As the RTLM spread genocide propaganda, the RPF armed and 
trained local militias of Tutsi civilians to withstand the growing retaliatory 
violence (ibid., p. 78).23 
The conflict’s retaliatory nature demonstrates the civil war’s deterioration 
into what sociologist Martin Shaw describes as ‘degenerate war’ (2003, p. 5). 
It differs from civil war in that it includes systematic attacks against unarmed 
21 ‘The Ten Commandments’ were cited in The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahima, 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, case no. ICTR-99-52-T. In 2003, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Hassan Ngeze, Kangura’s 
chief editor, of genocide and crimes against humanity, sentencing him to 35 years’ 
imprisonment. 
22 The term ‘counter-elite’ refers to Hutu who challenged the political domination of 
the Tutsi elite during the Social Revolution (Mamdani, 1996, p. 12).
23 See Chalk (1999) for detailed discussion of the RTLM’s role in promoting violence 
against Tutsi civilians. 
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civilian groups (ibid.). In the Rwandan context these included retaliatory 
assaults against Tutsi civilians, one of which, in northern Rwanda, resulted in 
the deaths of three hundred civilians in January 1993 (Kuperman, 2004, p. 
74).24 On their part, the RPF also launched deliberate assaults against Hutu 
civilians. On 1 December 1991, the rebel group attacked a camp housing 
6,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rwebare. Nineteen civilians 
were killed during the onslaught (Africa Watch, 1992, p. 23).25 The civil war’s 
degenerate quality soon shifted gears towards a much more deadly series of 
events including the assassination of President Habyarimana (Kuperman, 
2004, p. 79).26
The 1994 genocide 
The plane carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President 
Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down by surface-to-air missiles close to Kigali 
international airport at 8.30pm on 6 April 1994. The two presidents, 
accompanied by other dignitaries, were returning from peace negotiations in 
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, regarding the implementation of the Arusha Accords. 
On 28 June 1994, the UN sent a special envoy to investigate the connection 
between the assassinations and the violence that followed, but did not launch 
a formal investigation of the missile attack itself, citing a lack of funds as the 
reason for its failure to commission an inquiry into the deaths (Bruguière, 2006, 
p. 3). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also declined 
to investigate the attack (ibid., p. 4). On 31 August 1997, family members 
of the French pilot who was also killed filed a complaint to the French Chief 
of Justice. In October 2006 an order to execute legal process was launched in 
France (ibid., p. 5). 
An investigation led by French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière was put in place 
that same year. This report blamed Paul Kagame and the RPF for organising 
the missile strikes. Bruguière claimed that the RPF wanted to ignite further 
conflict in order to legitimise its seizure of power (ibid., p. 39). He issued nine 
international arrest warrants for rebel group members deemed responsible for 
the attack and requested that President Kagame be tried at the ICTR (ibid., 
24 This attack brought the total of Tutsi civilian deaths to 2,000 from when the 
invasion began in October 1990 up to January 1993 (Kuperman, 2004, p. 74). 
25 See Africa Watch report for details of other alleged RPF attacks against civilians, 
including the murder of six nurses and patients in a Nyarurema hospital in 
December 1991 (1992, p. 23).
26 Shaw differentiates between degenerate war and genocide by arguing that the latter is 
shaped by the purposeful killing of members of a civilian group or groups because 
the perpetrators perceive these groups to be the enemy rather than supporters of 
the opposing enemy force. Shaw qualifies that genocide can be understood as an 
extension of degenerate war (2003, p. 5).
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pp. 46–7). The report relied on the testimonies of several former RPF soldiers 
who had defected, several of whom claimed to hold inside information about 
the crash, but later retracted their statements. Bruguière’s report did not 
include evidence gathered from the site of the attack or any interviews with 
the top-ranking RPF officers it accused. President Kagame insisted that the 
assassinations were ordered and carried out by Hutu extremists who considered 
Habyarimana too moderate (BBC News, 10 January 2012). Kagame also 
accused former French President François Mitterand’s government of training 
and arming the Hutu militia members who carried out the attack. The report’s 
release prompted the RPF government to sever diplomatic ties with France in 
2006 (The Guardian, 10 January 2010).
French Judge Marc Trévidic ordered a second report into the attack with 
the full cooperation of the RPF government in 2010. It concluded that the 
missiles were launched from the Kanombe military camp, an area controlled by 
Rwandan government forces, not the RPF. The report relies on testimony from 
missile and air accident experts. Although the investigation does not name the 
assailants, the Rwandan government claims that the report fully exonerates 
President Kagame and the RPF (BBC News, 10 January 2012). The RPF 
government agreed to renew diplomatic ties with France in 2009 (Reuters, 29 
November 2009).
The downing of the plane killed the Burundian and Rwandan presidents, 
seven dignitaries and three French crew members, and triggered the 1994 
genocide. By 9.18pm on 6 April 1994, roadblocks had been assembled 
throughout the capital (The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al.). That same 
night, General Roméo Dallaire, the force commander of the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR),27 ordered an escort to protect Prime 
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The ten Belgian peacekeepers who arrived 
at her residence the next morning were murdered, as was Prime Minister 
Uwilingiyimana who was also sexually assaulted by her attackers (ibid.). This 
ambush prompted Belgian officials to evacuate the remaining members of 
the peacekeeping contingent (Jones, 2006, p. 238). Other Hutu, including 
opponents to the Habyarimana regime, were killed on 7 April 1994 (The 
Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al.).28 Tutsi civilians whose names had been 
printed on lists carried by the Interahamwe were also murdered. Two days 
27 For background information on UNAMIR see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/past/unamirFT.htm (accessed 23 March 2015).
28 This reference is taken from the trial case notes of Hutu officials including 
Théoneste Bagosora at the ICTR. Bagosora was the Ministry of Defence’s cabinet 
director during the 1994 genocide. On 14 December 2011, the ICTR Appeal 
Chamber confirmed Bagosora’s convictions of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and violations the Geneva Protocol II’s Article 3. Bagosora was sentenced to 35 
years’ imprisonment (Bradfield, 2011). 
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later, soldiers began to check Tutsi identity cards at checkpoints across the city 
(ibid.). 
On 10 April 1994, the UN sent military observers to Gisenyi near the 
border between Rwanda and eastern Zaire where tens of thousands of Tutsi 
had already been massacred. These observers reported their findings to the UN 
who, along with American, Belgian and French policymakers, were aware that 
genocide had begun in Rwanda (ibid., 239; Des Forges, 1999, p. 19). The 
UN forbade UNAMIR soldiers from intervening to prevent the massacres that 
continued to sweep through the hillside (Jones, 2006, p. 238). Upwards of 
45,000 people hiding in and around the parish church in Karama in Butare 
were killed in under six hours on 20 April 1994 (ibid., p. 239). According to an 
American military expert, quoted by Alison Des Forges, former senior advisor 
to the Human Rights Watch Africa Division, had 5,000 international soldiers 
been deployed in the later weeks of the 1994 genocide, the violence could have 
been halted (ibid., p. 468). 
International dimensions of the 1994 genocide
The UN’s failure to send an appropriate number of troops to Rwanda during 
the 1994 genocide reflects just one of many instances of international inaction 
during the civil war and 1994 genocide. As early as 1992, evidence emerged 
that mass violence was about to spread across the country. A speech given by 
one of Habyarimana’s representatives in December of that year incited violence 
by publicly encouraging Hutu civilians in north-west Rwanda to ‘liberate’ the 
area of all Tutsi. This provocation led the Rwandan NGO, Collectif des Ligues 
et Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (CLADHO), to 
call for the creation of an international commission to investigate human rights 
abuses and violations in the country (HRW, 1995, p. 2). The International 
Commission Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda included 
ten international observers from such NGOs as Africa Watch and the Paris-
based International Federation of Human Rights. Habyarimana allegedly 
welcomed the commission’s arrival in January 1993. During its three-week 
stay, the commission collected data from government documents and hundreds 
of testimonies given by civilians and government officials. Its members also 
recorded the excavation of two mass graves filled with Tutsi bodies (ibid.). 
The UN launched a related investigation following allegations that Rwandan 
officials had intimidated witnesses who gave evidence to the international 
commission. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, then Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, arrived in Rwanda on 8 April 1993 and 
spent a week investigating alleged human rights violations (Klinghoffer, 1998, 
p. 23). Ndiaye claimed to have evidence that members ‘at the highest level’ 
of Habyarimana’s army, FAR, were actively involved in killing Tutsi civilians 
(Ndiaye, 11 August 1993, p. 11, as cited by Klinghoffer, p. 23). Ndiaye stated 
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that Tutsi civilians were being killed ‘solely because of their membership of a 
certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason’ (Ndiaye, p. 45, as cited 
by Klinghoffer, p. 23). Although he did not explicitly use the term ‘genocide’ 
to describe the massacres, he did clarify that violating the right to life of Tutsi 
could fall within Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
parameters (ibid., p. 24). Ndiaye recommended that the UN take a series of 
steps in order to prevent further violence, but was ‘largely ignored by key actors 
within the United Nations system’ (UN Secretary General, 1999, p. 7). 
The letter just cited was sent by former Secretary General Kofi Annan to the 
president of the Security Council on 16 December 1999. It outlines the 1994 
genocide events, as well as UNAMIR’s stated mandate, and also summarises the 
findings of an independent inquiry, launched on 18 March 1999, to look into 
UN (in)actions during the 1994 genocide. The inquiry identified 18 reasons for 
the UN’s failure to intervene, ranging from weaknesses in UNAMIR’s mandate 
to logistical problems related to the flow of information from the field to the 
Secretariat. The inquiry also found that Rwanda’s membership of the Security 
Council was problematic, as it had allegedly influenced decisions regarding 
action during the 1994 genocide (ibid., pp. 30–50). The overriding reasons for 
the UN’s failure to prevent or to end the 1994 genocide were identified as the 
non-availability of resources and a ‘lack of will to take the commitment which 
would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide’ (ibid., p. 30).
International inaction during the 1994 genocide was purportedly rooted in 
the fact that key Security Council members refused to acknowledge publicly 
that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. Using the term ‘genocide’ to 
describe events in Rwanda would have resulted in an international obligation 
to intervene (ibid., p. 38).29 The Clinton administration in the US refused to 
use the term ‘genocide’ throughout April, May and June of 1994 (Klinghoffer, 
1998, p. 99). It allegedly cited the United States’ military interventions in 
Macedonia and Bosnia as reasons not to intervene in Rwanda. Moreover, the 
Rwandan crisis followed that of Somalia, during which 18 American soldiers 
had been brutally killed (ibid., p. 95). On 25 May 1994, President Clinton 
stated that the US should not intervene, as it did not have a strategic interest 
in Rwanda (ibid., p. 97). 
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is reported to have 
said that the Americans were 100 per cent responsible for the 1994 genocide. 
He allegedly made this statement with regard to the US’s repeated attempts 
to prevent an adequate number of UN troops being deployed to Rwanda 
(Philpot, 2003, p. 11). Des Forges offered this explanation for the failure of the 
UN, and in particular the US, to intervene during the 1994 genocide: ‘Rwanda 
29 See Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and Chapter VII of the 1945 UN Charter.
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was simply too remote, too far, too poor, too little, and probably too black to 
be worthwhile’ (Des Forges, 1996, as cited by Jones, 2006, p. 233). 
Herman and Peterson posit an alternative interpretation of the United States’ 
efforts to prevent international intervention in Rwanda. They argue that the 
Clinton administration’s actions during this period were guided by an interest 
in securing the RPF as the government of Rwanda after the 1994 genocide had 
ended. This interest purportedly related to a quid pro quo agreement between 
the US and RPF, an arrangement that had significant benefits for both parties 
as it sought to secure US military presence in Central Africa, increase American 
influence in former European colonies and garner US access to proxy armies 
and mineral resources in Zaire. It also gave the RPF freedom to restore a Tutsi 
minority government, increase its access to weapons and foreign investment, 
eradicate its enemies, and bolster international prestige (Herman and Peterson, 
2010, p. 61).
France played a markedly different role in the violence during the civil war 
and 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which stemmed primarily from geopolitical 
interests in the region and the relationship between Habyarimana and 
Mitterand’s government. On 2 October 1990, one day after the RPF launched 
Figure 2.1. Placard in Murambi, southern Rwanda, indicating mass graves upon which 
Opération Turquoise soldiers played volleyball during the final stages of the 1994 genocide 
(author’s photo, 3 February 2009)
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its invasion, Habyarimana allegedly telephoned President Mitterand’s son 
Jean-Christophe to seek assistance (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 16). France provided 
financial and military support to Habyarimana’s MRND during the civil war, 
including funding used to train the Interahamwe militia, and to purchase 
weapons from Egypt and South Africa. France also maintained roadblocks and 
interrogated RPF prisoners (ibid.; Mamdani, 1996, p. 28). Its intervention in 
Rwandan affairs was allegedly fuelled by the French government’s interest in 
extending its sphere of control over Belgium’s former colonies by incorporating 
Rwanda into its Franco-African community (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 18). 
In mid June 1994, the French authorities launched Opération Turquoise 
with the stated mandate to establish a humanitarian zone in southwest Rwanda 
in order to prevent further civilian deaths (Des Forges, 1999, p. 23). The 2,500 
Opération Turquoise soldiers saved 15,000 to 17,000 lives during the 1994 
genocide. They also permitted and in some cases arranged the evacuation of 
members of Habyarimana’s regime, including his wife Agathe and her family 
(ibid., p. 24; Klinghoffer, p. 80). 
In an interview with Jeune Afrique on 5 April 2014, President Kagame 
accused both France and Belgium of aiding the political preparation of the 
genocide and the former of participating in the violence. France responded by 
cancelling its official participation in the event (Jeune Afrique, 5 June 2014). 
President Kagame drew further attention to international action and inaction 
in his official speech, given on 7 April 2014 at the 20th Commemoration 
Ceremony at Kigali’s Amahoro Stadium,
The people who planned and carried out the Genocide were Rwandans, 
but the history and root causes go beyond this country. This is why 
Rwandans continue to seek the most complete explanation for what 
happened…
Twenty years is short or long depending on where you stand but there is 
no justification for false moral equivalence. The passage of time should 
not obscure the facts, lessen responsibility, or turn victims into villains.
People cannot be bribed or forced into changing their history. And no 
country is powerful enough, even when they think that they are, to 
change the facts. After all, les faits sont têtus.30
Nearing the end of the genocide
By mid June 1994, the RPF had successfully pushed FAR troops into the 
country’s south-western corner. The genocide officially ended several weeks 
later on 4 July when the RPF took full control of the capital (Jones, 2006, p. 
244).31 Over 80 per cent of the domestic Tutsi population in Rwanda prior to 
30 Les faits sont têtus translates to, ‘the facts are stubborn’.
31 Other towns, including Butare in southern Rwanda and Ruhengeri in the northwest, 
were captured within two weeks of the fall of Kigali to the RPF (Anyidoho, 1998, p. 
63CONFLICT IN CONTEXT
the 1994 genocide had been killed in one hundred days (Kuperman, 2004, 
p. 79). The genocide was the culmination of a number of different tensions 
that had bubbled below the surface for many years,32 the first of which was 
shaped by the perception of antagonistic identities. The notion that all Tutsi 
were the enemy, devised many years prior to the 1994 genocide, was broadcast 
to the masses through anti-Tutsi propaganda in the 1990s. This identity was 
also fuelled by a second tension related to political control, as Hutu extremists 
allegedly feared a return to the Tutsi hegemony of the colonial period. The 
RPF invasion in 1990 created further insecurity during a period of economic 
decline. International inaction did little to ease this tension or slow the growing 
conflict. Ultimately, the proliferation of anti-Tutsi violence was devastating, 
yet it paradoxically resulted in a Tutsi rebel group being installed as political 
leaders.
The rise of the RPF as a political power 
In the words of Timothy Longman, ‘In the post-genocide era, Rwanda has 
made a transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another’ (2011a, 
p. 26). Two overarching forces shaped the immediate post-conflict period: 
devastation created by the 1994 genocide and political dominance secured and 
executed by the RPF. The devastation was reflected in a mixture of pressure 
and constraint on Rwanda’s social and economic landscape. These constraints 
included the near decimation of the country’s economy, infrastructure and 
human capital.33 On the ground, many of those who remained in Rwanda 
were affected by trauma, injury and emotional distress. Insecurity abounded 
during this period as two million Rwandans fled the country in the months 
following the end of the 1994 genocide (Prunier, 1995, p. 312). Many of these 
refugees included FAR and Interahamwe members who sought refuge in camps 
in eastern Zaire (ibid., p. 314). In 1995, Amnesty International (AI) estimated 
that 25,000 to 30,000 Interahamwe and FAR soldiers regrouped and rearmed 
during this period with the stated intention to launch attacks on Rwanda (AI, 
1995, p. 4). By December 1996, Rwanda faced extreme economic pressure 
related to the return of over one million refugees from Zaire and Tanzania.
RPF influence in Rwanda 
The RPF’s seizure of political power took shape amidst growing social and 
economic difficulties. The rebel invaders turned political leaders established 
114). The day the RPF officially ended the genocide, 4 July 1994, is commemorated 
as ‘Liberation Day’.
32 See Fujii (2009) and Straus (2006) for in-depth discussions of why civilians chose 
to participate in the violence. 
33 See Newbury and Baldwin (2000) for detailed discussion of economic pressures and 
trauma experienced by women during this period.
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and displayed their dominance through a series of political and military 
manoeuvres that on several occasions spilled over the border into neighbouring 
Zaire. The first major political action took place in the weeks immediately 
after 4 July 1994. On 19 July the Government of National Unity (GNU) was 
formed as a coalition government comprising the existing political parties 
save former President Habyarimana’s MRND and the Hutu extremist CDR. 
Initially, the GNU’s composition reflected Arusha Accord terms with regard 
to power-sharing between the parties involved and the installation of Faustin 
Twagiramungu as Rwanda’s prime minister. The change was short-lived; 
Twagiramungu resigned and went into exile in August 1995, accusing the 
RPF of abuses of power, mass human rights violations and discrimination 
against Hutu and Tutsi survivors (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 180). Interior Minister 
Seth Sendashonga and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito also resigned that 
August. Sendashonga and many others, including army officers, journalists, 
diplomats and national football team members, left Rwanda during this 
period. On departure they accused the RPF of similar transgressions to those 
Twagiramungu had listed (ibid.). These accusations followed formal changes 
made by the RPF to the Fundamental Law related to the Arusha Accords, 
modifications which included establishing an executive presidency and 
restructuring Parliament, both of which functioned to consolidate RPF power 
within the GNU (ibid., p. 178). The military also remained under the RPF’s 
political control, as the vast majority of soldiers in the newly formed Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) were Tutsi (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 228).
Rwanda received substantial amounts of financial aid from the 
international community in the years following the 1994 genocide. Many 
international donors had pulled out of Rwanda early that year before the 
genocide began, leaving only the Red Cross to manage the humanitarian 
crisis (Hayman, 2007, p. 9). Canada, Germany and Switzerland implemented 
reviews of their actions during the genocide and subsequently increased their 
aid to Rwanda in 1994–5. Belgium, France and Japan also restarted their aid 
agreements with Rwanda, but continually decreased their donations between 
1991 and 2001 (Hayman, 2006, as cited by Hayman, 2007, p. 9). Hayman 
explains that Belgium and France reduced aid and froze programmes during 
this period due to concerns about the RPF’s management of such issues 
as democracy, human rights, refugees and justice. Countries that had not 
previously provided aid to Rwanda, such as Norway, the UK, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, were allegedly motivated to donate by the magnitude of 
the tragedy and international community’s failure to intervene in 1994 
(Hayman, 2007, p. 9). Significant funds began to flow into the wider Great 
Lakes Region in support of refugees and reconstruction projects (Hayman, 
2009, p. 584). 
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In January 1995, upwards of US$600 million of foreign aid was promised 
to Rwanda. Filip Reyntjens34 contends that the aid was offered and accepted 
without considering the ‘rapidly deteriorating human rights situation’ in the 
country at the time (2004, p. 179). This deterioration refers not only to the 
narrowing of the RPF’s power base, but to the harassment and imprisonment 
of Hutu officials. During this period, the RPA allegedly killed provincial 
governors, mayors, head teachers and judges thought to be Hutu (ibid., p. 180). 
Donors’ willingness to overlook human rights abuses committed by the RPA 
shortly after the 1994 genocide may be explained by donor naivety regarding 
political dynamics in Rwanda. It may also stem from guilt purportedly related 
to the failure of the UN and individual nation states to intervene in the 1994 
genocide (Hayman, 2011, p. 127; Hayman, 2007, p. 19).35 
Violence escalated during the post-conflict period as the RPA killed 
civilians during the Kibeho tragedy of April 1995. The Kibeho camp was 
one of eight camps for IDPs still in operation at that time. The GNU had 
been negotiating with the UN the closure of these camps. The transitional 
government accused the camps of sheltering civilians and militia members 
who had participated in the 1994 genocide. On 17 April 1995, the GNU 
closed the Kibeho camp leaving 80,000 IDPs trapped inside without adequate 
shelter, food, or sanitation. Five days later, as civilians attempted to flee the 
camp, the RPA opened fire. According to a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
report published two months later, ‘[a] large number of deaths occurred from 
firing by government forces, trampling and crushing during the stampede and 
machete attacks by hard-liners in the camp, who assaulted and intimidated 
those who wished to leave’ (1995, p. 3). Amnesty International estimates that 
the RPA killed upwards of several thousand IDPs at Kibeho (1996, p. 18).
The GNU publicly justified closing the Kibeho camp as an attempt to 
prevent future violence by flushing out ex-FAR soldiers and ex-Interahamwe 
militia members who were hiding among the refugees (ibid.). The perceived 
threat of violence was also used to legitimise an RPA attack in Zaire during the 
same period. In October 1996, the RPF received details of a planned attack 
against Zairian Tutsi by Hutu militants in Zaire. The RPA, in cooperation 
with Zairian rebels who opposed President Mobutu, launched an invasion with 
the stated mandate to ‘dismantle the camps’ (Kagame, as quoted by Pomfret, 
34 Filip Reyntjens is a professor of African law and politics at the University of 
Antwerp. In 1978, during his time as a professor of law at the National University 
of Rwanda (NUR), he and two councillors from the Ministry of Justice drafted 
the 1978 Constitution of Rwanda under the presidency of Juvénal Habyarimana 
(Reyntjens, 1998, p. 1). Reyntjens has since provided expert testimony at the ICTR 
and accused the RPF of committing crimes against humanity in Rwanda and DRC 
(ibid., p. 5).
35 Chapter 6 examines the relationship between international donors and the RPF 
more closely.
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1997, p. A01). The attack’s second stated objective was to forcibly scatter 
and repatriate the militia members in order to destabilise their organisational 
structure. The third goal was to overthrow Sese Seko Mobutu, the Zairian 
president. The invasion resulted in the return of 500,000 Hutu refugees to 
Rwanda and the deaths of thousands more, many of whom were unarmed 
civilians (ibid.; Reyntjens, 2011, p. 135). 
RPF influence in Zaire/DRC
The RPA’s stated objective to topple Mobutu’s regime was realised in 1997 
when the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
(AFDL), the Congolese rebel force supported by the RPA, seized Kinshasa 
(Lemarchand, 2009, p. 17). Laurent Désiré Kabila, the AFDL leader, became 
president of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
There are not many people who thought that Mobutu was very weak. 
They thought of Mobutu as a big monster who wouldn’t be defeated, 
with his big hat and his big stick. They thought little Rwanda and 
big Zaire. Only when we started did they look at the map and see the 
possibilities (Kagame, as quoted by Pomfret, 1997, p. A01). 
The RPF’s political and military endeavour received financial and tactical 
support from the Clinton administration (Renton et al., 1997, p. 178).36 In 
1996, the US government sent American soldiers and spies to Rwanda and 
provided intelligence to the AFDL in eastern Zaire (ibid., p. 179). President 
Clinton allegedly used the RPA to secure American interests in the region. 
These interests included undermining the Sudanese government in order to 
restrict the growth of Islamist militancy in Sudan. The US sought to weaken 
Islamist power in Sudan by providing military assistance to nearby countries 
including Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda (Le Monde, February 1997, as cited 
by Renton et al., p. 183). Providing support to the Rwandan government was 
deemed to be an essential element in maintaining stability in Uganda (Renton 
et al., 2007, p. 183). The other major American interest in the area was securing 
access to DRC’s rich mineral reserves (ibid., p. 181).
The Second Congo War was initiated in part when President Laurent Kabila 
pushed for the RPA to leave the country. This request was poorly received and 
violence erupted with leaders in both Kigali and Kampala launching new rebel 
initiatives in DRC (Stearns and Bordello, 2011, p. 157). The RPA maintained 
36 American support for the RPF’s incursions in DRC during this period reflects the 
quid pro quo between the US and Rwanda described by Herman and Peterson. 
The authors argue that this arrangement ensured Rwandan access to weapons and 
military support and provided the US with access to rich mineral reserves in Zaire/
DRC (2010, p. 61).
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its military and political presence in DRC throughout the war.37 This ongoing 
warfare formalised strong anti-Tutsi sentiment inside DRC, an anger that was 
particularly acute in the North and South Kivu provinces, which share a border 
with Rwanda. Lemarchand argues that this ‘visceral hatred of all Tutsi, whether 
of Rwandan or Congolese origin’, by non-Tutsi in DRC was caused by political 
exclusion, the violence created by occupying forces, and the RPA’s economic 
exploitation (ibid., p. 34). 
Both Ugandan and Rwandan forces were heavily involved in plundering 
minerals throughout the Second Congo War (Renton et al., 2007, p. 194). 
Rwanda’s trade of coltan, mined in DRC in 1999 and 2000, allegedly funded 
the RPA’s entire military intervention during the war (ibid., p. 193). Sénat de 
Belgique estimates that the revenue the RPA collected from coltan reached 
US$80−100 million in 2000 (2003, p. 72, as cited by Reyntjens, 2011, p. 
139). The RPF justified Rwandan presence in DRC as integral to flushing out 
Hutu militants who had participated in the 1994 genocide (ibid., p. 196). 
The RPA officially withdrew from DRC in 2002, but allegedly maintained a 
clandestine presence in the country until the war ended in 2003 (Reyntjens, 
2004, p. 206).
The RPF demonstrated its political and military might in DRC while 
advancing its political agenda under the guise of the GNU inside Rwanda.38 
One of the earliest objectives was to arrest and jail as many suspected genocide 
perpetrators as possible. In April 1995, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
published a report examining the implications of mass arrests across Rwanda. 
The NGO estimated that within the first nine months of being established, the 
GNU jailed upwards of 30,000 suspected perpetrators (HRW, 1995, p. 3). The 
judicial system had nearly been destroyed by the 1994 genocide and the rate at 
which these arrests took place only added pressure to the system (ibid., p. 4).
The sweeping arrest of Hutu civilians and the fear it created demonstrated 
the RPF’s domestic political dominance. By the late 1990s, the RPF had 
established a firm hold on power inside Rwanda and greatly influenced 
the political landscape in neighbouring DRC. Both of these endeavours 
were informed by the violence of the past including that which took place 
during: the 1959 Social Revolution; the 1990 RPF invasion; the civil war; 
and the 1994 genocide. On many occasions, the movement of refugees away 
from Rwanda sparked or exacerbated social and political conflicts inside 
host countries. The RPF was faced with the additional social, political and 
economic pressure created by the return of refugees from Burundi, Zaire/DRC, 
37 See Prunier (2002) and Nabudere (2004) for more detailed discussions of the 
Second Congo War.
38 Although the RPF governed Rwanda as a part of the coalition GNU, I refer to 
the government as the RPF during this period to demonstrate the group’s political 
dominance within the GNU. 
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Tanzania and Uganda. In DRC, the movement of Hutu refugees across its 
borders after the 1994 genocide had a devastating impact on peace and security 
in the area. The violence of the 1994 genocide and the RPF’s attempts to 
‘flush out’ Hutu militants contributed to the Second Congo War and ongoing 
conflict in the Kivu provinces. As the Second Congo War raged on, the RPF 
stated a commitment to promoting ‘national reconciliation’ inside Rwanda. 
The National Unity and Reconciliation Programme demonstrated the RPF’s 
response to mass violence, the perceived need for justice and threats to the 
RPF’s political hegemony from inside Rwanda and neighbouring DRC. 
Unity and ‘national reconciliation’ after genocide
The transitional government did not publicly endorse an official reconciliation 
initiative during the first few years after the 1994 genocide concluded. 
Government silence on the matter contrasted starkly with UN actions aimed at 
promoting the creation of a national reconciliation programme in Rwanda. A 
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) memorandum from 23−24 June 
1995 stated that:
Owing to the sheer magnitude of the tragedy and the extent of violence 
and atrocities during the conflict, Rwanda highlights more than any 
other crisis that achieving credibility of the government and national 
reconciliation are key for all other reconstruction activities, including 
the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (p. 12).
The desire to create an official national reconciliation programme inside 
Rwanda lagged behind that expressed at the international level for several 
reasons. Prioritising justice resulted in the pursuit of a largely retributive 
approach in the post-conflict period as demonstrated by the mass arrest of 
predominantly Hutu citizens suspected of crimes related to the 1994 genocide. 
This endeavour swept through the capital and hillside and led to the arrest of 
more than 120,000 suspects between 1994 and 2000 (Uvin, 2000, p. 3).
The GNU’s reluctance to pursue an official reconciliation programme was 
also due in part to increasing pressure from survivor groups. Reyntjens and 
Vandeginste contend that survivor advocacy groups equated the promotion of 
reconciliation between survivors and perpetrators with unpalatable outcomes 
of forgiveness, amnesty and impunity. The influence of these organisations on 
government policy began to wane towards the end of the 1990s (Reyntjens 
and Vandeginste, 2005, p. 102). However, tension mounted between the 
government and several of these organisations in 1999 when the GNU released 
3,365 prisoners against whom little or no evidence was available (Le Verdict, 
July 1999, as cited by Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2005, p. 102). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the GNU understood national 
reconciliation to be synonymous with power-sharing and Hutu majority rule. 
By 1999, the organisation of a powerful Hutu opposition was perceived as no 
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longer posing a credible threat to the government. Banning political parties 
and the fact that opposition leaders had emigrated to avoid incarceration 
reduced this threat. The risk of attack from Hutu military groups in eastern 
DRC had been diminished by the RPF invasion across the border in August 
1998 (Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2005, p. 102). Both events created what 
Reyntjens and Vandeginste call a ‘comfortable’ environment for the transitional 
government to pursue a policy of national reconciliation (ibid., p. 103). 
Earlier in this post-conflict period, the GNU reached out to the UN for 
support in creating an international criminal tribunal to prosecute individuals 
suspected of having organised or committed crimes of genocide. This request 
was informed by the devastation of Rwanda’s domestic legal system following 
the deaths and exile of many lawyers and judges during the 1994 genocide as 
well as the destruction of related infrastructure (Sosnov, 2008, p. 128). Security 
Council Resolution 995 established the ICTR on 8 November 1994: 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power 
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, 
in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute (UNSC, 1994, 
p. 3).
Two overarching interests purportedly shaped resolution 955: halting and 
addressing violations that threaten international peace and security, and 
promoting peace and reconciliation in Rwanda (Des Forges and Longman, 
2004, p. 3). 
After seeking help from the UN, Rwanda was the only UNSC member to 
vote against the tribunal’s formation (Sosnov, 2008, p. 129; Dubois, 1997, p. 
1). The GNU objected to the ICTR for several reasons including the ICTR’s 
focus on crimes committed in 1994. The government denounced this narrow 
time frame as it precluded convictions related to earlier massacres and it failed to 
take account of the planning period before the 1994 genocide (Dubois, 1997, 
p. 1). The government also took issue with the shared Appeals Chamber and 
Prosecutor at the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Other objections included the nomination of judges for 
the tribunal by countries that had supported Habyarimana’s regime during the 
1994 genocide and the incarceration of convicted perpetrators outside Rwanda 
(ibid., p. 2). The government also objected to the non-existence of capital 
punishment. This omission created a major discrepancy between maximum 
levels of punishment in domestic courts and the ICTR, as perpetrators found 
guilty of lesser crimes in Rwanda could be given the death sentence.39 Lastly, 
39 Capital punishment was abolished in Rwanda in 2007, although the final death 
sentence was imposed in 2003. The use of capital punishment prevented the 
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the GNU opposed the tribunal’s location in Arusha Tanzania, insisting that it 
ought to operate inside Rwanda (ibid.). The ICTR’s location was decided by 
the UNSC ‘with regard to considerations of justice and fairness’, as stated in 
resolution 955, indicating the Security Council’s perception of due process in 
Rwanda (UNSC, 1994, p. 2).
Because this book focuses on the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme in Rwanda, it does not engage deeply with the ICTR’s work as the 
tribunal operates outside Rwanda and includes a stated mandate devised by 
the UN, not the RPF. The four pillars of global legal order shape this mandate: 
international human rights law; international humanitarian law; international 
criminal law; and international refugee law (Scharf, 2008, p. 1). Chapter 
VII of the 1945 UN Charter also guides it: ‘Action with respect to threats 
to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’. Its Article 42 could 
have been, but was not applied during the 1994 genocide. It sanctions the use 
of demonstrations, blockades and military action by forces of UN member 
countries to restore international peace and security. The ICTR’s mandate was 
purportedly also informed by the assumption that justice is an essential element 
for the maintenance of peace. According to this understanding, peace could 
not be restored after the 1994 genocide without international intervention, as 
Rwanda did not have the institutional capacity to prosecute crimes related to 
the genocide.
UN Security Council Resolution 995 includes an objective to ‘contribute 
to the process of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance 
of peace in Rwanda’ (1994, p. 1). The ICTR is not discussed, however, in major 
government policies or documents, nor does it feature in official reconciliation 
discourse inside Rwanda. Of particular relevance, however, are the RPF 
government’s successful attempts to block former Chief Prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte’s investigation of crimes allegedly perpetrated by the RPF against Hutu 
civilians in 1994 (Peskin, 2008). The ICTR has yet to indict any RPF members 
for crimes committed in 1994 (ibid. p. 225).
Despite the government’s stated objections to the ICTR, justice remained 
a major priority in the first years after the 1994 genocide. The GNU began 
to pursue justice at the domestic level in the mid 1990s through the Military 
Tribunal of Rwanda and later through restoring community-level gacaca 
courts.40 The Military Tribunal was mandated to try cases of genocide and 
crimes against humanity committed by military personnel between 1 October 
extradition of genocide perpetrators living abroad and on trial at the ICTR to 
Rwanda (see AI, 2 August 2007). 
40 Gacaca was a historical conflict resolution mechanism purportedly used in the pre-
colonial era to resolve disputes related to land and relationships. It was restored in 
the post-conflict period to try cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. The 
reinvention of gacaca and the courts’ mandate to promote reconciliation will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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1990 and 31 December 1994 (Sosnov, 2008, p. 133). Members of the RPF 
were retroactively considered to be members of a military organisation, yet 
only 20 cases of ‘vengeance killings’ by RPF soldiers were tried between 1994 
and 2002 (Strain and Keyes, 2003, as cited by Sosnov, 2008, p. 133). This 
number pales in comparison with the reported killings of 25,000 to 45,000 
Hutu civilians by RPF rebels as described in the Gersony Report (Des Forges, 
1999, p. 18).41 
Gacaca courts reflected the GNU’s pursuit of justice on a much larger scale. 
Like the Military Tribunal, gacaca was mandated to try cases of genocide and 
crimes against humanity committed inside Rwanda between 1 October 1990 
and 31 December 1994. Gacaca was designed to speed up the trials of the 
120,000 suspects initially arrested after the genocide but would eventually 
hear more than 1.2 million cases by 2010 (Bikesha interview, 20 July 2010).42 
Gacaca received significant funding from international donors including 
Belgium, Switzerland, the UK and Sweden. Oomen states that the vast majority 
of international donors provided some level of support to the gacaca process by 
2002 (2005a, p. 902).
The influence of international donors and foreign investors is also reflected 
in the government’s creation of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) in 1999. Reyntjens and Vandeginste contend that the 
NURC was established to please donors and funding agencies (2005, p. 103). 
Oomen argues that the GNU settled for a ‘watered-down’ NURC to prevent the 
creation of an independent reconciliation commission with the power to grant 
amnesty (2005a, p. 897). The ‘watered-down’ nature of the commission refers 
to its lack of legal power and its mandate to advise the government, conduct 
research and educate the population about unity and ‘national reconciliation’.43
The commission’s stated mandate to promote ‘national reconciliation’ 
features heavily in pertinent government documents including the 2003 
Constitution and the 2007 Reconciliation Policy. Since its inception in 1999, 
the NURC has been charged with the task of promoting unity and ‘national 
41 The Gersony Report describes the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 
mission led by Robert Gersony to investigate ways of speeding up refugee 
repatriation after the 1994 genocide. The team gathered data about RPF/RPA-led 
attacks against civilians in Rwanda. Gersony estimated that the RPF had killed 
between 25,000 and 45,000 civilians between April and the end of August 1994. 
The UN directed him to never discuss the report or share the data, an order he has 
largely followed (Des Forges, 1999). 
42 Klaas de Jonge clarifies that this estimate does not necessarily reflect the true 
number of genocide perpetrators in Rwanda as individual defendants could appear 
in multiple cases. He also explains that over 50% of these cases were related to 
crimes against property (2010, p. 3).
43 See Article 178 of the 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda for a full list 
of the NURC’s responsibilities. 
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reconciliation’ and ridding Rwanda of the effects of past ‘bad governance’ 
(NURC, 2006, p. 277).
Against the past of Rwanda, characterized by a type of governance 
based on criminality, political uniqueness (divisionism, extremism, 
nepotism, and paternalism) and genocide ideology, the NURC has 
been assigned to overcome all the barriers and face the unimaginable 
challenges to wash all the past dirtiness down and to re-invent a ‘new 
social intelligence’ through which the people of Rwanda supported 
by his development partners proceeded to a fundamental change 
and rebuilt a holistically unified, pacified, hatred-free [country], and 
committed to forge hand-in-hand a new country armed with a new 
mind-set and values (ibid.).
The NURC’s efforts to wipe away ‘past dirtiness’ created by ‘divisionism’ 
and ‘genocide ideology’ are supported by several criminal statutes (ibid.). 
These laws include the 2001 Law on Prevention, Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism. Civilians found guilty of 
‘sectarianism’ face prison sentences of three months to two years and/or fines 
between 50,000 and 300,000 Rwandan francs (RwF).44 Current and former 
government officials, members of political parties and domestic NGOs face 
much harsher sentences if found guilty. Punishment includes sentences of 
one to five years in jail and fines between 500,000 and two million RwF 
(Parliament, 2001, Art. 5).45 Consequently, any actions perceived to divide 
the population or promote genocide in some way may be seen as crimes of 
‘sectarianism’ or ‘divisionism’, and can be harshly punished. 
Conclusion
Periods of mass violence in Rwanda have been shaped by outpourings of 
refugees, economic pressure and political tensions. The pre-colonial era may 
not have forged wholly antagonistic relationships between Hutu and Tutsi 
citizens, but it did lay the foundation for an increasingly stratified political and 
economic system. Colonial rulers played a significant role in manipulating what 
they presumed to be a ‘natural’ social order. The exclusion of Hutu civilians 
from political power had devastating consequences for the Tutsi population 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Violence against Tutsi was legitimised as an 
attempt to escape the highly inequitable monarchist system of the past.
As independence arrived, it was the Tutsi population who would soon 
be excluded from political control. This exclusion did not pertain solely to 
44 As of May 2015, 50,000 Rwandan Francs (RwF) is roughly equivalent to £45 and 
300,000 RwF is approximately £271. See XE Currency Exchange, www.xe.com 
(accessed 18 May 2015). 
45 As of May 2015, 500,000 RwFs is equivalent to £455. Two million RwF is roughly 
equivalent to £1,820. See ibid. 
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Rwanda; Tutsi refugees in Uganda who had fled the violence of the Social 
Revolution faced violent expulsions. Prejudice against Rwandan Tutsi refugees 
purportedly encouraged the creation of the RPF and motivated the group’s 
invasion of Rwanda in 1990. The RPF’s attempt to seize political control 
from Habyarimana resulted in a ‘degenerate’ civil war that led to the deaths of 
thousands of Hutu and Tutsi civilians. The RPF’s advances fuelled anti-Tutsi 
propaganda that spurred many Hutu civilians to commit genocide against Tutsi 
civilians. The RPF’s political and military maneuvers ended the 1994 genocide, 
facilitated the group’s transition from rebel invaders to political leaders and 
supported the toppling of Mobutu’s regime in Zaire.
The RPF’s political interests informed not only the October 1990 invasion, 
but also the group’s rise to power in the post-conflict period. Since the 1994 
genocide ended, the RPF has maintained political control of the country. As 
such, it is responsible for rebuilding a nation decimated by genocide. Achieving 
this was complicated by the mass exodus and repatriation of refugees, social and 
economic upheaval, and continued violence inside and outside of Rwanda’s 
borders. At first, the government ignored the international community’s calls 
for a formal reconciliation process, but it did eventually establish the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme. As the next chapter will show, the first 
major theme to emerge from this programme was the pursuit of justice on a 
massive scale.

Chapter 3
Gacaca: justice and reconciliation at the community genocide 
courts
Only justice delivered in Rwanda, mainly by Rwandans, according to 
Rwandan and universal principles, can genuinely contribute to peace, 
healing and reconciliation (Kagame, 2008, p. xxv).
Two years after the 1994 genocide ended the GNU faced pressure from donors, 
diplomats and other international community representatives to publish 
the Organic Law of 30 August 1996. This law relates to the ‘organization of 
prosecutions for offences constituting the crimes of genocide or crimes against 
humanity since 1 October 1990’ (Vandeginste, 1998, p. 2).1 In addition to 
defining the parameters of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, the 
law codifies the GNU’s stated commitment to eradicating impunity in order to 
promote justice and ‘national reconciliation’ across the country (TNA, 1996, 
p. 18). The pursuit of justice was demonstrated by the arrests of more than 
120,000 genocide suspects between 1994 and 2000 (Waldorf, 2007, p. 425). 
By late 1998, the GNU, under Pasteur Bizimungu’s presidency, was considering 
creating what political scientist Peter Uvin later described as an ‘unprecedented 
legal-social experiment’ (Uvin, 2000, p. 3).2 This experiment would involve 
applying a traditional process of conflict resolution to the criminal trials of 
those accused of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity (ibid.).
1 This law defines acts of genocide and crimes against humanity according to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948. It is limited to crimes committed inside Rwanda between 
1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. 
2 Pasteur Bizimungu was Rwanda’s president, 19 July 1994−23 March 2000. He 
allegedly resigned ‘for personal reasons’ but was accused of crimes including tax 
fraud and preventing parliamentary inquiries into corruption (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 
181). Bizimungu, who was publicly critical of the RPF, was arrested in 2001 and 
sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released in 2007 following a pardon from 
President Kagame (Reuters, 6 April 2007). Bizimungu’s resignation came shortly 
after that of Joseph Sebarenzi, the Speaker of the National Assembly and Prime 
Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema. Sebarenzi and Rwigema both fled Rwanda and 
settled in North America (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 181). 
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This approach was informed by a dual interest in increasing popular 
participation in the judicial system and advancing the rate at which cases could 
be heard and processed (Uvin, 2000, p. 3; Waldorf, 2007, p. 427).3 The GNU 
proposed to meet these goals by means of the traditional process called gacaca, 
a form of mediation during which male elders or heads of households passed 
judgment on disputes related to land, property and marital relationships. This 
system takes its name from the grass on which its procedures most commonly 
took place (Clark, 2010a, p. 52). According to Clark, by the turn of the 20th 
century, gacaca was the primary means through which ‘uncomplicated cases’ of 
inheritance, marriage and livestock disputes were resolved and social order was 
maintained across the country (ibid., p. 341).4
The uncomplicated nature of conflicts resolved at gacaca was a far cry from 
the responsibilities bestowed upon the system in 2001. The GNU passed a law 
in January of that year formally establishing gacaca as a criminal court through 
which cases of genocide and crimes against humanity would be tried (TNA, 
2001, p. 1).5 The retooled gacaca model was shaped by multiple stated objectives 
including: revealing the truth about 1994 genocide events; speeding along 
genocide trials; eradicating impunity; promoting unity and reconciliation; and 
proving that Rwandans can solve their own problems (NSGJ, n.d.(b), p. 1). It 
was also guided by high expectations from the NURC, ‘When every Rwandan, 
wherever he/she is at any time, will have understood his/her role to play in this 
process, there is no doubt unity and reconciliation will be achieved. Conflict 
between Rwandan people, suspicion, divisions, hatred and woes that befell and 
destroyed this country will have been defeated and Rwandan people will live 
in prosperity forever’ (2001, p. 23). These objectives and expectations reflect 
the two overarching themes of the GNU’s responses to crimes related to the 
1994 genocide: maximal justice6 and reconciliation. As such, this chapter seeks 
3 National courts were also trying cases related to genocide and crimes against 
humanity during this period. They were deemed to be too slow and ineffectual, as 
only an estimated 9,000 cases were tried between 1996 and 2003 (Waldorf, 2007, 
p. 425).
4 Waldorf takes a more critical view of traditional gacaca. He draws attention to 
the dominance of male elders in the gacaca system, as women were not permitted 
to speak during sessions. Moreover, he contends that gacaca did not hear cases of 
crimes such as cattle theft. He clarifies that gacaca courts commonly meted out 
collective punishment as members of the accused’s family or clan were commonly 
obligated to provide reparations to the victim (2010, p. 186). 
5 The full title of the law is ‘Organic Law no. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up 
gacaca jurisdictions and organizing prosecutions for offences constituting the crime 
of genocide or crimes against humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1994’ (TNA, 2001, p. 1). 
6 Newbury and Baldwin use the term ‘maximal justice’ in conjunction with repression 
to describe the RPF’s approach to governance in the post-conflict context (2000, 
p. 243). My use of the term refers only to gacaca and thus more closely reflects 
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to compare primary and secondary data about practice at gacaca with state 
discourse about justice and ‘national reconciliation’.
Clark raises this issue when he asks, ‘[t]o what degree then should Rwanda 
pursue reconciliation and what degree of reconciliation is possible through 
gacaca?’ (2010a, p. 334). Clark points to the importance of evaluating the 
concept as the rebuilding of interconnected relationships. This understanding 
resembles arguments made by other authors including Lederach (1997), Daly 
and Sarkin (1997) and Villa-Vicencio (2005), who analyse what they deem 
to be the positive correlation between rebuilding relationships and promoting 
interpersonal reconciliation. Clark’s example is more specific, however, as it 
refers to reconciliation as rebuilding interconnected relationships between 
differing groups of people at the ‘individual-to-individual’ level, ‘individual-
to-group’ level and ‘group-to-group’ level (2010a, p. 338). 
In the post-conflict Rwandan context, ‘rebuilding relationships’ refers to 
the restoration of social connections that were damaged or destroyed by the 
1994 genocide. Also referred to as ‘social cohesion’ in government documents, 
these pre-genocide social relationships were purportedly built upon trust, 
cooperation and friendship.
Rwanda is gradually making progress on the road to reconciliation 
reflected in general high trust in Government action and good 
marks for newly decentralized political structures. However, it is 
also struggling to overcome widespread interpersonal distrust and 
continuing divisions between genocide survivors and those accused of 
or convicted for crimes of genocide.
Division and exclusion rather than cohesion marked Rwandan society 
from independence up to the genocide in 1994. Enormous efforts have 
been undertaken to bridge the deep rifts in society and heal the wounds 
inflicted by the genocide (NURC, 2008a, p. 1).
Interviews with government officials and NURC documentation have revealed 
the two broad categories of relationships in need of rebuilding. This process 
is referred to as ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ reconciliation (Bakusi interview, 
23 July 2010; NURC, 2010).7 The former is described as a ‘common level 
Clark’s reference to ‘comprehensive justice’ or Jones’ use of ‘maximal accountability’ 
to describe the government’s attempts to prosecute all civilians suspected of acts of 
genocide and crimes against humanity (Clark and Waldorf debate, 3 March 2010, 
Oxford; Jones, 2010, p. 52). 
7 The ‘Rwanda reconciliation barometer’ was published in October 2010 by the 
NURC with support from the Department for International Development and the 
UN Development Programme. It is a national public opinion survey that measures 
progress towards ‘national reconciliation’ (2010, p. 23) and uses a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative methods to question public opinion on six main topics: 
human security; political culture and governance; crosscutting relations; historical 
confrontation; social cohesion; and integration (ibid., p. 31). 
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of reconciliation’ that focuses on rebuilding connections between citizens 
(Bakusi interview, 23 July 2010). Alphonse Bakusi, then the director of the 
NURC’s Civic Education Department, used the example of rebuilding former 
relationships between survivors and those who killed their families to describe 
the government’s conception of ‘horizontal’ reconciliation (ibid.). Other 
examples could include those between former perpetrators serving sentences in 
community service camps8 and survivors living in the surrounding area. This 
vision is shaped by the assumption that, ‘if trust increases between Rwandan 
citizens, and particularly those on different sides of the genocide, reconciliation 
is more likely to occur’ (NURC, 2010, p. 11). The three relationship levels 
Clark identifies most closely resemble those the RPF call ‘horizontal’ relations 
(2010a).
The RPF’s conception of ‘vertical’ reconciliation refers to the relationship 
between citizens and the government with particular emphasis on building trust 
in institutions (ibid.). This association reflects the assumption that if ‘citizens 
view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and 
effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur’ (ibid., p. 36). In the context of 
gacaca, ‘vertical’ reconciliation includes building trust in the justice system as 
well as rebuilding the relationship between civilians and the government that 
restored and monitored court proceedings. 
Gacaca in the post-conflict period
Organisation and implementation
A nationwide data collection programme commenced in 2002 during which 
judges heard testimonies and began compiling potential cases to be tried at 
gacaca. This process reflected elements of the middle range of Crocker’s 
reconciliation spectrum as it prioritised dialogue between individuals about 
their experiences of the 1994 genocide as well as their input into how the justice 
process should proceed (2000, p. 108). Between January and April 2005, a new 
local administration structure began to help judges collect data at the inyumbi 
level, which was later validated according to testimonies given in the cells 
(Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009).9 Trials officially started later that year. Two 
hundred thousand judges, of whom there were nine per bench, heard cases in 
100,000 local areas across Rwanda (Waldorf, 2007, p. 422).10 These judges, 
8 These camps are referred to as Travail d’Intérêt Général (TIG). Individuals serving 
sentences at these camps are called ‘tigistes’. 
9 Inyumbi level refers to groups of ten houses, whereas cells comprise groups of at 
least two hundred adults per area.
10 Waldorf contends that the information-gathering phase led to an ‘avalanche of 
accusations’ amounting to over one million cases, 450,000 of which included 
accusations of violent crimes (2010, p. 189).
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referred to as inyangamugayo, represented a more diverse cross-section of the 
population than those who had resolved disputes during traditional hearings 
prior to and during the pre-colonial period.11 For instance, upwards of one 
third of inyangamugayo at modern gacaca were women, starkly contrasting 
with the male dominance of traditional cases (Waldorf, 2010, p. 188). In the 
post-conflict period, local communities elected inyangamugayo according to 
their perceived level of integrity. These positions were relatively exclusive as 
they were restricted to those who were thought to hold no bias or political 
affiliations and had not participated in the 1994 genocide (Parliament, 2006, 
p. 4).
Cases heard by modern inyangamugayo were divided into four categories 
that referred to classifications of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
These classifications were later reduced to three in the revised version of 
Organic Law in 2008 to include: ‘masterminds’ of the genocide who planned 
and/or supervised acts of genocide and crimes against humanity but did not 
necessarily commit acts of murder;12 government officials, religious leaders or 
military personnel who perpetrated acts of genocide or crimes against humanity 
or encouraged other to do so; and persons who committed acts of rape or 
sexual torture in Category 1. Category 2 includes: well-known murderers 
who used excessive cruelty; persons who carried out acts of torture regardless 
of whether the act ended in the victim’s death; persons who perpetrated acts 
that ‘dehumanised’ victims’ bodies; persons who killed without the intention 
11 The term ‘traditional gacaca’ refers to hearings that took place prior to the arrival 
of German colonists in the late 19th century. This distinction is important as later 
gacaca hearings reflected the colonial period’s ethnically stratified political system, 
as Belgian leaders gave local Tutsi administrators control over judge selection.
Hearings also began to take place at regular intervals rather than as they were 
needed (Karekezi, 2001, p. 32, as cited by Clark, 2010a). See Karekezi (2001)for 
further details about the historical development of gacaca. 
12 As Oomen states, there is significant overlap between the mandates of gacaca and 
the ICTR to prosecute cases of genocide and crimes against humanity, described 
as Category 1 above. These mandates differ, however, with regard to timeframe as 
the ICTR prosecutes crimes committed in 1994, while gacaca prosecuted those 
perpetrated between 1990−4. The ICTR may also prosecute persons accused of 
the aforementioned crimes in Rwanda’s neighbouring states, whereas gacaca may 
only try cases allegedly committed inside Rwanda. Oomen outlines the notion of 
‘complementarity’ with regard to the overlap of these mandates. Complementarity, 
as used in the Rome Statute, defines the jurisdiction of international tribunals over 
cases that domestic courts are unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute (2005b, 
p. 2). A state may be deemed ‘unwilling’ to prosecute a case if the proceedings are 
being carried out in order to shield the person of interest from prosecution; there 
is significant delay in the proceedings with the intention to prevent prosecution; or 
the proceedings are not or will not be carried out independently or impartially (ICC 
Statute, as cited by Williamson, 2006, p. 117). 
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to commit murder; and those who attempted to kill, but did not succeed. 
Category 3 includes persons who carried out crimes against property. Category 
1 and 2 cases could also be heard in domestic courts and the Military Tribunal, 
but were most commonly tried at gacaca (Parliament, 2008a, pp. 18–21).
Attendance at gacaca cases was mandatory for all community members 
living in the hearings’ catchment areas. Mass participation was crucial in the 
first few years of gacaca as witnesses provided the only evidence available to 
the court. As the 1994 genocide was widespread and left virtually no forensic 
evidence, gacaca relied on community members telling the court ‘what they 
saw, what they heard, and what they did’ (victim interview, 3 May 2009). 
Judges were apparently able to identify false testimonies through comparison 
with the detailed records compiled during the data collection period. It was 
also possible for community members and other spectators to question the 
accuracy of statements given during the trials, leading to charges of false 
testimony against the witnesses. Community members were encouraged to 
pose questions to defendants and victims directly. In this context, ‘gacaca 
doesn’t depend on the smartness of lawyers’, as spectators often played the 
roles of both prosecutors and defence lawyers (Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009; 
Parliament, 2008a, p. 8).13
13 Although lawyers were permitted at gacaca, they were rarely present due to cost 
and availability (Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009). Gacaca has been criticised for 
Figure 3.1. Spectators listen to testimonies given by defendants at gacaca in Burema, Kigali 
Province, Rwanda (author’s photo, 5 May 2009)
81GACACA: JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
The direct communication between defendants and survivors within 
the court setting had the potential to yield more than testimonies and 
corroboration. There was a significant emphasis on confession, apology and 
forgiveness within the gacaca system. In fact, pleading guilty, confessing, 
apologising and repenting in front of the Bench of the Gacaca Court, the 
Judicial Officer, or the Public Prosecution Officer in charge of the case prior to 
the court hearing could have resulted in a reduced sentence (Parliament, 2007, 
p. 7). For instance, if successful, defendants charged with Category 2 crimes 
would spend a third of their sentence in jail; half of their full term would be 
spent in a community service camp or TIG and a sixth of the sentence would 
be suspended (ibid.).14 
Victims, perpetrators and community members attending trials were not the 
only stakeholders in the gacaca process. International donors began to provide 
a significant amount of support to the development and day-to-day operation 
of the courts as early as 2002 (Oomen, 2005a, p. 902). Gacaca received 
technical and financial assistance from governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, such as Belgian Technical Cooperation, and multilateral groups 
including the EU, UNDP and UNICEF. Gacaca also received donor support 
from America, Canada, the UK, France and Japan among many others (ibid., 
p. 898). International benefactors assisted more than one hundred projects 
related to the promotion of justice in Rwanda. This included: the provision of 
fuel and vehicles; training of lawyers, judges and police; supplementing judges’ 
salaries; and constructing prisons and libraries (Uvin, 2000, p. 2). Oomen 
argues that while international donors provided financing to other judicial 
bodies trying cases related to the 1994 genocide, including the ICTR and 
Rwanda’s domestic courts, they were particularly supportive of gacaca (2005a, 
pp. 895, 898). This may have been due to gacaca’s use of participatory justice, 
which reflected an international interest in democratisation, decentralisation 
and ‘alternative systems of justice’ during this period (ibid., p. 903).
Themes of maximal justice and reconciliation
Gacaca was funded in part by international donors, yet it remained a state-
sponsored apparatus under the Rwandan government’s guidance throughout 
its development and operation, until its official closure on 18 June 2012. 
The Gacaca Courts system will allow the population of the same Cell, 
the same Sector to work together in order to judge those who have 
participated in the genocide, identify the victims and rehabilitate the 
innocents. The Gacaca Courts system will thus become the basis of 
numerous violations of due process including the absence of legal representation at 
trials (see HRW, 2011a). 
14 A suspended sentence allowed the convicted perpetrator to live at home with the 
obligation to meet periodically with the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions 
(NSGJ) prosecution department.
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collaboration and unity, mainly because when the truth will be known, 
there will be no more suspicion, the author will be punished, justice 
will be done to the victim and to the innocent prisoner who will be 
reintegrated in the Rwandan society (NSGJ, n.d.(b), p. 1).
This quotation illustrates two overarching themes that informed the 
government’s conception of gacaca in the post-conflict context: maximal justice 
and reconciliation. The former refers to the government’s attempt to try the 
cases of everyone suspected of participation in the 1994 genocide, including 
those who committed crimes against property (Parliament, 2008a, p. 21). The 
inclusion of gacaca in the government’s approach to ‘national reconciliation’ 
contrasts starkly with the amnesty process at the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) during which individual applicants could 
apply for and be granted amnesty (Wilson, 2001, p. 23).15
The pursuit of maximal justice at gacaca was informed not only by the high 
levels of public participation in crimes of genocide, but also by the government’s 
stated commitment to eradicating impunity in Rwanda. Jones refers to the 
GNU’s rejection of a blanket amnesty in 1995 as an attempt to dismantle 
the ‘entrenched and institutionalized culture of impunity’ (2010, p. 51).16 
Moreover, the speed at which gacaca processed cases and the individualised 
punishments the inyangamugayo meted out added to the gacaca system’s 
retributive nature.
The theme of reconciliation refers to the government’s stated commitment 
to promoting collaboration, truth, rehabilitation and community participation 
at gacaca, which had both pragmatic and social implications. As previously 
discussed, community members and witnesses were required to provide 
evidence and question the accuracy of testimonies at gacaca. This interaction 
created a forum in which survivors and perpetrators engaged directly with each 
other, a condition Kiss identifies as central to restorative justice (2000, p. 79). 
Moreover, this dialogue resulted in a process that included the acknowledgement 
of past transgressions during the data collection phase (Sarkin, 2001, p. 147). 
These acknowledgements at gacaca commonly came in the form of confession 
or repentance. In the broad body of literature, confession and repentance 
are commonly related to forgiveness, which multiple authors including 
15 In the context of amnesty application at the TRC, applicants were obliged 
to disclose the details of their actions, prove that the violation in question had 
been informed by a political objective, and that it took place within a particular 
timeframe (Wilson, 2001, p. 23).
16 Jones refers to an international conference, convened by President Bizimungu 
in November 1995, during which the option of a blanket amnesty was formally 
dismissed (Government, 1995, p. 16, as cited by Jones, 2010, p. 51). A specialised 
chamber for the prosecution of suspected genocide perpetrators was chosen in its 
place (2010, p. 52). 
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Villa-Vicencio (2005) and Worthington Jr. (2006) argue is supportive of 
reconciliation, but not a prerequisite for its taking place.17
‘Vertical’ reconciliation
Individuals and the government
In its broadest form, the relationship between the government and individual 
Rwandans in the context of modern gacaca was informed by the Rwandan 
government’s role as reinventors of the gacaca system.18 The transition from 
its ‘semi-official and neo-traditional’ use after independence in 1962, was 
instigated, monitored and guided by the government (Reyntjens, 1990, as cited 
by Waldorf, 2010, p. 186).19 The state-guided implementation of gacaca was 
explained to the population through a nationwide Sensitisation Programme. 
According to Dennis Bikesha, former director of training, mobilisation and 
sensitisation at gacaca, the system needed to be explained because, ‘most 
Rwandans didn’t support it or understand it’ (interview, 9 June 2009). The 
public scepticism alluded to in this quotation is antithetical to the government’s 
emphasis of gacaca’s ‘home-grown’ appeal.20 A nationwide survey about social 
cohesion, led by the NURC with funding from the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), found public perception of gacaca 
between 2005 and 2007 to be mixed. The results showed that, although many 
survivors were hopeful that gacaca would bring closure, justice and peace, both 
survivors and prisoners remained concerned about the accuracy and credibility 
of the process. Moreover, survivors, prisoners, judges and witnesses expressed 
fears of reprisal related to their participation at gacaca (NURC, 2008b, p. 6). 
Purportedly, President Kagame and his ‘inner circle’ were also sceptical 
of the gacaca system prior to its adoption (Clark, 2010b, p. 2). Clark claims 
that Kagame opposed the use of gacaca to try cases of genocide and crimes 
against humanity fearing that it would mete out sentences too lenient for 
genocide perpetrators. Clark explains that the courts were established in 
2001 following significant pressure from other officials within the RPF, who 
allegedly highlighted the gacaca system’s benefits with reference to collecting 
17 Villa-Vicencio describes reconciliation as a political process that includes reparations, 
acknowledgement and time for mourning (2005). Worthington Jr. conceives it 
as the process of rebuilding relationships damaged by conflict. He stipulates that 
although forgiveness may make reconciliation between individuals easier to achieve, 
it is not a necessary component (2006).
18 Waldorf refers to modern gacaca as a ‘(re)invented tradition’ that shares nothing 
beyond its name with the traditional conflict resolution mechanism (2010, p. 189). 
19 Reyntjens describes the use of gacaca by local authorities shortly after independence 
as an extra-legal resource for resolving conflicts (1990, as cited by Waldorf, 2010, p. 
186). 
20 See President Kagame’s ‘Preface’ in Clark and Kaufman (eds.) (2008).
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information about the 1994 genocide events and the pursuit of reconciliation 
(ibid.).
The Sensitisation Programme also focused on bolstering popular 
participation at gacaca (Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009). The opportunity 
to participate in administering justice, integral to the promotion of ‘truth-
telling’ and ‘truth-hearing’, as described by Clark (2010a), was thrust upon 
the population by the government (African Rights, 2003, p. 2). As we have 
seen, community members’ participation at gacaca was shaped by both 
theoretical and practical imperatives. At the theoretical level it was guided by 
the assumption that the gacaca process would uncover the truth, and that truth 
promotes justice. From a more pragmatic perspective, participation at gacaca 
formed the primary method for gathering data, corroborating and contradicting 
testimonies. This participation was often coerced, however, as witnesses risked 
jail time if they failed to appear in court, or if the inyangamugayo found their 
testimonies to be false or incomplete (gacaca trial, Butare, 13 May 2009). In 
May 2009, the inyangamugayo threatened a witness at the trial of 15 suspected 
perpetrators of Category 1 crimes with six months’ jail time following several 
accusations from spectators that she was withholding information (ibid.). 
The mandatory nature of participation at gacaca was not restricted to 
witnesses. Waldorf highlights the forced closure of shops on days of weekly 
hearings as well as the threat of fines for truancy as evidence that the local 
population was being pressured to attend gacaca (Avocats sans Frontières, 
2004, p. 4, as cited by Waldorf, 2010, p. 190). Coercion was apparent when 
a hearing was postponed on 11 February 2009 to facilitate a meeting between 
several judges and the police. The meeting resulted in the rescindment of an 
inyangamugayo’s resignation after he was purportedly ‘strong-armed’ by the 
police and other judges into the decision to return to the bench (gacaca trial, 
Butare, 11 February 2009).
Although spectators were encouraged to engage with victims and defendants, 
they were rarely given opportunities to speak directly with government 
members during trials. State representatives did occasionally attend hearings 
in order to monitor proceedings. For instance, members of the Peace Building 
and Conflict Management (PBCM) department at the NURC occasionally 
monitored cases and produced reports on their findings. The PBCM attempted 
to ‘correct injustice’ by making recommendations to either the National 
Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ), the TIG office, or the Ministry of 
Justice (Minijust) (Mukajiranga interview, 9 June 2009). Representatives from 
the NSGJ also monitored cases from time to time (Bikesha interview, 9 June 
2009). Although government representatives were infrequently in attendance 
at gacaca, the GNU stated a commitment which had the potential to foster 
trust between individuals and the state: that reparations would be provided 
to survivors for material losses suffered during the 1994 genocide (Waldorf, 
2010, p. 191).
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These losses were officially recorded during the data collection period in 
2001 with the stated intention of communicating this information to the 
Compensation Fund for remuneration. Waldorf states that, as of 2009, this 
fund had not been created (Waldorf, 2010). On 15 June 2012, the Survivors 
Fund (SURF), an advocacy group for genocide survivors, wrote of its concerns 
about how thousands of compensation and restitution awards granted by gacaca 
would be enforced after the courts’ official closure on 18 June 2012. The group 
called for a Task Force for Reparations to be created to identify compensation 
cases that have not yet been fulfilled (SURF, 2012). As of May 2014, the 
government had not yet enforced compensation awards made through the 
courts including gacaca (SURF, 2014b, p. 4). An official Minijust statement 
explained that the government has committed 132 billion RwF to date to 
support survivors’ basic healthcare and education needs, but compensation, 
reparation and support for their social protection are not priorities at this time 
(Minijust, 2014).
Article 95 of Organic Law no. 16/2004 refers to the compensation that 
ought to be provided to those survivors whose property was looted or otherwise 
damaged between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. It stipulates that 
suspects found guilty of crimes against property must pay for or repair the 
damage caused whenever possible (Parliament, 2004, p. 26). This was often 
not feasible, however, as most perpetrators were too poor to repay the full 
value of the goods they stole or damaged (Waldorf, 2010, p. 191). That there 
was no indemnification law to ensure compensation regardless of perpetrators’ 
ability to pay may have created tension in the relationship between individual 
survivors and the government (PRI, 2010, p. 46). It may also have damaged 
victims’ trust in the gacaca institution. The lack of legislative support is 
compounded by inadequate compensation through government-led initiatives 
including the Fund for the Support of Genocide Survivors (FARG) and the 
imidugudu resettlement scheme for the rural population that led to houses 
being destroyed without remuneration in 2001 (HRW, 2001, p. 2).21
Survivors who had their property damaged or destroyed were not the only 
individuals who did not receive reparations from the government. Those who 
were wrongly imprisoned following the 1994 genocide and the families of 
innocent people who died in prison have not been compensated. In December 
2003, an NURC meeting resulted in a formal recommendation to create a 
separate compensation fund for these individuals. As of June 2014, there was 
no evidence that such a fund had been created. The government’s failure to 
compensate those wrongly accused or to adequately subsidise the reparations 
that perpetrators could not pay may have had devastating consequences for 
relationships between individuals and the state: 
21 The consequences of inadequate support from organisations including FARG and 
projects like imidugudu for survivors will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
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In many contexts, reparations have been shown to be a key element 
of the reconciliation process. Whatever their form, reparations hold 
a particular significance, representing a form of ‘symbolic healing’, 
for losses suffered, as well as social acknowledgement for the suffering 
of survivors. Far from being a separate issue, reparations are part and 
parcel of transitional justice mechanisms, alongside truth-seeking and 
justice …
The delays in addressing the compensation issue and the continued 
absence of a clear decision by the Rwandan authorities led to the 
bitter disillusionment of survivors, many of whom lost all hope of 
being officially compensated. Some survivors turned their backs on 
the Gacaca process as a result, resorting to individual agreements with 
released detainees, who effectively bought their silence (ibid., pp. 45–
6).
Groups and the government
The state-led de facto ban of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities led to the creation 
of new group identities derived from events during and after the 1994 
genocide22 including refugees, victims, survivors and perpetrators (Mamdani, 
2001, p. 266). Mamdani clarifies that the term ‘refugees’ is composed of two 
smaller groups including ‘old’ and ‘new caseload’ refugees and indicates the 
ethnic nature of these terms. ‘Old caseload’ refers to Tutsi who fled systematic 
violence before the 1994 genocide began, whereas ‘new caseload’ refugees are 
exclusively Hutu who left Rwanda after the 1994 genocide ended (ibid.).
In the context of gacaca, group identities included victims, defendants, 
convicted perpetrators and those attending TIG (tigistes). Unlike the groups 
of refugees listed above, these identities did not relate exclusively to ethnicity. 
The labels of defendants, perpetrators and tigistes were assigned according to 
accusations and judgments at gacaca and were primarily assigned to Hutu, 
although some Tutsi were sentenced for crimes against humanity and acts of 
genocide (Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009).23 In contrast, membership of the 
22 The de facto ban of ethnicity in public discourse is identifiable in Article 9 of the 
2003 Constitution. It states, ‘The State of Rwanda commits itself to conform to the 
following principles and to promote and enforce the respect thereof: 1) fighting the 
ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; 2) eradication of ethnic, regional 
and other divisions and promotion of national unity’ (MOD, 2003, p. 4). I use the 
term ‘de facto’ with reference to the ban because no law has been written explicitly 
banning the use of ethnic labels in government documents or public discourse. 
Instead, the use of these identifiers is discouraged by laws against ‘sectarianism’ and 
‘genocide ideology’ as well as government rhetoric about the unity of all Rwandans.
23 Statistics about the ethnicity of defendants at gacaca were not requested or provided 
during this interview. Instead, Bikesha observed that ‘most [defendants] identified 
as Hutu’ in response to a question about the promotion of collective guilt at gacaca 
(interview, 9 June 2009).
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victim group belonged exclusively to Tutsi. The label ‘victim’ at gacaca, like that 
of ‘survivor’ more generally, referred to Tutsi who remained in Rwanda during 
the 1994 genocide. Excluding Hutu and Twa from this group may have created 
tension between multiple groups and the government.
The exclusive nature of membership in the survivor group is dictated in 
part by the ‘victor’s narrative’ of the events leading up to and during the 1994 
genocide. For instance, although the government maintains that upwards 
of 60,000 ‘moderate Hutu’ were killed during that time, these murders are 
considered to be crimes against humanity rather than acts of genocide 
(Hintjens, 2008, p. 84). For Helen Hintjens this is a ‘drastic underestimate’, 
who contends that a more accurate figure lies somewhere between the RPF’s 
estimate of 60,000 and the 500,000 gauged by Christian Davenport, a 
sociologist who conducts research about genocide and political conflict (ibid., 
2008, pp. 84–5). 
The limited parameters of these post-conflict identities are demonstrated 
by the fact that ‘moderate Hutu’ − targeted for extermination immediately after 
the genocide began − were excluded from the survivor and victim groups. As 
discussed in the introduction, the definition of genocide outlined in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
does not include acts committed with the intention to destroy political groups 
(UN, 1948, Article II). As such, it is the term ‘moderate’ that transforms the 
intentional mass murder of this group into crimes against humanity rather 
than acts of genocide. Even if the term ‘genocide’ is not used to describe the 
systematic murders of ‘Hutu moderates’, the terms ‘survivor’ and ‘victim’ would 
capture the trauma and violence associated with their massacre. This exclusion 
further separates Hutu and Tutsi experiences during the 1994 genocide and 
for some may devalue the trauma and violence suffered by the former group. 
Membership of the victim and survivor groups was made all the more restrictive 
in 2009 when the term ‘Genocide against the Tutsi’ was introduced. 
Lemarchand points to the murders of former Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, the leaders of the opposition Parti Social Démocratique, 
49 journalists who criticised the 1994 genocide, and tens of thousands of 
Hutu opposition party members, among others, to highlight the danger of 
forgetting those Hutu who were targeted during the genocide those who had 
refused to join in the killing, and those who actively protected Tutsi friends 
and neighbours from attack (2008, p. 50). In the context of gacaca, failure to 
officially acknowledge many Hutus’ resistance to the violence may also have 
impeded the building of trust between the government and Hutu civilians 
who did not participate in the 1994 genocide. Although President Kagame 
contends that the RPF government recognises the heroism of Hutu civilians 
who opposed the genocide, authors including Hintjens (2008), Waldorf 
(2007) and Lemarchand (2008) discuss the dangers of the government-level 
assumption that all Hutu in Rwanda are either guilty of genocide acts or have 
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directly benefited from the crimes committed by others. The collective guilt of 
Hutu that these authors touch upon stems from the notion of victor’s justice in 
which the RPF, in its joint role as political party and rebel group which ended 
the 1994 genocide, decided who may or may not be considered a survivor and 
receive justice at gacaca (Waldorf, 2010, p. 191). 
Victor’s justice also relates to the exclusion of crimes perpetrated by the RPF 
from prosecution at gacaca. This omission was supported by the government’s 
vehement denials that RPF/RPA members carried out acts of genocide or crimes 
against humanity during or after the 1994 genocide. President Kagame does 
contend, however, that appropriate judicial bodies have punished individual 
RPF members found guilty of ‘vengeance’ crimes between 1990−4. He also 
identifies any accusations of genocide or crimes against humanity made against 
the RPF as incorrect and a clear propagation of ‘genocide ideology’. ‘To try to 
construct a case of moral equivalency between genocide crimes and isolated 
crimes committed by rogue RPF members is morally bankrupt and an insult 
to all Rwandans, especially survivors of the genocide’ (Kagame, 2008, p. xxii).
The RPF’s impunity at gacaca, like that at the ICTR, demonstrates 
a political interest in preventing official acknowledgement and criminal 
responsibility for human rights abuses and violations perpetrated by RPF 
members during the civil war and 1994 genocide, or the RPA after the latter 
concluded. At gacaca, this strategy may have impeded the successful rebuilding 
Figure 3.2. Sign commemorating the ‘Jenoside Yakorewe Abatutsi’ (Genocide against the 
Tutsi) at former Ecole Technique Officielle, Kicukiro, Kigali Province (author’s photo, 7 
April 2009)
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of relationships between the RPF and civilians directly affected by these crimes 
as well as the Hutu population more generally. Legally dismissing testimonies 
against the RPF prevented accountability on both sides of the conflict and 
expunged from ‘official’ memory those whose rights were abused by the RPF 
rebels (Lemarchand, 2008, p. 69). More broadly, it directly contradicted the 
RPF’s stated commitment to eradicating the ‘entrenched and institutionalized 
culture of impunity’, as described by Jones (2010, p. 51). This result was 
accentuated by RPF crimes being referred to as acts of ‘vengeance’ committed 
by rogue RPF members, a description which added moral legitimacy to these 
murders and prevented these acts being associated with cases of genocide or 
crimes against humanity.
The political interests that guided the omission of RPF crimes from gacaca 
and excluded Hutu from survivor and victim groups had the potential to not only 
frustrate the building of trust between groups and the state, but also to actively 
damage the relationship. Damage may have been caused by the perception 
that gacaca was a political instrument used solely to punish Hutu civilians 
collectively, one that may not have been entirely accurate, as punishment at 
gacaca was individualised and Tutsi were sometimes, albeit rarely, prosecuted 
for crimes related to the 1994 genocide. And yet, as Vandeginste argues, the 
mere existence of this negative perception may have diminished gacaca’s ability 
to promote truth (1999, p. 12). Moreover, the RPF’s impunity at gacaca and 
failure to recognise the heroism and suffering of many Hutu civilians may have 
damaged groups’ trust in the gacaca process. It may also have decreased the 
likelihood of ‘vertical reconciliation’ since it limited trust in the government as 
the purveyor of justice and reconciliation in the post-conflict context.
‘Horizontal’ reconciliation
Groups with other groups
Phil Clark describes the different relationships between groups and individuals 
at gacaca, which he names as ‘group-to-group’, ‘individual-to-group’ and 
‘individual-to-individual’ reconciliation (2010a, p. 333). As the gacaca process 
was shaped by the popular participation of those living in the areas surrounding 
the courts, group-to-group interactions may have included victims, defendants, 
tigistes and community members. Arguably, the most pertinent relationship 
to be rebuilt at gacaca was that of victims and defendants or survivors and 
perpetrators more broadly. As previously discussed, dialogue between these 
two groups at gacaca was primarily shaped by testimonies, confessions and 
apologies given during court proceedings. ‘Gacaca Courts function on the 
principle of dialogue and speech which must circulate, liberate, accuse and 
testify. Testimony is thus the cornerstone of the Gacaca process’ (Avocats 
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sans Frontières, 2008, p. 40). Testimony given by both groups, as well as by 
witnesses, was presumed to uncover the truth about 1994 genocide events 
(NSGJ n.d.(b), p. 1).24
Jeremy Sarkin defines the concept of truth in the gacaca context as relating 
to the official acknowledgement of past human rights abuses. He argues that 
recognising these abuses can create dialogue between groups and individuals 
in society (2001, p. 147). In the context of gacaca hearings, acknowledging 
past wrongdoings may have been limited by the trial’s focus. For instance, the 
details uncovered may have related to the acts of a small number of defendants 
or may have been limited by the amount of participation from defendants, 
judges, witnesses and community members on a particular day (Daly and 
Sarkin, 2007, p. 28).25 Moreover, the truth uncovered at gacaca may have been 
mostly ‘forensic’ in nature since it was revealed through public denunciations 
and pertained mostly to the details of who, where, how and against whom 
crimes were committed (Ingelaere, 2007, p. 36). Ingelaere refers to truth at 
gacaca as forensic at best, arguing that the reasons for genocide crimes having 
been perpetrated were commonly omitted from testimonies (ibid., p. 36). He 
clarifies that these details do not fit the ‘logic of criminal trials’ as the goal of 
gacaca was to establish whether evidence was provided for specific charges to 
be given, rather than to understand perpetrators’ motives (ibid.). Ingelaere’s 
analysis refers to the data-collection phase of the gacaca process that began in 
2002.
In some cases, these details may have been enough to encourage survivors 
and perpetrators to engage in further dialogue. ‘Survivors are trying to 
understand what happened to them; if perpetrators talk to them, help them 
and listen to them, it will help’ (victim interview, 17 July 2010). In other cases, 
testimonies and confessions may have failed to give survivors any pertinent 
information, as they may not have been entirely truthful. Waldorf questions 
the quality of truth-telling during gacaca proceedings as all participants had 
many incentives to lie, such as fear of reprisal upon testifying or passing the 
blame in an attempt to evade conviction (2007, p. 428). In some cases, passing 
the blame took place when defendants accused those who were not present of 
criminal responsibility or claimed that superiors in the militia or government 
24 The ‘objectives’ of gacaca describe the relationship between testimony and truth as, 
‘the way in which the Gacaca Institution has been conceived will allow [them] to 
discover the truth because: the citizens who have been the eyewitnesses of the facts 
that occurred mainly in their cells will give evidence’ (NSGJ, n.d.(b), p. 1).
25 The quality of participation may have been affected by logistical problems 
associated with local trials. Longman argues that the decentralised nature of gacaca 
proceedings made it challenging to try cases when violence was not contained 
to the local area. For instance, many perpetrators committed acts of genocide or 
crimes against humanity in communities other than their own but commonly faced 
accusations only in their local region (2006, p. 220).
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forced them to commit crimes (gacaca trial, Burema, 12 February 2009; PRI, 
2010, p. 45). The defendants at a trial in Burema, a Kigali suburb, repeatedly 
blamed the murder of four civilians on a man who had died before the trial 
began. Nine out of the 11 defendants accused were later given sentences ranging 
from two to 15 years (gacaca trial, Burema, 12 February 2009). Avocats sans 
Frontières (ASF) found most defendants in the cases it monitored between 
October 2006 and April 2007 accepted only partial responsibility for crimes 
they had committed. Instead, defendants attempted to make the crime appear 
collective in order to reduce their own individual culpability (2008, p. 49).
This appeal to collective responsibility may have damaged relationships 
between Hutu and Tutsi more generally as it emphasised the perceived guilt of 
all Hutu for acts of genocide (ibid., p. 44). The sense of collective responsibility 
would have been particularly detrimental in light of the RPF’s impunity at 
gacaca for crimes against Hutu civilians. It also presented a contradiction 
between the emphasis on ethnicity, whether directly or indirectly at gacaca, and 
the construction of a singular national identity devoid of ethnic labels in the 
post-conflict period. Although ethnicity could have been discussed at gacaca, 
the perception of Hutu civilians’ collective guilt stands in stark contrast to 
the government message of national unity in official reconciliation discourse, 
government documents and public events (Waldorf, 2009, p. 104).
Individuals and groups
The relationship between individuals and groups at gacaca was primarily shaped 
by direct communication related to apology, sentencing and reintegration. 
Although these interactions may have been informed by differing moral and 
pragmatic incentives, all were impacted by the participatory nature of gacaca. 
This communal character, with regard to community participation and the 
fact that many courts were set in communities where the violence had taken 
place, may have created a number of different dynamics between individuals 
and groups. The first of these was influenced by the act of public shaming. 
Daly and Sarkin argue that the shaming of individual defendants by groups 
of community members at gacaca, which include victims and witnesses, may 
have promoted social cohesion in the community (2007, p. 84). Moreover, 
they contend that the public’s participation and commitment to the trial may 
have legitimised the entire process by demonstrating popular support for the 
sentence meted out to the defendant. This sense of legitimacy, they argue, 
could in turn have supported the subsequent reintegration of the defendant 
into the community after the sentence was completed (ibid.).
It is plausible that public shaming resulted in confession, apology and/or 
repentance from the defendant at gacaca, who could choose to apologise to a 
single victim, the community, or even the nation. A defendant being tried for 
Category 2 crimes in Burema repeatedly apologised to community members 
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present and the nation of Rwanda, but refused to apologise directly to the 
victim during the trial (gacaca trial, Burema, 12 February 2009). Villa-Vicencio 
highlights the importance of apology in promoting reconciliation. He contends 
that apologies may restore dignity to the victim or support the development 
of a relationship between the wrongdoer and those who have been wronged 
(2005, p. 59). Confession, apology and repentance also had pragmatic value 
for defendants at gacaca as they could have resulted in drastically reduced 
sentences when made in conjunction with guilty pleas (Parliament, 2007).
In order to receive a reduced sentence, these convicted perpetrators were 
required to complete community service at TIG, a programme which represents 
a shift towards the reeducation and reintegration of perpetrators into society, 
particularly their own communities.26 At TIG camps in Rebero and Nyanza, 
tigistes wake up at 4am to breakfast and a prayer session, begin working at 6am 
and finish at 2pm (Ndoli interview, 19 June 2009). They spend their working 
hours constructing terraces, building roads, breaking stones for paving and 
building houses for survivors. Although the principal activity in the camps is 
community service, the stated goal of the programme is to ‘change their [the 
tigistes] minds’ with regard to violence, ‘divisionism’, ‘genocide ideology’ and 
the promotion of ‘national reconciliation’ (Kabayiza interview, 19 June 2009). 
Secondary stated goals of the TIG programme include punishing 
perpetrators and supporting the country’s reconstruction and development. In 
addition to the skills tigistes learn from their community service activities, they 
are given lessons in reading, writing, craft-making and hygiene. Tigistes are 
also given lectures about the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
and peaceful coexistence in a purported effort to ‘turn these bad guys into 
good guys’ (ibid.).27 In some cases, they interact directly and regularly with 
survivors living near the camps, interactions which revolve around services 
to the community such as bringing water to vulnerable survivors or building 
and repairing survivors’ houses that may have been damaged during the 
1994 genocide (Ndoli interview, 19 June 2009). As individual perpetrators 
are normally sent to camps near their home communities, it is possible they 
will interact with survivors who have been directly affected by the crimes 
they committed. This interaction is particularly poignant as tigistes are most 
commonly perpetrators convicted of Category 2 crimes including murder and 
assault. When asked about the risk of tension or violence between survivors 
and tigistes living in the same area, Kabayiza responded that he ‘[had] never 
seen peasants throwing rocks at tigistes or tigistes using machetes to kill people 
on the outside’ (interview, 19 June 2009).
26 Although the gacaca courts officially closed in June 2012, the TIG programme 
continues to operate. 
27 See PRI (2004), p. 17 for a detailed outline of lectures given to detainees attending 
TIG.
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The TIG programme represents much of the reparative aspect of what can be 
described as restorative justice in Rwanda (Melvin, 2010, p. 943). Perpetrators 
found guilty at gacaca were required to compensate victims to the best of 
their ability and to donate to the FARG (Kabayiza interview, 19 June 2009). 
As many perpetrators were not able to compensate victims financially, TIG 
provides the framework through which they perform acts that aid survivors. 
Clark suggests that these reparative acts may in some cases demonstrate tigistes’ 
remorse, sincerity, or intention to rebuild relationships with those they have 
harmed, elements Lederach describes as integral to post-conflict reconciliation 
(Clark, 2008, p. 351; Lederach, 1997, p. 26).
Although this may be true in some cases, exchanging repentance and apology 
for a reduced sentence may have weakened the sincerity of a tigiste’s desire to 
rebuild damaged relationships. Waldorf highlights the differences between 
Rwandans’ perceptions of gacaca’s reduced punishment, arguing that many Hutu 
perceived gacaca as a means through which wrongly imprisoned family members 
could have been released from prison. This perception opposes that of many Tutsi 
survivors who viewed gacaca as a form of ‘disguised amnesty’ (2007, p. 428).
The latter description closely resembles that of Jean Baptiste Kayigamba, a 
journalist and genocide survivor, who fears that the RPF’s official reconciliation 
programme fosters impunity. Kayigamba argues that the failure to bring about 
justice for crimes of genocide, in an attempt to promote the government’s 
vision of ‘national reconciliation’ or reintegration, may produce the opposite 
effect. Shortcuts to justice, such as plea-bargaining at gacaca, may have released 
perpetrators and those who planned the 1994 genocide from guilt and reduced 
their accountability for the crimes they committed (2008, p. 41). This fear, 
purportedly shared by many survivors, may have been exacerbated by the 
risk of reprisal attacks and murders of survivors by defendants and released 
perpetrators; a risk Dennis Bikesha argues was the genocide court’s greatest 
obstacle (ibid.; Bikesha interview, 9 June 2009).
Individuals with other individuals
Phil Clark argues that gacaca provided participants with an opportunity to 
share their thoughts about what they had witnessed and experienced during 
the genocide (2010a, p. 330). As previously discussed, dialogue between 
individuals during trials, like that between groups may have been restricted by 
the case parameters. As such, it may have symbolised the beginning of longer-
term discussion between individuals and groups, rather than have brought 
about a deeper sense of connection between individuals. A 2010 Penal Reform 
International (PRI) report touches on gacaca’s potential to facilitate dialogue 
between survivors and perpetrators. It discusses gacaca’s importance as a forum 
for such discussion but, like Clark, points to the need for dialogue to continue 
between both parties after the trial concludes (2010, p. 66).
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This form of engagement was in some cases paired with an expectation 
of forgiveness at gacaca, which in this context could have been sought by the 
defendant and granted by the victim. The pressure felt by some survivors to 
absolve perpetrators during the gacaca process likely resulted from the ‘state-
sponsored “requirement” to seek and grant forgiveness’ (ibid., p. 51).28 This 
expectation resembles the thicker end of Crocker’s reconciliation spectrum. 
Crocker warns that forgiveness is unlikely to occur following the relatively 
short proceedings of transitional justice mechanisms. Moreover, he contends 
that it is ‘morally objectionable’ to force people to agree about the past and 
forgive following conflict (2000, p. 108).
The perception of a requirement to forgive at gacaca is antithetical 
to Martha Minow’s argument that the power to do so belongs to victims 
and cannot be claimed by others as a right (1998, p. 17). This perceived 
pressure resembles the emphasis on forgiveness at Human Rights Violations 
Hearings and during the application process for amnesty at the South African 
TRC (Wilson, 2001, p. 119). As with the TRC, forgiveness at gacaca was 
influenced by political and religious overtones. The perceived pressure to 
forgive may have created further tension between victims and defendants 
at gacaca. For instance, it may have created an unrealistic expectation of 
being forgiven, diminished the sincerity of the sentiment, or caused offence 
or resentment if an individual survivor was not ready to forgive (PRI, 2010, 
p. 51). While attending the trial of those accused of murdering five members 
of his family, the victim explained that forgiveness ‘c’est un long chemin’ (is 
a long road) (interview, 17 July 2010). 
Interactions at gacaca may also have been accompanied by expectations of 
a moral transformation on the part of the defendant at the trial, at TIG, or in 
prison. The hope for moral conversion was in some cases related to confession: 
‘Those who are cured, I think they are the majority, they are doing it from their 
heart. That is the best’ (Bikesha interview, 20 July 2010). This expectation, 
like that of forgiveness, could have put undue pressure on the relationship 
between individual survivors and perpetrators. It could have created unrealistic 
expectations of change in a relatively short period, or it may have fostered 
complacency with regard to further dialogue about the actions taken and 
decisions made by perpetrators during the 1994 genocide.
Conclusion
Gacaca’s stated objectives reiterate the RPF’s stated commitments to truth, 
justice and reconciliation. In practice, the relationship between the gacaca 
courts and the government’s vision of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ reconciliation is 
28 The PRI report, ‘Eight years on … a record of gacaca monitoring in Rwanda’, 
discusses the perceived requirement to forgive with reference to ‘numerous cases’ in 
which survivors felt pressured by the government or the Church (2010, p. 51).
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more tenuous, a tension created by contradictions between these commitments 
and the ways in which gacaca functioned in social and political practice. For 
instance, the stated commitment to eradicating impunity was made less 
meaningful when RPF crimes were excluded from prosecution. This restriction 
effectively denied justice to Hutu civilians targeted during the genocide and 
damaged the potential for building trust between this group and the state. That 
damage was made potentially more severe by the term ‘Genocide against the 
Tutsi’ being introduced and by the contradiction between gacaca’s emphasis 
on ethnic identities and the government’s construction of a singular national 
identity that supersedes ethnic labels. 
In a more general sense, the way in which gacaca functioned was shaped 
by its reinventors’ political interests. State influence was particularly evident 
with regard to ‘vertical’ reconciliation at gacaca. The government’s failure to 
provide adequate compensation, accept responsibility for crimes committed by 
the RPF or RPA, and officially acknowledge Hutu victims of the civil war and 
1994 genocide may have damaged connections between individuals/groups 
and the government. The influence of the RPF was also detectable with regard 
to ‘horizontal’ reconciliation. Like all relationships at gacaca, these connections 
were informed by the assumption that truth promotes justice and justice leads 
to reconciliation. In some documented cases the impetus to lay blame on 
others promoted collective guilt and obscured or manipulated the truth about 
events during the 1994 genocide. Moreover, the incentive to confess in order 
to receive a reduced sentence may not have yielded accurate testimonies or the 
sincerity sought by some victims. The perceived pressure to forgive or make a 
moral transformation may have also hindered relationship rebuilding between 
victims and defendants. If we apply Lederach’s conception of reconciliation 
here, there is hope that continued dialogue between individuals after gacaca 
concludes might support the rebuilding of both trust and relationships more 
generally as it creates the opportunity to share experiences of the past and 
thoughts of the future.

Chapter 4
Nation-building and a return to unity
The RPF’s stated commitment to promoting its vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ is outlined in official documents including Vision 2020 and 
the 2003 Constitution. It was not until 2007, however, that the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s objectives were officially stated, with 
the publication of the National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation. These 
objectives include ‘building a new nation that promotes the national pride 
and equal rights to all citizens’ (NURC, 2007, p. 15). This stated commitment 
to building a new nation is echoed in presidential speeches, government 
documents and official reconciliation discourse.
Nation-building can be understood as ‘a political objective as well as a 
strategy, for reaching specific political objectives’, as described by political 
scientist Jochen Hippler (2005, p. 2).1 Hippler contends that this particular 
understanding includes the creation or solidification of a political system by 
internal or external leaders who are seeking to promote their own interests or 
to increase their own political control (ibid.). He continues by outlining what 
he deems to be the three central components of successful nation-building 
programmes. The first component, ‘integrative ideology’, legitimises political 
restructuring and encourages public support by including the population in a 
shared national identity (ibid., p. 8).2 The second refers to the integration of 
loosely connected groups into the single society. The final component includes 
creating a strong central state apparatus that can effectively govern the entire 
nation (ibid., p. 9). 
In the Rwandan context, the main driver of nation-building is the RPF 
government. This agenda was formally articulated in Vision 2020, published 
in 2000, which focuses primarily on the government’s plan to support the 
nation’s economic development. Vision 2020 also poses pertinent questions 
1 Text italicised here and below as in original. Hippler offers a second definition of 
nation-building as a ‘process of sociopolitical development’, which includes integrating 
loosely connected communities into a single nation-state over a long period (2005, 
p. 6). He contends that these overlapping definitions frequently suffer from 
inconsistent and unclear application (ibid.).
2 Text italicised as in original.
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related to how the nation will be rebuilt following the 1994 genocide. ‘How 
do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to 
become? How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity? 
What are the transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory 
social and economic situation?’ (Minecofin, 2000, p. 1). The RPF’s nation-
building agenda reflects several elements highlighted by Hippler, including 
constructing and disseminating an inclusive national ideology, and creating a 
strong central state apparatus that tolerates little opposition or criticism. This 
agenda also functions to secure the RPF’s political dominance and advance the 
government’s economic objectives.
Vision 2020 opens with a preface by President Kagame in which he 
describes the aspirations of all Rwandans to transform the nation into 
a middle-income country by the year 2020 (Minecofin, 2000, p. 2). This 
purportedly communal ambition to foster prosperity provides insight into 
not only the RPF’s vision for development, but also its vision of unity 
and nation-building more broadly. Stepping away from the RPF’s plans to 
promote economic development, a point to which I will return in chapter 
6, we are left with a description of the government’s aspirations for the 
future: ‘Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and 
united nation, proud of its fundamental values, politically stable and without 
discrimination amongst its citizens’ (ibid., p. 4).
This quotation sheds light on government priorities within the Vision 2020 
development programme as well as the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme more generally. Although ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ are commonly 
linked as ‘national unity and reconciliation’ in government documents and 
official discourse, the terms relate to separate concepts and priorities within 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme parameters. For instance if the 
quotation above is analysed in conjunction with the RPF’s stated commitments 
to unity and nation-building, the aspiration for Rwanda ‘to become a modern, 
strong and united nation’, can be understood as a major goal of the official 
programme (ibid.). And, as we shall see, the promotion of Rwandan values, 
political stability and eradication of discrimination can be interpreted as the 
steps the government deemed necessary to achieve this goal. This particular 
arrangement has significant implications for the promotion of the RPF’s vision 
of ‘national reconciliation’ after the 1994 genocide.
Overlapping agendas 
The path to national unity 
The government’s stated commitment to promoting national unity and to 
building the nation imbues ‘national reconciliation’ with both forward- 
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and backward-looking gazes, structures and presuppositions.3 Unity is 
most commonly depicted in official discourse and documents as ‘national 
unity’. According to the 2003 Constitution’s preamble, national unity and 
reconciliation were ‘seriously shaken by the genocide and its consequences’ 
(MOD, 2003, p. 1). It can be inferred from this quotation as well as from 
numerous other examples of official reconciliation discourse and documents 
that the government perceives national unity to have existed prior to 1994.4
There are people who can ascertain that it is not necessary to prove 
that there was the unity of Rwandans before the Colonialists’ arrival. 
However it is necessary, because there are many people who are 
currently writing that killings during the genocide and massacres which 
took place in Rwanda from 1959 until the culminating war of 1994 
took root in bad relations between Hutus and Tutsis before the White 
People’s arrival. This was written by some of the White People and 
Rwandans.
The truth from history is that before the Colonial period, i.e. before the 
year 1900, that Catholic Missionaries began to live in our country, in 
which there was strong unity, between Rwandans: no ethnical war took 
place between them before that year…
That unity was for all Rwandans: Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. They were 
making up all together what our ancestors called ‘The King’s People’. 
All of them also knew they were Rwandans, that Rwanda was their 
country, that nobody could say that he had the right to it more than 
the others. Even though they said that Rwanda was belonging to the 
King (Rwanda’s Owner, the Country’s Owner), they ascertained that 
‘the King was supported by the warriors’ (Office of the President, 1999, 
p. 6).
Although this document and official discourse more generally emphasise the 
role of German and Belgian colonists in propagating ethnic tension in Rwanda, 
3 Zorbas describes the backward- and forward-looking pillars of what she refers to as 
the ‘RPF Healing Truth’ (2009, p. 128). This narrative blames the 1994 genocide 
violence upon the ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ of the past. It also looks to 
the future to prevent the recurrence of genocide by seeking to build a ‘prosperous, 
peaceful future for the country’ (ibid., p. 136). The backward- and forward-looking 
gazes discussed in this book extend beyond the 1994 genocide to include the social 
cohesion and national unity that allegedly existed during the pre-colonial era. They 
also refer to the RPF’s stated commitment to foster this form of social cohesion in 
the future. 
4 These examples include: ‘The unity of the Rwandans before the colonial period’ 
(Office of the President, 1999), from which the above quotation is taken; Aggée 
Shyaka Mugabe’s report, ‘Community conflicts in Rwanda’ (NURC, 2007); and 
‘Report on the evaluation of national unity and reconciliation’ (NURC, 2001).
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neither colonial power is included in the official reconciliation programme. This 
absence may relate to priorities that shape the RPF’s nation-building agenda 
and development programme. For instance, as Belgium and Germany are both 
bilateral donors, the RPF may fear potential damage to the positive relationship 
between Rwanda and these former colonial rulers should they be included in 
the programme.5 Holding these nations to account for alleged wrongdoing 
during the colonial period may also be perceived to detract from the goals of 
the nation-building agenda. Rather than rebuilding relationships with former 
colonising countries, this agenda prioritises the restoration of the unity that was 
purportedly destroyed by colonial leaders’ segregationist policies (ibid., p. 52). 
This metaphorical return to the unity that existed between ‘The King’s People’ 
prior to the arrival of German and Belgian colonists, serves multiple functions 
with regard to promoting the government’s conception of national unity (ibid., 
p. 7),6 the first of which is to promote the image of a pre-colonial utopia. The 
utopian qualities of harmonious coexistence are most prominently illustrated 
by the government’s essentialist rendering of social relations between ethnic 
groups in Rwanda during this period.
The ‘victor’s narrative’ describes these relations as having been highly 
flexible. Ethnic labels allegedly reflected social status rather than immutable 
racial qualities as institutionalised by colonial leaders (NURC, 2007, p. 4; 
ingando lecture, 3 July 2009).7 Johan Pottier, a sociologist specialising in the 
Great Lakes Region, accuses the government of over-simplifying the nation’s 
pre-colonial history. He argues that the historical narrative the RPF government 
disseminated glosses over the origins of ethnicity in Rwanda. Pottier contends 
that the RPF emphasises pre-colonial ethnic unity in order to make ethnicity 
appear irrelevant within the ruling party, which he argues is dominated by a 
Tutsi minority (2002, p. 111).
5 In 2011, Belgium and Rwanda agreed upon an Indicative Development 
Programme that includes €160 million in bilateral aid to be donated by Belgium 
during the period 2011−14 (see the Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs website 
at: http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/where_we_
work/partner_countries/rwanda/ (accessed 12 March 2015)). In that same year, 
Germany pledged an annual aid donation of €20 million to Rwanda over three 
years (AFP, 29 July 2012).
6 ‘The King’s People’ refers to all Hutu, Tutsi and Twa living in Rwanda during 
the pre-colonial period (Office of the President, 1999, p. 6). Reference to ‘The 
King’ appears elsewhere in the document as a unity symbol based on his supposed 
transcendence of ethnicity: ‘After he was enthroned, people said that, “he was not 
umututsi any more”, but the King for the people’ (ibid., p. 8).
7 Eltringham refers to the introduction of mandatory identity cards for all Rwandan 
citizens as the culmination of the ‘process of racialization’ during the colonial era. 
Belgian leaders issued these cards, which listed the carrier’s ethnic identity, during 
the 1933−4 census (2004, p. 18). 
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More broadly, the RPF’s depiction of ethnic relations in Rwandan history 
may restrict the ways in which unity and ‘national reconciliation’ are promoted 
in the present. As political theorist Andrew Schaap argues, a focus on the return 
to a form of social unity that allegedly existed in a country’s past may have 
detrimental consequences for current reconciliation processes. Schaap locates 
the rhetorical invocation of such collective terms as ‘we’ and ‘the people’ within 
the religious dimensions of reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm (2006, p. 
616). He warns that applying a religious metaphor of redemption to an entire 
nation may presuppose the existence of an ‘original unity’ that did not exist as 
well an ‘ultimate unity’ that has yet to be attained (ibid.). The assumption that 
social unity existed and that the nation ought to return to it may restrict the 
ways in which the conflict in question is represented and render the concept of 
reconciliation purely ideological (ibid., p. 618).
Schaap points to the ‘re’ in ‘reconciliation’ as the impetus to return to or 
restore the harmony and relationships that were destroyed during the conflict 
or wrongdoing. He argues that this restorative dimension may be unsuitable 
for addressing legacies of colonialism, state violence and oppression committed 
by one group against another (ibid., p. 622). The Rwandan example differs 
slightly from this arrangement, as the goal of restoring unity is not to recognise 
the complexities of systematic violence, ethnic relations or the effects of 
colonialism. Instead, it functions to legitimise the RPF’s conception of unity 
and render it more understandable to the population. As Schaap argues, social 
conflict is best understood when it is contrasted with the notion of social unity 
(ibid.). The ‘victor’s narrative’ states that social conflict began during the colonial 
period. As such, the pre-colonial era provides the background of national unity 
against which the conflict is contrasted. Moreover, the presupposition that 
unity existed in the past constructs a prescriptive path on which unity may be 
attained in the future. The RPF designs and maintains this path and promotes 
social and cultural values chosen by the government to best represent its vision 
of Rwanda’s past and future.
In an interview, Alphonse Bakusi, then the director of the NURC’s Civic 
Education Department, discussed the importance of promoting Rwandan 
social values in government documents and specific projects within the official 
reconciliation programme including itorero ry’igihugu civic education camps. 
He explained that ‘we are revising moral values to promote social cohesion 
and development’ (interview, 23 July 2010). These values are identified in 
government documents, including the 2003 Constitution, as having belonged 
to ‘our ancestors’ and as being vital to the ‘flourishing of our nation’ (MOD, 
2003, p. 1). As Bakusi’s statement indicates, the retrospective identification 
and subsequent promotion of purportedly historical values is a strictly top-
down operation. His use of the word ‘we’ to describe who is revising moral 
values, refers to the NURC and RPF more broadly. This action reinforces the 
RPF’s ‘monopoly over knowledge production’, as outlined by Pottier (2002, 
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p. 19). The government has the capacity to restore values which may never 
have existed and/or promote those which represent its own political interests. 
The most blatant example is the stated commitment to restoring pre-colonial 
Rwandan values that discourage misusing public funds for private gain. Other 
examples include ibigyie, a Kinyarwanda term that reflects hard work and 
pride. Bakusi argued that it is the RPF’s intention to promote development as 
a means of uniting citizens in Rwanda (interview, 23 July 2010).
Building the ‘Rwandan nation’
Nation-building in the Rwandan context represents the process through 
which the RPF’s interpretation of the nation’s history is applied to its vision 
of the future. President Kagame compared this undertaking in a post-conflict 
Rwanda to that of building a house in a speech he gave to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies on 16 September 2010:
You start with the foundation before you build the structure. The 
foundation comprises security, peace, and stability. But let me also 
reiterate that, while acknowledging the value of external support and 
partnership, nation building cannot be dictated from outside. It should 
reflect and be informed by the history and particular circumstances of 
a country (p. 9).
The image of erecting a ‘Rwandan house’ illustrates two key features of the RPF’s 
nation-building agenda; the first of which is structure. Once the foundation 
of security, peace and stability was suitably laid, the government set forth to 
‘transform our society’ through a formal top-down approach to structural 
and political change (ibid.). These stated changes included: effective problem 
solving; establishing a formal decentralisation programme; and creating Vision 
2020 as a framework for socio-economic development (Kagame speech, March 
2009, p. 3). The RPF’s stated commitment to building the nation is repeated 
in official discourse, policy and projects related to the promotion of national 
unity and ‘national reconciliation’.8 
The second feature ensures that the nation-building process is a wholly 
Rwandan project. The RPF maintains ownership of the programme by rejecting 
interference from the international community and incorporating Rwandan 
social values as articulated by the government. Kagame’s assertion that nation-
building ought to be dictated from the inside legitimises the government’s 
agenda by devaluing international criticism of the project. For instance, during 
his opening address at the 9th National Dialogue Council meeting in Kigali 
on 15 December 2011, Kagame expressed his frustration with international 
8 See NURC (2008b), NURC (2007), NURC (2001), as well as Vision 2020 
(Minecofin, 2000), the 2003 Constitution (MOD, 2003) and the 2007 
Reconciliation Policy (NURC, 2007).
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human rights NGOs and journalists who had criticised the regime’s approach 
to free speech and ethnic identities in Rwanda.
Who is a minority? I am not from the minority. I am from the RPF and 
it’s the majority. I am from these Rwandans and they are not minority 
in their own country. Imagine these are the people who want to give 
lessons to Rwandans about governance and freedoms. 
The nation-building agenda’s structured top-down nature is made all the more 
inflexible by the legal consequences associated with thoughts and actions 
perceived to threaten political stability or promote discrimination. These two 
acts could be detrimental to building the ‘modern, strong and united nation’ 
envisaged in the Vision 2020 quotation near the beginning of this chapter. 
Both acts relate to accusations of ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’. The risk 
of being accused and convicted of either of these ‘negative ideologies’ may deter 
interference, disagreement with or criticism of the nation-building project by 
Rwandans living inside the country. 
Commonality, identity and ethnicity
The definition of ‘national unity and reconciliation’ outlined in the 2007 
Reconciliation Policy provides insight into concepts that inform the RPF’s 
notion of national unity and the nation-building process. The definition states:
The unity and reconciliation of Rwanda are instinctive to people who 
accept that they share nationality, culture and equal rights, characterized 
by credibility, humanity, respect, equality. Complementarity, truth, 
healing one another’s moral wounds, inflicted on them during the 
appalling events of the past [are essential] in order to be able to progress 
peacefully. It requires every citizen to change their mind completely; 
hence unity will spread all over the nation − Rwandans will be free, and 
so too will the country which is always eager to ensure a better future 
for every Rwandan (NURC, 2007, p. 2).
Although somewhat convoluted, the official definition highlights the concepts 
of commonality, equality and civic education, among others, as elements of 
the RPF’s official reconciliation programme that will purportedly enable the 
country to ‘progress peacefully’ (ibid.). Commonality is the most ubiquitous 
concept in this regard. The definition above provides a relatively short list of 
attributes allegedly shared by all Rwandans including nationality, culture and 
equal rights. Shared history and language are included in other government 
documents such as the 2003 Constitution preamble (MOD, 2003, p. 1). 
Unlike the 2003 Constitution, however, the 2007 Reconciliation Policy 
outlines Rwandans’ specific common interests including ‘building the 
country’ (NURC, 2007, p. 4). It also stipulates that these interests, along 
with citizenship, hold more value than ‘ethnics, family, relationships, religious 
belongings, regions, sex and so forth’ (ibid.).
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The concept of commonality, as depicted in official reconciliation discourse 
and government documents, is posited in opposition to the ‘divisionism’ that 
allegedly shaped the ‘bad history’ of not only the 1994 genocide, but also the 
Social Revolution, civil war and colonial era (ibid., p. 2).9 According to a group 
of 15 students at ingando solidarity camp,10 ‘divisionism can divide people 
by skin, ethnic origins. Colonial masters tried to divide Rwanda by ethnic 
groups like schools for Hutu and others for Tutsi. Rwandans started believing 
they were different’ (ingando lecture, 15 June 2009). They were responding 
to the question ‘[w]hat can be done to eliminate divisionism in order to 
abort divisionism encouraged by colonialists and missionaries?’ (ibid.). The 
quotation and the discussion from which it is taken are examples of the stated 
requirement in the official definition described on the previous page for all 
Rwandans to ‘change their minds’ about national unity and reconciliation. The 
stated commitment to reeducating the population is put into practice at the 
live-in itorero ry’igihugu and ingando civic education camps as well as in the 
new history book published by the NURC (Bawaya interview, 30 May 2009). 
This commitment will be discussed in the next chapter.
The RPF government’s repetition of the purportedly collective interest 
of all Rwandans in building the nation legitimises the RPF’s nation-
building agenda (NURC, 2007, p. 3; Minecofin, 2000, p. 1). The process, 
in this particular context, more closely resembles the formal act of redefining 
‘nationhood’. Nationhood can be understood as an exercise that develops 
the relationship between citizens and the state (Boyce, 1999, p. 236). Boyce 
argues that nationhood is fully developed when citizens experience a sense of 
belonging to a particular territory, identify with state institutions, and share 
a sense of common values and identity with others (ibid.). At the conceptual 
level, nation-building in Rwanda may be better understood as a process of 
nationhood-building as the RPF’s agenda includes a stated commitment to 
building a strong relationship between the state and citizens through ‘good 
governance’ as well as an emphasis on the shared values, culture, history and 
identity of all Rwandans as outlined in Vision 2020 (Minecofin, 2000, pp. 
2, 4). This depiction of nationhood-building resembles the RPF’s definition 
of ‘vertical’ reconciliation, which is guided by the stated mandate to foster 
belonging and build trust in state institutions. 
9 See Waldorf for a detailed discussion of the development of the RPF’s ‘prohibition 
on divisionism’ (2009, p. 108). Waldorf argues that although Rwanda needs laws 
to protect its citizens from genocide denial and ideology, current laws against 
‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ promote a culture of accusation, legitimise the 
silencing of NGOs and political opponents, and promote the collective guilt of all 
Hutu (ibid., p. 118). This argument will be reexamined in chapter 6.
10 Solidarity camps are a form of mandatory live-in education camp. This one was 
organised for students entering university.
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The top-down nature of the nationhood-building process not only seeks to 
create a bond between citizens and the state, but also to unite the people of the 
nation. The emphasis on common attributes and the shared experience of ‘bad 
history’ provides the rhetorical basis upon which citizens’ bond of ‘horizontal 
comradeship’ is built (Anderson, 2006, p. 7).11 The ‘bond’ between citizens 
as members of a nation reflects elements of what is commonly described as 
interpersonal reconciliation in the broader body of the literature. In particular, 
the nation-building agenda emphasises the rebuilding of relationships between 
individuals, as it seeks to transform these individuals into a single ‘people’.
Etienne Balibar, a Marxist philosopher, argues that modern nations are not 
naturally occupied by any given group of people. Instead, the country’s people 
continually ‘produce themselves’ as a community belonging to ‘the nation’. 
He contends that the concept of unity will make group members appear to 
everyone in the nation ‘as a people’ and will provide the origin of and basis 
upon which political power is consolidated (1996, p. 138). Balibar uses the 
example of ethnic groups to support his argument about the construction 
of a people, one which is also applicable to promoting nation-building and 
national unity in Rwanda. In this particular context, the group being made 
to continually produce itself is the national community as a whole, bound 
together not only by the shared attributes of language, culture and experience, 
but also by a singular national identity referred to as the Banyarwanda.
David Kiwuwa, a political scientist who focuses on the politics of ethnic 
identity and democratisation, argues that a collective identity, such as that 
promoted by the RPF, is the result of homogenising multiple identities within 
a nation. He contends that this project may be mandated to prevent fracturing 
of the state in the post-conflict period (2007, p. 9). It may also serve a more 
shrewd political purpose. As Powell suggests, ‘[t]hrough nationhood or through 
race, the nation and myself become one, which means that I have nothing to 
fear from state power and must approve its judgments, for they are my own’ 
(2011, p. 250). Kagame’s assertion, ‘I am from the RPF and it’s the majority’, 
quoted earlier in this chapter, universalises the appeal of the current regime 
(speech, 15 December 2011). In so doing, it appears that the government is 
11 Anderson has investigated the development and subsequent spread of nationalism 
in the 19th century, defining nations as social constructs or ‘imagined communities’ 
(1983). In the revised edition of his seminal text Anderson uses the term ‘horizontal 
comradeship’ to describe the nation’s deep sense of fraternity (2006). In that edition, 
he uses the willingness of millions of people to die for their nation in times of war 
to exemplify the commitment to what he determines to be ‘limited imaginings’ 
(ibid., p. 7). I use the term to demonstrate the conception of unity constructed and 
implemented by the RPF, a unity that joins all Rwandans together as members of a 
single community: the nation. 
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controlled by and serves the interests of the Banyarwanda rather than what can 
arguably be described as a minority of Tutsi officials.12
This national identity and the RPF’s emphasis on commonality represent a 
nationalist ideology in the post-conflict context:
An ideology replaces another: Rwandans should choose between a 
nationalist ideology (Ubumwe bw’ Abanyarwanda) and Parmehutu’s 
(Rubanda nyamwinshi/Bene Sebahinzi) … The main strategy to fight it 
consists in exposing Rwandans to its divisive and sectarian intentions, 
and showing them the advantages of national unity – ubunyarwanda 
(NURC, 2008c, p. 19).
The Kinyarwanda words Ubumwe bw’ Abanyarwanda translate to ‘the unity 
of Rwandans’, reflecting the Banyarwanda’s singular national identity and 
illustrating the RPF regime’s stated commitment to promoting unity for 
all Rwandans. The statement Rubanda nyamwinshi/Bene Sebahinzi loosely 
translates to ‘the mass population’, a reference to the colonial period during 
which the population was purportedly ‘divided’ into two groups. It depicts 
the colonial rulers’ reference to Hutu as cultivators of the land and to Tutsi 
as those who owned cattle. The term Rubanda nyamwhinshi was also used to 
describe the Hutu majority in anti-Tutsi propaganda prior to and during the 
1994 genocide.
The RPF constructs its ‘nationalist ideology’ as the antithesis of ‘genocide 
ideology’. Authors including Waldorf (2009) and Simon (2012) argue that 
‘negative ideologies’ do continue to exist in Rwandan society. Simon points 
to the acute overcrowding of Rwandan prisons between 1997 and 2005 as 
a major facilitator of anti-Tutsi sentiment in the post-conflict era. He argues 
that ‘genocide ideology’ continued unabated in prisons among many convicted 
genocide perpetrators, contending that it was repeated in private settings, as 
perpetrators were not required to demonstrate remorse upon their release. 
Instead, ex-prisoners who continued to subscribe to ‘genocide ideology’ shared 
it with their families (2012, p. 262). 
The concepts of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ play important 
discursive roles within the RPF’s conception of national unity and its nation-
building agenda. The RPF uses both concepts to legitimise the construction of 
the singular national identity by illuminating the ‘perils’ of ethnic identities:
There is a lot one can say about the origins and social relationships 
between Batutsi, Hutus and Twas. Let us just take the following idea: 
Banyarwanda must understand that maintaining themselves prisoners 
of their belonging to ethnic Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups is one of the 
12 I use the term ‘arguably’ here because I am referring back to Pottier’s assertion that 
the RPF government is dominated by a small group of Tutsi members (2002). I did 
not enquire as to the ethnic identities of research participants and do not assume 
to know the identities of those I interviewed apart from the few individuals who 
openly discussed their own ethnicity.
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big obstacles standing in their way to development. In fact, to remain 
prisoner of one’s ethnic group without having anything positive in 
mind, is like locking oneself up in a cave so that one cannot look 
outside. What matters is to live together peacefully, work together for 
the development of their country, so that Banyarwanda can tackle and 
solve their common problems, and break their narcissism and wake up 
to the progress the world has achieved (Office of the President, 1999, 
p. 58).
The shared national identity of the Banyarwanda is posited as the ‘solution’ 
to problems purportedly created by ethnic identities having been propagated 
in post-conflict Rwanda. The challenges include impediments to development, 
‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’. Murray Edelman, a political scientist, 
argues that leaders manipulate depictions of problems in society in order to 
construct ‘facts’ that undermine particular courses of action and perpetuate 
government-sponsored ideologies (1988, pp. 10–11). The ‘fact’ advanced 
by the RPF government states that ethnicity is intricately connected to the 
‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ that allegedly led to the 1994 genocide. 
It informs the assumption that the continued existence of ethnic identities in 
society promotes these negative ideologies. The proposed ‘solution’ to these 
problems, a singular national identity that supersedes ethnicity, is imbued 
with RPF ideology: this shared identity will promote national unity and 
‘national reconciliation’ and help to build a ‘modern, strong and united nation’ 
(Minecofin, 2000, p. 4).
The RPF has promoted the de facto banning of ethnic labels from public 
discourse and government documents in an attempt to eradicate ‘genocide 
ideology’ and ‘divisions’ in society more generally. The banning has been 
achieved in part by eliminating ethnicity from identity cards and regional 
quotas for schools, as well as by manipulating the moral debate about identity 
in Rwanda (NURC, 2008c, p. 13; Ranger, 1999, p. 23).13 As Ranger argues, 
the concepts of nationalism and ethnicity are neither inherently good nor 
bad. The perceived consequences of these constructions are defined by the 
prevailing voice in the moral debate on the issue (1999, p. 23). The RPF, as 
‘moral guardians’, has depreciated the moral value of ethnic terms by equating 
their use with the promotion of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ (Pottier, 
2002, p. 207). 
The government’s stated commitment to eradicating ‘genocide ideology’ 
adds significant moral value to the singular national identity of the Banyarwanda. 
The NURC describes it as ‘any ideology that would see the extermination of 
the other group – considered as the enemy – as the (final) solution to problems 
13 Although using ethnic labels has been banned from public discourse, such as radio 
broadcasts and public speeches, they continue to be employed in more private 
settings between friends and family members (interview with son of returnee, 8 
April 2009).
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of its society’ (NURC, 2008c, p. 7). This definition suggests that should the 
ideology spread, a return to genocide would be imminent (Waldorf, 2009, p. 
109). As such, the depiction of the singular national identity of all Rwandans as 
a safeguard against a return to genocide supports its construction. As the 2003 
Constitution’s preamble makes clear, ‘We, the People of Rwanda … resolved to 
fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations and to eradicate ethnic, 
regional, and any other form of divisions’ (MOD, 2003, p. 1).
The singular national identity is also promoted through fostering ‘nationalist 
enthusiasm’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 163). Anderson describes this sense of 
excitement as taking place in the context of the nation-building policies of 
new states. He argues that it takes two forms simultaneously: a genuine and 
popular expression of the people, and a nationalist ideology systematically 
promoted to citizens in a top-down manner through media, civic education 
and government policies (ibid.). The Rwandan government has put the latter 
method of fostering nationalist enthusiasm into practice through introducing 
a new national flag in 2001 and a national anthem in 2002 (Fawcett, 2003, 
as cited by Kiwuwa, 2007, p. 19). This sense of enthusiasm is also promoted 
at ingando and itorero ry’igihugu camps, which emphasise the importance of 
unity, national pride and the benefits of a singular national identity (NURC, 
2009a, pp. 12–13).14 
The implications of unity and nation-building for ‘national 
reconciliation’
The RPF as arbiter
President Kagame reminded the population of its shared ownership of the 
nation during an RPF rally in Kirehe district days before winning a 93 per 
cent majority in the August 2010 presidential election (Rwanda News Agency, 
4 August 2010; Reuters, 11 August 2010). Kagame reiterated the message of a 
singular Rwandan identity when he asked, ‘[w]hich majority are they talking 
about because the majority is you people and Rwanda doesn’t belong to Hutu, 
Tutsi or Twa – it belongs to Rwandans’ (ibid.). Kagame was responding to 
suggestions that FDU-Inkingi leader Victoire Ingabire was fighting for 
14 Although the syllabi of both ingando and itorero ry’igihugu engage heavily with 
the Rwandan national identity, there are several features that distinguish the 
mandates of each camp. According to the NURC, the stated mandate of ingando 
is to ‘promote reflection and discussion on post-conflict national reconciliation and 
reconstruction challenges with a view to mapping out solutions to address them’ 
(NURC, 2009a, p. 9). The stated goals of itorero are, however, ‘to promote values 
of unity, truth, culture and of hard work and avoiding attitudes and mindsets that 
deter development all aimed at speeding up the attainment of Vision 2020’ (ibid., 
p. 12).
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Hutu people’s rights and thus represented the interests of the majority of 
Rwandan citizens (ibid.). FDU-Inkingi was barred from running in the 2010 
presidential elections and Ingabire faced numerous accusations related to her 
alleged promotion of ‘genocide ideology’ (BBC News, 25 October 2010).15 
This quotation demonstrates the political value of the Banyarwanda’s singular 
national identity in two ways. Firstly, Kagame’s appeal to unity discredits 
political support for Ingabire and FDU-Inkingi by equating it to ‘divisionism’, 
as it allegedly singles out one ethnic group for representation. Secondly, as 
discussed earlier, the inclusive nature of the identity of the Banyarwanda serves 
as a rallying point which fosters support for the RPF.
The top-down manner in which the RPF promotes its conceptions of 
unity, nation-building and national identity presents multiple challenges for 
achieving the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s stated goals. 
The first challenge relates to the RPF’s forceful approach to institutionalising 
a singular national identity for all Rwandans. As Simon states, harsh 
punishments for public expressions of ethnic identity are counterproductive. 
Accusations of ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ are unlikely to rid the 
nation of associations with the ethnic identities they held prior to and during 
the genocide, he argues. Instead, this attack on ethnicity may prevent free 
expression and foster further animosity between groups, thus preventing the 
promotion of unity and reconciliation (2012, p. 262).
The second of these challenges relates to the risk that promoting unity, 
nation-building and national identity could be an entirely elite undertaking. 
As Kiwuwa asserts, the state is far from a ‘neutral arbiter’ in the construction 
of national identity (2007, p. 22). Indeed, the RPF is an active participant 
in the process as it attempts to eradicate allegiances to ethnic groups. Boyce 
contends that a nation-building initiative ought to be derived from the national 
constitution rather than appeal solely to the interests of political elites (1999, p. 
238). The 2003 Constitution states that the government is committed to such 
fundamental principles as eradicating ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ 
as well as promoting unity, equality, social welfare, consensus and dialogue 
(MOD, 2003, p. 3). Article 9 of the Constitution states:
The State of Rwanda commits itself to conform to the following 
fundamental principles and to promote and enforce the respect thereof:
–  Fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; 
–  Eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion 
of national unity;
–  Equitable sharing of power;
–  Building a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic 
government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and 
15 The impact of accusations of ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ on political 
space in Rwanda will be explored in detail in chapters 5 and 6.
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men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty 
per cent of posts in decision-making organs;
–  Building a state committed to promoting social welfare and 
establishing appropriate mechanisms for ensuring social justice;
–  The constant quest for solutions through dialogue and consensus 
(ibid.).
Although the RPF stated a commitment to promoting equality, social welfare 
and dialogue, the rigid nature of its approach to national unity and nation-
building hinders these pledges from being realised.
The absence of equity and equality for survivors and the Twa community
The pursuit of national unity and nation-building, through constructing 
a singular national identity, conflicts with the promotion of equality, social 
welfare and free speech. Rwanda’s population in the post-conflict context is 
diverse. Contrary to what Kagame stated in the excerpt above, taken from his 
speech at the RPF rally in Kirehe District, the population of Rwanda is far more 
varied than the ethnic labels Hutu, Tutsi or Twa would suggest. These divisions 
include political identities created by the RPF that relate to experiences of 
violence prior to and during the 1994 genocide. As discussed in chapter 
3, these identities include those of ex-combatants, genocide perpetrators, 
survivors, returning groups of ‘new caseload’ refugees who fled during the 1994 
genocide, and ‘old caseload’ refugees who fled during periods of violence in the 
1950s and 1960s (Hintjens, 2008, p. 80). The disparity of experiences from 
which these identities stem runs counter to the shared identity and common 
experience of ‘bad history’ emphasised by the RPF (NURC, 2007, p. 2).16
This disparity is compounded in the post-conflict context by the absence 
of equity and equality for some. For instance, survivors continue to be among 
the most marginalised groups in the country. President Kagame acknowledged 
the challenges facing many survivors and firmly placed the blame on the poor 
performance of ‘bad politicians’ (speech, 7 April 2010). Kagame encouraged all 
citizens to hold those responsible accountable for their actions so that survivors 
could join in the communal processes of nation-building and development 
(ibid.). This appeal to nation-building, unity and national identity fails to get 
to grips with the issues of equality and social welfare that continue to plague 
many survivors. According to the Survivors Fund (SURF), these include 
extreme poverty since 50,000 survivor households were reported to be without 
income in 2008 (2008, p. 6).17
16 See Lemarchand and Niwese for discussion about how differing memories of the 
genocide affect how groups understand and interact with each other in Rwanda 
(2007, p. 166). The authors argue that the RPF uses nation-building to restrain 
what they refer to as ‘the public expression of ethnic memories’ (ibid., p. 181). 
17 Issues affecting many survivors, including poverty, difficulties accessing healthcare 
and inadequate housing will be examined in more detail in chapter 6. 
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The fact that many survivors did not receive social welfare is made all 
the more apparent when compared with the support given to ex-combatants 
returning from the Great Lakes Region. Upon completing the demobilisation 
process at Mutobo camp, ex-combatants, including former members of the 
FDLR,18 receive 60,000 Rwf from the RPF government and an additional 
100,000 RwF three months later for use in investment, trade and developing 
small businesses (Kanyambo interview, 27 June 2009).19 Rather than levelling 
the playing field, the financial support given to ex-combatants may exacerbate 
tensions in the communities to which they return. Disparity created by this 
financial aid is pertinent as 60 per cent of the Rwandan population lives in 
poverty, 42 per cent of them in absolute destitution (UNDP, 2011, p. 1).20 
The demobilisation process also increases inequality with regard to justice. 
Since 2005, no officially reintegrated ex-combatants have been tried at gacaca 
for crimes committed between 1990−4 (Waldorf and Clark debate, 3 March 
2010). When asked about the conviction rate of ex-combatants at gacaca 
John Kanyambo, then assistant centre manager at Mutobo Demobilisation 
and Reintegration Camp, replied ‘justice from 1994 is not really our concern’ 
(interview, 27 June 2009).
Widespread impunity for demobilised and reintegrated ex-combatants 
may be granted for several reasons. The first, as Kanyambo explained, is to 
encourage ex-soldiers and rebels to return, who would not do so willingly if 
they were to face conviction at gacaca (ibid.). This point is disputable, however, 
as none of the six hundred ex-combatants at Mutobo camp at the time of this 
interview entered Rwanda willingly. They had all been captured by MONUC, 
now MONUSCO, the United Nations’ Peacekeeping mission in DRC. Once 
captured, they began the demobilisation process in Goma, eastern DRC, and 
18 Approximately 90% of ex-combatants at Mutobo camp, when I visited in June 
2009, knew each other from their time in the Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (Kanyambo interview, 27 June 2009). The FDLR 
is a predominantly Hutu rebel force that has been involved in violent conflict in 
eastern DRC, including killings, rapes and abductions of thousands of Congolese 
civilians since 2000 (HRW, 2009, pp. 10, 30). The FDLR, some members of which 
participated in the 1994 genocide, continue to pose a significant threat to civilians 
living in DRC’s North and South Kivu provinces near the Rwandan border. An 
arrest warrant was issued for FDLR Commander Sylvestre Mudacumura by the 
ICC in July 2012 on nine counts of war crimes committed in 2009 and 2010. As 
of July 2015 he has still not been arrested (HRW, 13 July 2015).
19 In May 2015, 60,000 RwF was equal to approximately £55 and 100,000 RwF was 
equivalent to £92 (XE Currency Exchange, 14 May 2015).
20 Chapter 2 of the 1995 report on the World Summit on Social Development 
Programme of Action in Copenhagen defines ‘absolute poverty’ as a ‘condition 
characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It 
depends not only on income but also on access to social services’ (UN, 1995, p.1).
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then crossed the border into the reintegration programme at Mutobo in north-
western Rwanda (ibid.). Secondly, excluding ex-combatants from gacaca trials 
may have been partially or fully informed by the impetus to finish hearing 
new genocide cases and complete the gacaca process. Thirdly, this impunity 
may more closely reflect the same political interests that may inform allotting 
financial support to ex-combatants once they have completed ingando training 
at demobilisation camp.21 Impunity may be used to appease ex-combatants in 
order to circumvent any political discord or violence from these predominantly 
Hutu combatants inside Rwanda’s borders. Prioritising reintegration and the 
political interests that inform it may impede the rebuilding of relationships 
between ex-combatants and those living in the communities to which they 
return. It may also frustrate many survivors as they continue to struggle with 
extreme poverty (Melvin, 2010, p. 944).
The Twa minority faces an altogether different struggle of marginalisation 
and poverty that is magnified by the implementation of a singular national 
identity. The Twa people are believed to be the first inhabitants of the Great 
Lakes Region’s equatorial forest areas. Twa groups continue to live in Burundi, 
southern Uganda, Rwanda and eastern areas of DRC (Lewis, 2000, p. 3). Prior 
to the arrival of European colonists, they shared a common hunter-gatherer 
history (ibid., p. 5). The Twa in Rwanda, who consider themselves to be an 
indigenous people, have not been granted political identities related to the 
events of 1994 as they were for the most part not directly involved in the 
civil war or the genocide. They were, however, affected by the displacement, 
uncertainty and violence it caused (ibid., p. 23). Minority Rights Group 
International (MRGI) states that, in 1994, the Twa accounted for up to 0.4 per 
cent of Rwanda’s population. The NGO estimates that 30 per cent of the Twa 
population died or was killed as a result of the 1994 genocide (ibid.).22 Many 
Twa fled during the conflict, while the majority of those who remained were 
displaced (ibid., p. 24). 
In 2007, CAURWA (Community of the Rwandese Autochtons), an 
NGO which promotes Twa rights, conflicted with the RPF over the official 
recognition of the Twa as an indigenous group in Rwanda. The government 
argued that it would promote ‘divisionism’ (COPORWA, n.d.) and also 
threatened to suspend aid to Twa communities if they continued to refer to 
themselves as a distinct people (MRGI, 2012, p. 1). In 2006, the Ministry of 
21 Ex-combatants at Mutobo demobilisation camp attend an ingando session that 
lasts several months. It includes lectures about ‘national reconciliation’, as well as 
more practical lessons about hygiene and how to apply for bank loans (Kanyambo 
interview, 27 June 2009). 
22 Dorothy Jackson, who conducted research for MRGI, stated that these deaths 
were never officially acknowledged (2003). In April 2012, MRGI explained that 
the suffering of Twa people caused by the 1994 genocide has still ‘gone largely 
unrecognized’ (2012, p. 1).
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Justice (Minijust) threatened to suspend CAURWA’s charities licence unless 
the organisation agreed to stop referring to Twa as Rwanda’s first inhabitants, 
and removed the terms ‘indigenous’ or ‘autochtons’ from the NGO’s title 
(ibid.). CAURWA eventually reached an agreement with the government to 
refer to the Twa community by the most prominent profession of its members 
− pottery − and to change its name to COPORWA (Rwandese Community of 
Potters) (COPORWA, n.d.; Ndahinda, 2011, p. 239).
Although the term ‘Twa’ has been replaced with ‘Potter’ in a purported 
attempt to unite the nation, this group continues to be isolated by discrimination, 
extreme poverty, rampant unemployment, and reduced access to healthcare, 
education and traditional land (COPORWA, 2009, p. 1; MRGI, 2012, p. 
1). Lewis states that the RPF’s de facto banning of ethnic terms has helped 
to reduce some public discrimination experienced by Twa people (2000, p. 
24). The group is still at risk, however, of losing its distinct identity as an 
indigenous group. Moreover, it appears that little consideration has been given 
to the plight of many Twa living inside Rwanda, ‘Nowadays, the relationship 
between Hutus, Tutsis and Twas has become a conflict between two ethnic 
groups: Tutsis and Hutus. As for Twas, they seem to have been completely 
forgotten’ (Office of the President, 1999, p. 2). The loss of a distinct identity 
and the fact that Twa community members were not granted equity and 
equality further demonstrate the paucity of commitments made to promoting 
equal rights, social welfare and dialogue in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy and 
2003 Constitution.
Unity and ‘national reconciliation’: process or end goal?
The RPF’s focus on the unity and shared role of all citizens in the nation-
building process neglects to deal with issues other than ethnicity that could 
cause future conflict. As Susanne Buckley-Zistel argues, ‘the government 
fabricates unity without reconciliation’ (2006, p. 102). She makes this point 
with reference to the RPF’s focus on citizenship as the basis for both unity and 
reconciliation (ibid.). Her argument is also relevant to the RPF’s rhetorical use 
of the participation of all Rwandans in the nation-building process to gloss 
over issues of equality, dialogue and social welfare as articulated in the 2003 
Constitution. Moreover, prioritising both unity and nation-building may 
impede the successful promotion of the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’, 
as it jumps to the official reconciliation programme’s end goals before they have 
been achieved.
An earlier section of this chapter discussed the relationship between 
unity, nation-building and ‘national reconciliation’, as defined by the 2007 
Reconciliation Policy. Although it can be deduced from this document and 
Vision 2020 that unity and nation-building reflect priorities of the RPF’s 
RECONCILING RWANDA114
official reconciliation programme, neither document definitively states whether 
national unity is conceived of as a process or as an end goal of a process:
Under normal conditions, however, reconciliation takes place between 
the oppressor and the oppressed through mediation or not. In any case, 
prior to reconciliation and restoration of mutual friendly relationships, 
one who has caused harm to the other should admit and regret his/her 
wrong doings, apologize for them and if need be, give compensation. 
For the Rwandan case, none of those prerequisites has been fully met. 
And this constitutes one of the major obstacles for the process to be 
successful (Mugabe Shyaka, 2004, p. 35).
Unity is depicted in this study, as well as in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy, as 
an objective of the official reconciliation programme as a whole (NURC, 2007, 
p. 3). For instance, unity is referred to as something that ought to be fought 
for as well as the determining criteria of building a unified country (ibid.). 
Thus, in the context of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme, the 
RPF’s stated commitment to building a ‘strong, modern and united nation’ 
can logically be understood as an end goal of that process (Minecofin, 2000, 
p. 4). For instance, Vision 2020 states, ‘Rwanda will become a modern, united 
and prosperous nation founded on the positive values of its culture. The nation 
will be open to the world, including its own Diaspora. Rwandans will be 
a people, sharing the same vision for the future and ready to contribute to 
social cohesion, equity and equality of opportunity’ (ibid. p. 11). This shared 
vision of the future resembles elements of ‘thick’ reconciliation as described by 
Crocker (2000).
Nation-building and national unity are predicated on the construction 
of a single people, the Banyarwanda, one that allegedly recognises it has a 
shared common history, language and culture. It also purportedly shares a 
comprehensive vision of the future that is committed to building a prosperous 
and developed nation. The RPF’s emphasis on the shared nature of the vision 
serves the same rhetorical function as the concepts of commonality, shared 
values and national identity discussed earlier in this chapter; it legitimises the 
RPF’s chosen path to future prosperity. Like the role of the entire population 
in building the nation, this shared desire glosses over issues of inequity and 
inequality that plague the government’s nation-building agenda and its vision 
of ‘national reconciliation’ more generally.
The top-down structure of the nation-building agenda creates further 
problems in promoting ‘national reconciliation’. This inflexible, top-down 
structure precludes analysis and open discussion, both of which are necessary 
for fostering trust between civilians and the state or ‘vertical’ reconciliation. 
Buckley-Zistel argues that the RPF’s top-down approach to promoting its vision 
of national unity and reconciliation is weakened by a growing sense of mistrust 
directed at the state, located in issues surrounding the fact that perpetrators 
feel no remorse, as well as misleading confessions at gacaca, false imprisonment 
115NATION-BUILDING AND A RETURN TO UNITY
and disregard for victims of the 1994 genocide (2006, p. 111). Additionally, 
the RPF’s failure to promote equality, social welfare and free speech for all 
citizens, commitments it made in the 2003 Constitution, frustrates the process 
of ‘vertical’ reconciliation, as well as the possibility of successfully promoting its 
vision of unity and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation between citizens.
The de facto banning of ethnicity from public discourse prevents open 
debate about the benefits and disadvantages of the new national identity as well 
as criticism of the government’s approach to unity and nation-building. It also 
limits discussion about whether or not this sense of identity is in fact uniting 
Rwandans or is even desired by the population. The risk of being accused of 
‘genocide ideology’ or ‘divisionism’ further limits free debate of unity, nation-
building and ‘national reconciliation’ among citizens. This not only contravenes 
the RPF’s stated commitment to dialogue in the 2003 Constitution, but also 
limits bottom-up approaches to reconciliation. 
Grassroots reconciliation organisations operating in Rwanda must register 
with the NURC.23 In so doing, these groups must follow the 2007 Reconciliation 
Policy guidelines and laws related to ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’, all 
of which limit opposition and public discussion of issues related to ethnicity, 
identity and experiences of the 1994 genocide that deviate from the ‘victor’s 
narrative’ (Mukajiranga interview, 9 June 2009; NURC, 2007, p. 9).24 As a 
volunteer in a religious youth group focusing on forgiveness and reconciliation 
stated, ‘a [genocide ideology] law is needed, but should be reformed to make 
it safer for us to do our jobs … even if you have good intentions, one small 
slip of the tongue can put you in jail’ (interview, 21 July 2010). These legal 
and normative restrictions ensure that the RPF maintains control over the 
ways in which its vision of ‘national reconciliation’ is promulgated. This 
level of authority also ensures the continued promotion of the government’s 
conception of Rwanda’s past and its future.
Conclusion
Contradictions, political interests and a top-down structure inform the 
relationship between unity, nation-building and ‘national reconciliation’ in 
the Rwandan context. The RPF’s prioritisation of unity and nation-building 
23 The term ‘grassroots reconciliation organisation’ refers to any community-
driven club, group or cooperative with the stated mandate to promote unity and 
reconciliation. These groups often have other stated objectives including encouraging 
forgiveness, repentance and cooperation between survivors and perpetrators.
24 Although there was no database of NURC volunteers at the time of this interview, 
Laurence Mukajiranga, then acting director of the NURC’s peace-building and 
conflict management department, estimated that there are approximately 1,000 
grassroots unity and reconciliation initiatives across the country, all overseen by the 
NURC (interview, 9 June 2009).
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within the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme is evident in official 
discourse, government documents and reconciliation projects such as ingando 
and itorero ry’igihugu. The dual gaze (both backward and forward) of unity and 
nation-building creates a highly prescriptive path along which both priorities 
are pursued. Moreover, the presupposition of social and cultural values that 
promote social cohesion is informed by RPF-sponsored historical narrative. 
The ‘victor’s narrative’ legitimises the RPF’s approach to unity and nation-
building. It also provides justification for the de facto banning of ethnicity 
from public discourse and the condemnation of acts and thoughts deemed to 
promote ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’. The impetus to eradicate these 
acts, thoughts and ideologies further justifies the RPF’s construction of the 
Banyarwanda’s singular national identity, one which although it may create 
‘a people’ at the national level, fails to adequately follow through on the 
government’s own stated commitments to equality, social welfare and dialogue. 
This may not only impede the realisation of national unity and nation-building, 
but also the government’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’.
The RPF’s conception of national unity and its nation-building agenda 
also precludes analysis and restricts active participation in the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Programme. Fear of accusations of ‘genocide ideology’ and 
‘divisionism’, coupled with the official reconciliation programme’s prescriptive 
top-down structure, leaves little room for open discussion and criticism of 
pertinent issues, policies and programmes. Although there are close to 1,000 
grassroots unity and reconciliation initiatives in Rwanda, they must all abide 
by the 2007 Reconciliation Policy and face the same risk of being accused of 
‘negative ideologies’ as do journalists, political opponents and NGOs, should 
they engage with issues of ethnicity and identity or publicly criticise the RPF. 
The result of this top-down approach is the achievement of a singular national 
identity with little regard for several of the stated commitments related to 
promoting the government’s own vision of ‘national reconciliation’.
The government’s failure to make good on its commitments to promote 
equal rights, social welfare and dialogue is compounded by its ‘fabrication’ of 
unity. As described by Buckley-Zistel (2006), this potentially impedes ‘national 
reconciliation’ in several ways. The emphasis on national identity and the shared 
role of all Rwandans in the endeavour promotes the end goal of ‘building a 
modern, strong and united nation’ before it has been achieved (Minecofin, 
2000, p. 4). Also, if the RPF defines ‘national reconciliation’ as the rebuilding 
of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ relationships, it must allow space and time for 
these connections to develop rather than attempt to construct a single people 
united by common attributes and experiences. If Buckley-Zistel is correct and 
mistrust is developing between the state and citizens, the consequences for 
‘national reconciliation’ could be calamitous. Moreover, the absence of equity, 
equality and free speech could result in further divisions between the people 
of the nation.
Chapter 5
Teaching the nation: reconciliation through education
Historical clarity is a duty of memory that we cannot escape. Behind the 
words ‘Never Again’, there is a story whose truth must be told in full, no 
matter how uncomfortable (Kagame, 20th Commemoration of Genocide 
against the Tutsi, 7 April 2014)
Two hundred students dressed in Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) uniforms sat 
in attendance at ingando at the Peace and Leadership Centre in north-western 
Rwanda.1 The speaker that afternoon was Captain Gerald Nyirimanzi of the 
RDF, whose lecture focused on national unity and included a presentation 
called, ‘Hutu and Tutsi constructed races or ethnic groups: the root causes 
of the Rwandan conflict system’. After the presentation was over, Nyirimanzi 
asked the teenagers to raise their hands if they were Hutu. When no hands were 
raised, he asked the same question of the Tutsi students and received the same 
lack of response.
Nyirimanzi then asked the group whether they thought the ethnic terms 
of Hutu and Tutsi should be officially reinstated in Rwanda. A microphone 
was passed around the hall to give students the opportunity to share their 
thoughts about the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic identities in the 
country. One student suggested that the terms should be reinstated and used 
to reflect social status as they had in the pre-colonial period.2 She proposed 
using the term ‘Hutu’ to represent those on the lower rungs of society and 
that of ‘Tutsi’ to depict members of the upper class. The student reasoned that 
the class difference would inspire Hutu to work harder and rise ‘to the top 
class like Tutsi’ (ingando training, 3 June 2009). After a series of arguments 
1 The head of ingando training at the Peace and Leadership Centre reported to 
me that students wear RDF fatigues to ‘demystify the uniform’. Asked about the 
relationship between the RDF and ingando, he stated, ‘We don’t intend to make 
you a soldier’ (interview with ingando official, 15 June 2009).
2 The depiction of ethnic terms as relatively flexible social identities in the pre-colonial 
period featured heavily in Nyirimanzi’s presentation. The students attending this 
particular ingando camp were preparing to begin their university studies shortly 
after this mandatory six-week course concluded.
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for and against the restoration of ethnic terms, Nyirimanzi led the students to 
the conclusion that ethnic identities were among the root causes of violence in 
Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region. He ended the session by reminding them 
of the benefits of the government abolishing ethnic labels and the advantages 
of being unified by a single national identity (ibid.).
This lecture about history and identity at ingando illustrates specific 
elements of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s education 
remit. The stated commitment to sensitising the population about the need 
to fight for unity, their role as patriots, and the customs and values that 
purportedly promote social cohesion appear in the 2007 Reconciliation Policy’s 
‘specific objectives’ (NURC, 2007, p. 3). The stated goals of civic education 
camps include: teaching citizens about their rights and the importance of 
Vision 2020; giving lessons about unity and ‘national reconciliation’ in schools; 
teaching Rwandan history; and promoting ingando seminars in order to foster 
a culture of peace and ‘good governance’ across Rwanda (ibid., p. 4). 
The perceived need to reeducate the population about unity and ‘national 
reconciliation’ was formally expressed in 1999 in the ‘Nation-wide grassroots 
consultations report: unity and reconciliation initiatives in Rwanda’. The 
consultation was conducted with the stated goal of giving all Rwandans the 
opportunity to participate in influencing and designing the path towards 
national unity and reconciliation. It engaged with issues ranging from the 
perceived causes of ‘disunity’ in Rwanda to ways in which ‘national reconciliation’ 
should be promoted. Since it was not possible for all Rwandans to participate 
in the grassroots consultation, they were represented by 200 members from 
key target groups including community leaders, women’s committees, business 
and religious leaders (NURC, 1999). This consultation, led by the newly 
formed National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), promoted 
the use of civic education to enlighten citizens about such issues as human 
rights, the importance of truth, and the accurate representation of history and 
national identity (ibid., p. 15). The consultation highlighted the importance 
of free discussion about issues that purportedly divide Rwandans, as well as 
the use of ‘solidarity’ camps to overcome obstacles hindering the promotion 
of national unity and ‘national reconciliation’ (ibid., pp. 15, 17). ‘Solidarity’ 
camps had been established three years earlier in 1996 with the stated goal of 
aiding the repatriation and reintegration of Rwandan refugees who had fled 
during the 1994 genocide (Mgbako, 2005, p. 209). Towards the end of the 
1990s, ingando ‘solidarity’ camps were expanded to include participants from 
diverse groups, including convicted genocide perpetrators, ex-combatants and 
students entering university. These mandatory camps became the sole formal 
source of Rwandan history after the genocide.
119TEACHING THE NATION
Civic education at ingando
Ingando restored
Ingando was described by former NURC executive secretary Fatuma Ndangiza 
as ‘nothing short of a revisit to culture’ during an NURC presentation at the 
2003 International Conference on Security and Lasting Peace in the Great 
Lakes Region (2003, p. 7). Like gacaca, ingando purportedly reflects elements 
of a traditional Rwandan cultural institution that has been restored from its pre-
colonial roots to promote the government’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’. 
The term ‘ingando’ is taken from the verb kugandika, which in the Kinyarwanda 
language is the act of interrupting daily activities to reflect upon and find 
solutions to challenges facing the nation. These periods of coming together to 
contemplate and problem-solve allegedly took place in times of war, disaster 
and national catastrophe during the pre-colonial era (ibid.). Legal scholar Chi 
Mgbako contradicts the NURC’s description of ingando’s historical origin. She 
argues that although there is historical evidence of meetings between elders to 
address issues of interest to the community, there is none to support the claim 
that the process was called ‘ingando’, making it an ‘invented tradition’ (2005, 
p. 208). Mgbako contends that it most likely refers to a ‘pre-war RPF creation’ 
in which participants were mobilised about pro-RPF ideology (ibid.).
The post-conflict iteration of ingando supported the Government of 
National Unity’s (GNU) efforts to reintegrate repatriated citizens who had fled 
to neighbouring countries prior to and during the 1994 genocide (ibid., p. 
209). Mgbako explains that the first camps established in 1996 were designed 
to reintegrate Tutsi returnees and foster a sense of nationalism among them 
(ibid.). Unlike Mgbako, the NURC, which took over leadership of ingando 
camps in 1999, does not specify the ethnicity of the first participants although 
it does point to a connection between them and ex-combatants by clarifying 
that refugees entered the camps, ‘when they decided to dissociate themselves 
from ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia’, implying that these refugees were 
Hutu (NURC, 2007, p. 16). 
In the years following refugees’ initial participation at ingando, separate 
camps were established for groups including politicians, women’s association 
members, students and ex-combatants. The duration of these mandatory live-
in camps ranged from several days to several months (Mgbako, 2005, p. 209). 
Although the groups attending these camps were diverse, the overarching 
mandate of all ingando ‘solidarity’ camps remained the same:
By any accepted standards of reckoning, the single most important 
determinant affecting Rwanda’s future is the tragic legacy of the social 
divisions which have plagued the country since ethnic distinctions were 
first exacerbated during the colonial era. The legacy culminated in one 
of the most horrific human tragedies in recorded human history: the 
genocide of 1994 that left the country with deep psychological, social 
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and economic scars … It suffices to mention that the only hopeful 
response is the emergence, at all levels, of well trained and patriotic 
leaders, who can facilitate intercultural co-existence and peace building 
initiatives. At another level, members of the community need to be 
trained and sensitised in order to improve awareness of their societal 
values, systems of governance, their fundamental human rights and 
civic responsibilities. This can only be done through community 
sensitization (Ndangiza, 2003, pp. 4–5).
The perceived necessity to sensitise citizens and leaders reflects the condition 
that all Rwandans must correct their mindsets and bad behaviour (NURC, 
2011b, p. 1). The desire to teach all community members about societal 
values, governance, human rights and civic responsibilities also speaks to large 
parts of the population having participated in the 1994 genocide. President 
Kagame estimated that upwards of one million Hutu civilians and officials 
in Habyarimana’s government took part (Hintjens, 2008, p. 82).3 The dual 
emphasis on mass participation and reeducation resonates with the controversial 
assumption that Rwandans are ignorant or culturally predisposed to obedience 
and were thus easily manipulated into committing acts of genocide, as analysed 
by Uvin (2001).4 Authors such as Straus and Fujii reject this simplistic 
interpretation of participation and provide more nuanced analyses of the 
decisions made by civilians to join in the killing (Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009).
The RPF’s stated commitment to eradicating ‘genocide ideology’ and 
‘divisionism’ resounds throughout the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme, and ingando is no different. The NURC’s 2006 report about 
the ‘solidarity’ camps’ impact on the promotion of unity and ‘national 
reconciliation’ describes the commission’s task as having to 
overcome all the barriers and face the unimaginable challenges to wash 
all the past dirtiness down and to re-invent a ‘new societal intelligence’ 
through which the people of Rwanda supported by his development 
partners proceeded to a fundamental change and rebuilt a holistically 
unified, pacified, hatred-free, and committed to forge hand-in-hand a 
country armed with a new mind-set and values (p. 11).
Karl Mannheim’s conception of ‘unmasking the mind’ is particularly helpful 
for analysing the ideology that informs the construction of this new societal 
3 Kagame also identified the remaining Hutu population, those who did not kill but 
also did not attempt to stop the killing, as bystanders to the 1994 genocide and 
thus also culpable in the devastation it caused. According to Hintjens, the highest 
estimate academics have calculated in relation to active participation by Hutu in the 
genocide is 10%, or between 350,000 and 600,000 people (2008, p. 82). 
4 Uvin analyses three dominant paradigms used by scholars, human rights activists 
and journalists to describe why the 1994 genocide happened. They include: 
perpetrators’ social and psychological features that made some civilians more likely 
to participate in the genocide, discussed above; social tension related to resource 
scarcity; and elite manipulation (2001).
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intelligence (1952, p. 140). According to Mannheim, the act of unmasking 
does not seek to refute or deny an idea, but rather to uncover the social and 
psychological function it serves in society (ibid., p. 141).5 In the context of 
ingando and itorero, ideology functions to denounce ethnicity, ‘genocide 
ideology’ and ‘divisionism’, and bolster support for government programmes 
including official reconciliation and development.
Ingando narrative and targets
‘Ingando is propaganda. I hate it because I love thinking for myself ’ (interview 
with volunteer, 21 July 2010). The ingando system provides a particularly 
rich example of the top-down dissemination of the RPF’s conceptualisations 
of unity, nation-building and identity. As the previous chapter demonstrates, 
the official historical narrative of pre-colonial unity informs these conceptions. 
Rwandan history appears in the curricula of all types of ingando, but its 
largest audience comprises students about to enter university, as the lectures 
aimed at them form the most prevalent type of ‘solidarity’ camp (interview 
with Lliberwaax, 28 June 2009; PRI, 2004; Mgbako, 2005, p. 217). Susan 
Thomson highlights the RPF’s distinction between ‘solidarity’ and ‘education’ 
camps in Rwanda, specifying that the former include ingandos run for the 
above-mentioned students, politicians and gacaca judges or inyangamugayo. 
Education camps, she clarifies, are organised for self-confessed genocide 
perpetrators, commercial sex workers, street children and ex-combatants (2011, 
p. 333).6 In the context of ‘solidarity’ camps for students entering university, 
Rwandan history is featured as one of six major topics taught in lectures during 
the ingando programme (NURC, n.d., p. 1).7 The second chapter, entitled 
‘Rwandan history’, includes a series of topics:
After this chapter the trainees shall be able:
To show that unity existed in the Rwandan community and was later 
destroyed by the bad leadership which has led to conflict and genocide.
5 Mannheim distinguishes between the acts of unmasking an ideology and unmasking 
a lie. The latter action, he argues, discredits the ‘moral personality’ of the person who 
has lied rather than simply determining the function served by the lie (1952, p. 140). 
6 Thomson is a Canadian scholar whom the RPF forced to attend ingando lectures 
with self-confessed genocide perpetrators in 2006. The government allegedly sent 
her to be ‘reeducated’ as her research was deemed to go ‘against national unity 
and reconciliation’ (2011, p. 331). The chapter just cited, entitled ‘Reeducation 
for reconciliation: participant observations on ingando’, gives a detailed account of 
Thomson’s experiences at ingando (2011).
7 The full title of this document is ‘A summary of lectures used in solidarity camps and 
other workshops in six lectures’. The other chapters include such titles as, ‘nation 
and nationality’, ‘human rights and conflict management’, ‘good governance’, ‘man 
and his environment’, and ‘economy and social welfare’ (NURC, n.d., p. 1).
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To show that Rwandans need to take the lead in providing solutions to 
problems caused/consequences of/ by the genocide.
Things to be discussed:
The summary of the Rwandan history ............................................ 41
Problems caused by ethnic groups in Rwanda and in the  
Great Lakes region .......................................................................... 50
Rwandan citizenship and the nationality of Rwanda ....................... 59
Genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere ................................................ 65
Trauma and counselling .................................................................. 74
Fighting against discrimination and genocide ideology in  
Rwanda and the Great Lakes region ................................................ 81 
(ibid., p. 2).
Although these topics illustrate the discursive emphasis on identity, ethnicity 
and ‘genocide ideology’, it is the methods used to teach this chapter that most 
greatly restrict critical thinking and dialogue about issues related to identity, 
the 1994 genocide and the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme 
more generally. For instance, each lesson given at ingando is accompanied by a 
set of goals or targets that all students must meet. After absorbing this chapter 
on Rwandan history, students should be able ‘to show that unity existed in the 
Rwandan community and was later destroyed by the bad leadership which has 
led to conflict and genocide’ (ibid.). These targets demonstrate ingando’s highly 
restrictive nature as it seeks to create a single set of conclusions about Rwandan 
history (Melvin, 2010, p. 940).
The singular nature of the ‘victor’s narrative’ of history is reflected in 
other chapters of the ingando syllabus. This narrative informs the lectures 
given about ethnicity as they describe ‘the real state of ethnicity in Rwanda’ 
as well as clarifying ‘the origin of the problems about ethnicity in [the] 
African Great Lakes Region’ (NURC, 2003, pp. 3–4). The FDLR’s former 
Major General, Paul Rwarakabije, delivered a lecture on the latter topic to 
students at ingando in July 2009. Rwarakabije had surrendered in November 
2003 and was at the time of his presentation working with the Rwandan 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (IRIN News, 22 January 
2004). The example of Captain Nyirimanzi’s lecture, given at the beginning 
of this chapter, demonstrates the target-oriented pedagogy as well as the 
singular nature of the narrative disseminated at ingando. The narrow scope of 
these targets diminishes students’ experience of thinking critically about the 
political rhetoric that imbues their curriculum; a direct contradiction of the 
goal to promote objective analysis, as outlined by Fatuma Ndangiza in 2003 
(Ndangiza, 2003, p. 9; Mgbako, 2005, p. 217).
The paucity of critical evaluation and target-free discussions about the 
‘victor’s narrative’ and government conceptions of ‘national reconciliation’, 
‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ is made all the more poignant in the 
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context of restricted freedom of speech, expression and media in Rwanda. 
Independent media organisations faced increasing restrictions in the run-up 
to the presidential elections in August 2010. Reporters without Borders, the 
international NGO, stated that some 30 radio stations and news publications 
had been suspended in the week before the elections for failing to register with 
the Media High Council.8 On 5 February 2011, opinion pieces published 
in Umurabyo newspaper prior to the election led to the imprisonment of 
the paper’s editor and deputy editor, Agnes Nkusi Uwimana and Saidati 
Mukakibibi respectively. Uwimana was found guilty of ‘genocide ideology’, 
‘divisionism’ and defamation, and sentenced to 17 years in prison, while 
Mukakibibi received a seven-year prison term for threatening state security 
(AI, 2011, p. 5).
Ingando has the stated mandate to promote critical discussion and ‘inculcate 
into the youth a healthy liberated mind’, yet it misses the opportunity to foster 
critical analysis of the history it teaches or the ‘solidarity’ it seeks to promote 
(Ndangiza, 2003, p. 11). The restrictive target-oriented pedagogy ensures 
that ingando functions as a government-sponsored indoctrination camp that 
disseminates a singular narrative to a captive audience.9 Yet, as McLean Hilker 
argues, it is not possible to entirely silence ‘alternative’ narratives of the past 
(2011, p. 327). The fact that there was no public discussion about the existence 
of multiple historical narratives may instead bolster the perception of separate 
Hutu and Tutsi understandings of the past. She argues that this may encourage 
conflict between the RPF-sponsored narrative and counter-narratives of why 
the 1994 genocide took place (ibid.).10 
8 The 2009 Media Law required these stations and publications to submit a request 
for an operating permit (Reporters without Borders, 2010, as cited by Longman, 
2011b, p. 1).
9 Mgbako makes a similar point regarding indoctrination at ingando. She refers to 
the RPF’s attempts ‘both to plant the seeds of reconciliation, and to disseminate 
pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination’ (2005, p. 202). This chapter’s 
analysis differs in that it does not examine whether ingando promotes ‘true 
reconciliation’, as described by Mgbako (ibid., p. 223). Instead, it analyses the ways 
in which ingando teaches the government’s particular vision of unity and ‘national 
reconciliation’ in order to legitimise state programming and bolster political support 
for the current RPF regime.
10 McLean Hilker points to Eltringham’s dichotomy of ‘RPF meta-narrative’ and 
‘counter-narrative’ to differentiate between two dominant versions of Rwandan 
history (2011). Eltringham identifies the two narratives in interviews conducted 
with government officials, journalists and civil society leaders inside Rwanda, and 
exiled scholars, former government officials and civil society leaders in Europe 
between 1997−9 (2004, pp. 163, 177−8). 
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Itorero and Rwandan values
Itorero, like ingando, is an institution with purportedly historical roots that has 
been retooled to provide mandatory civic education to Rwandans. According 
to the NURC, the pre-colonial form of itorero ry’igihugu was a traditional 
school in which students were educated about integrity, problem solving and 
national values including patriotism, defence of the nation and ‘fondness’ 
for the Rwandan culture (NURC, 2009a, p. 12). It also offered cultural 
activities such as sport, dancing and singing and was used as a formal training 
programme for national leaders, during which they came to understand how 
cultural values could benefit their work, outlook and relationships with others 
(NURC, 2011b, p. 1). Unlike other ‘home-grown’ initiatives, itorero was 
not entirely wiped out during the colonial period. According to the NURC’s 
Itorero Programme Strategy, changing the camp’s mission was the first mandate 
of this period as colonisers sought to weaken Rwandan leadership. The result 
of this transformation was purportedly catastrophic for Rwanda as it facilitated 
the spread of genocide ideology and discrimination, ultimately resulting in the 
1994 genocide (NURC, 2011c, p. 6).
President Kagame officially launched the post-conflict iteration of itorero 
on 16 November 2007 (NURC, 2009a, p. 3). Itorero and ingando were 
restored as part of the RPF’s stated commitment to changing the minds of the 
entire population with regard to unity and ‘national reconciliation’.
Despite many achievements of building the Rwandan society after 
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, there is still a problem with the 
mindset of Rwandans. Itorero ry’Igihugu is introduced to contribute 
to problem solving related to mindset, bad behaviour, bad practices, 
through applying Rwandan cultural values (NURC, 2011b, p. 1; 
document’s emphases). 
Perceived mindset and behaviour problems may stem from what the NURC 
describes as low levels among young people of social cohesion and engagement, 
education and patriotism, and of awareness about unity and reconciliation. 
Development is also challenged by high levels of unemployment and high 
risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, in addition to overpopulation and a high level 
of dependency on aid (NURC, 2011c, p. 6). Itorero seeks to overcome these 
challenges in part by fostering a culture of volunteerism for young Rwandans, 
building on the volunteerism that guides other state-led programmes including 
gacaca, umuganda and urugerero (national service). These emphasise the value 
of cooperation and volunteering, although participation in these projects, as 
with itorero, is compulsory for target groups.11
11 The target group for compulsory participation in urugerero is young people aged 
18−35 who are completing their secondary education. Citizens outside of this age 
group may join the national service voluntarily (NURC, 2011c, p. 9). 
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Itorero also seeks to overcome challenges and speed up mindset change 
by merging cultural values with development objectives. This consolidation is 
achieved through disseminating specific Rwandan values that support unity, 
patriotism and development goals, as outlined in Vision 2020, the Economic, 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and the Millennium 
Development Goals (NURC, 2011c, p. 2; NURC, 2009b, p. 13). As Alphonse 
Bakusi explained, ‘this country is trying to see how our cultural values can 
boost development’ (interview, 23 July 2010).
The government’s conception of cultural values and development plan are 
taught at itorero to a large number of participants or intore from different 
age groups, education levels and administrative positions.12 They include 
young children, unmarried youth and older adults at the village level as well as 
students, employers, NGOs and leaders at the sector, district and national level 
itorero camps (NURC, 2011c). 
Itorero camps follow similar schedules to those at ingando. The programme 
can be divided into four overarching modules. The ‘Physical’ module comprises 
such activities as marching, hand-to-hand combat, canoeing and practice 
missions which include night patrols and first-aid training. Two classroom-
based modules, ‘Nation’ and ‘Character Building’ are also included. The former 
is guided by lessons about sovereignty, dignity and national security, while 
the latter consists of games and activities that build self-confidence and teach 
good values. The fourth module, ‘Community Service’, is practice-oriented as 
groups of intore participate in projects that serve society and the environment 
(NURC, 2011c, p. 20).
The Itorero Task Force was created in December 2008 to identify and 
mentor the intore whom teachers have selected as having a particularly strong 
grasp of the values and cultural taboos taught at itorero (ibid., p. 2). They 
include unity, patriotism, Rwandan spirit, nobility, heroism and ‘standing 
up for national development’ (NURC, 2011b, p. 2). More broadly, itorero is 
mandated to mentor ‘a Rwandan citizen to become a positive change maker. 
Itorero ry’Igihugu is important for all citizens in all sectors of economic, social 
and political life’ (ibid.). Every July, the intore deemed most and least ready 
to contribute to the promotion of ‘good governance’, patriotism and heroism 
are singled out by the district-level intore leaders, the National Electoral 
Commission, and the committee coordinating the anti-corruption and 
injustice structures among others (ibid., p. 4). The best intore or indongozi 
from different age groups and their mentors are publicly congratulated for their 
achievements (ibid.).
12 Between 2007–9, 25,000 community leaders and 43,000 primary and secondary 
school teachers attended itorero (NURC, 2009a, p. 13). As of July 2010, itorero 
had been expanded to include the mandatory participation of 30,000 intore 
recently graduated from high school (Bakusi interview, 23 July 2010).
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Promoting the qualities described above not only bolsters the RPF’s nation-
building agenda, but also functions to build the people within that nation. As 
Balibar argues, 
Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is 
imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the projection of individual 
existence into the weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of 
a common name and on traditions lives as the trace of an immemorial 
past (even when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent 
past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain conditions, 
only imaginary communities are real (1996, p. 138; author’s emphases).
Balibar contends that in the context of nation-building, the community or 
‘people’ does not exist naturally and must instead be made to continually 
reproduce itself as a national community (ibid.). Similarly, itorero’s dual focus 
on common cultural values and working together to promote development 
makes it a particularly effective tool in the construction of the people of 
Rwanda. Disseminating the ‘victor’s narrative’ at the camp and throughout 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme further strengthens the 
construction of the national community by focusing on the commonality of 
all Banyarwanda discussed in the preceding chapter.
The NURC’s 2011 description of itorero outlines its stated commitment 
to fostering ‘analytical re-view [sic] of National values and their implication in 
National development’ (emphasis as in original text). It is difficult to conclude, 
however, that critical or oppositional views about these values may be made 
freely and publicly during these reviews (NURC, 2011b, p. 5). This doubt 
stems from concerns about the risk of being accused of ‘genocide ideology’ and 
‘divisionism’, and derives from the singular nature of the historical narrative 
from which these cultural values and understanding of national unity originate. 
Moreover, the public identification of the best and worst performers at itorero, 
with regard to embodying Rwandan values, may also deter intore from openly 
criticising or questioning these customs or the narrative that informs them.
Open discussion of varied experiences and divergent conclusions is 
particularly important in analysing identity in the post-conflict context in 
Rwanda. In light of the de facto ban of ethnic labels in public discourse and 
government documents, critical analysis of the conceptions that surround 
national identity has become all the more pertinent. As Buckley-Zistel argues, 
‘“being Rwandan” means different things to different Rwandans, and this is 
not per se negative or threatening, but an expression of having experienced one 
of the most horrendous events in history’ (2009, p. 48). Itorero is particularly 
well suited to promoting discussion and examination of these events as it 
brings together large groups of peers for extended periods. The opportunity to 
analyse experiences of the past critically, as well as post-conflict constructions 
of identity, values and ‘national reconciliation’, is neglected in order to actively 
promote the RPF’s understanding of Rwandan national identity. This may 
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create a sense of exclusion among those who do not agree with the government’s 
interpretation of unity, identity or Rwandan history.
Histoire du Rwanda: history and ‘national reconciliation’ in the 
classroom
‘Il n’y a pas de peuple sans histoire comme il n’y a pas d’histoire sans peuple’ (There 
are no people without history just as there is no history without people) 
(NURC, 2011a, p. v). The history of the Rwandan nation and its people has 
been described in detail in Histoire du Rwanda: des origines à la fin du xxe siècle 
(NURC 2011a). This textbook, produced in cooperation with the National 
University of Rwanda (NUR), includes seven chapters by different authors 
which cover a range of topics from 1000BC to the presidential elections of 2003. 
Although yet to be officially introduced into the public school curriculum, 
this textbook is set to become a major element of the official reconciliation 
programme’s education remit as it will be the first history book officially used 
in Rwandan public schools and government offices since the 1994 genocide 
came to an end (Bawaya interview, 30 May 2009). 
Sarah Bawaya, who was the NURC’s acting head of syllabus development 
and training, explained that prior to the 1994 genocide, history had been 
taught by means of books written by colonial scholars, texts that propagated a 
primarily Western view of Rwandan history. The GNU banned them in 1994 
as they were thought to promote ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ (ibid.). 
This suspension did little to quash allegations of ‘genocide ideology’ being 
taught in public schools. In 2008, Rwandan Parliament members conducted 
a study into the teaching of ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ in schools 
across the country. It determined that ‘ethnic hatred’ was still prevalent in most 
of these schools despite the ban on lessons about Rwandan history (BBC News, 
19 February 2008).
The lengthy duration of this ban was compounded by the destruction 
of materials and human resources during the 1994 genocide, and affected 
by disagreement among citizens, academics and government officials on 
how to teach students about the events of the civil war and 1994 genocide 
(Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, as cited by Schweisfurth, 2006, 
p. 701; Freedman et al., 2004, p. 248). Part of this disagreement stemmed 
from concerns about the significance of different events leading up to and 
during the 1994 genocide and about teachers’ promotion of ‘divisionism’. 
Schweisfurth argues that the curriculum taught by teachers prior to and during 
1994 perpetuated tension and violence (Institute of Research and Dialogue 
for Peace, 2003, as cited by Schweisfurth, 2006, p. 699) and that, for many, 
the participation of some teachers in the 1994 genocide, as well as the fact 
that massacres took place in schools, led to ‘the total erosion of faith in the 
education system’ (Obura, 2003, cited by Schweisfurth, 2006, p. 700).
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The NURC seemingly sought to tackle these concerns by commissioning a 
new history book for use in public offices and schools following the resumption 
in 2010 of history teaching in the classroom, at which time classes were guided 
by a teaching manual rather than a textbook (McLean Hilker, 2010, p. 2). 
The book’s final draft had not been completed at the time this interview was 
conducted in 2009, but Bawaya explained that the text would criticise the ‘bad 
elements’ of history that encourage ‘divisionism’, and celebrate the positive 
social factors that promote unity in the country (Bawaya interview, 30 May 
2009).13 Histoire du Rwanda was written with the stated mandate to promote 
‘national reconciliation’ and rebuild the nation (NURC, 2011a, p. v). The 
book is purportedly designed to reach this goal by promoting critical thinking 
and the truth about the events of Rwanda’s history (ibid., p. vi). More broadly, 
it states a commitment to educating the youth about the past: 
Young people need to know the origins and causes of the deep divisions 
that have shaped recent relations between Rwandans. Otherwise, future 
generations will have a partial vision of the past, fueled by emotional 
or popular stories gleaned from parents, friends, newspapers, and other 
writing or simply from the street (ibid., p. 11).14
The ‘official version’ of the truth may not reflect the views of all Rwandans, 
but it will be taught to them in public schools when Histoire du Rwanda is 
introduced into the education system. 
The ‘bad elements’ of history
Histoire du Rwanda describes the NURC’s understanding of the nation’s origins 
in great detail. The pre-colonial era is particularly relevant to the promotion of 
unity and ‘national reconciliation,’ as it is depicted as a time of solidarity and 
social cohesion, an image that appears throughout the book and the Rwandan 
government texts it analyses. Peaceful coexistence between the nation’s earliest 
clans is traced back as far as the 14th century at which time Rwanda was a 
‘small territorial entity’ in the area now known as Gasabo district in Kigali 
Province (NURC, 2011a, p. 85). Even in this early period, the chapter’s author, 
Gamaliel Mbonimana, contends that clans of Gasabo and neighbouring areas 
lived together peacefully and functioned as a type of ‘confederation’ (ibid., p. 
86). 
Themes of cooperation and coexistence are echoed throughout the next 
chapter covering the later pre-colonial period, which outlines how the era 
was shaped by the monarchic power of King Kigeri Rwabugiri in the 19th 
century. Patriotism and the desire to expand Rwanda’s borders are identified as 
common interests of the population at this time. Mbonimana contends that 
13 As of June 2015, this history book had still not been introduced into classrooms or 
government offices.
14 Translation from French, 8 March 2012.
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the highly centralised nature of political control was expressed through literary 
and historical texts espousing the power of the king and queen. It was also 
exercised through institutions including the ubuhake cattle clientelist system, 
which features heavily in the ‘victor’s narrative’ (ibid., p. 109). Mbonimana 
defines ubuhake as a voluntary contract between the cattle owner and the 
individual seeking work and ubuletwa as an arrangement whereby the poorest 
civilians spent two days a week working the fields of wealthier landowners 
(ibid., pp. 127, 129).
Mbonimana’s view of these systems conflicts with those of Eltringham 
and Prunier who see ubuhake − and ubuletwa, in particular − as examples 
of the growing power of a minority of individuals who had elite Tutsi status 
(Eltringham, 2004, p. 13; Prunier, 1995, p. 21).15 Conversely, the RPF’s version 
of history, as depicted in Histoire du Rwanda, rejects the notion of antagonistic 
identities during this period. Instead, these groups are shown to have been 
deeply intertwined through intermarriage and cooperation, ‘[i]n effect, neither 
Hutu nor Tutsi has the characteristics necessary to constitute two distinct 
ethnicities. They spoke the same language, shared the same religious beliefs, 
and lived together. Relationships between these groups were not sources of 
confrontation’ (NURC, 2011a, p. 172).
In Histoire du Rwanda, the colonial period of 1884 to 1962 contrasts starkly 
with the pre-colonial era of peace, cooperation and social cohesion. Elements 
of the ‘victor’s narrative’ are repeated and expanded upon in this section of 
the textbook, including colonial leaders’ manipulation of the existing political 
structures and the stratification of ethnic identities, resulting in the growing 
tension within the Hutu population shortly before independence. Histoire du 
Rwanda places particular emphasis on the role of Belgian leaders and Catholic 
missionaries in the growing anti-Tutsi sentiment during this period. 
Colonial leaders identified Tutsi according to their physical features and 
perceived aptitude for leadership, purportedly considering the Hutu majority to 
be nothing more than servants, and the Twa as ‘devoid of any humanity’ (ibid., 
p. 249). This particular understanding of ethnic identities was exemplified by 
Hutu and Twa civilians being barred from administrative positions, which 
instead were occupied by five per cent of the Tutsi population (ibid., p. 267). 
As instituted by the Belgian authorities, this system is blamed for ‘accentuating 
sentiments of ethnic identity’ (ibid.). Paul Rutayisire, author of the chapter 
entitled ‘Rwanda under German and Belgian colonial rule’, contends that 
colonial leaders misunderstood the ubuhake and ubuletwa systems, using them 
to exploit Hutu civilians towards the end of the colonial period (ibid., p. 298). 
Rutayisire refutes Mamdani’s descriptions of Belgian and Tutsi pastoralist rule 
as ‘double domination’ of Hutu civilians (1996, p. 8). Instead, he firmly places 
15 See chapter 2 for further detail about Eltringham and Prunier’s interpretations of 
these systems.
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the blame for growing anti-Tutsi sentiment upon colonial officials who sought 
to achieve the contradictory goals of protecting society’s weakest members 
while increasing the political control of the most powerful group in Rwanda, 
the Tutsi elite (NURC, 2011a, p. 298).
Rutayisire’s chapter shows that as Rwanda neared independence the tide 
of political control was beginning to turn. Increased public participation had 
been a stated goal of the trusteeship system established by the UN in 1946 
(ibid., p. 328), and Rutayisire argues that the failure of this stated mandate did 
little to calm the desire for change inside Rwanda (ibid., p. 329). Lemarchand 
describes the ‘Bahutu Manifesto’ of 1957 as having outlined the concerns of its 
Hutu authors about the social, political and economic injustice experienced by 
the Hutu majority. The manifesto’s authors recommended the active promotion 
of Hutu individuals to public office and increased access to education for 
the Hutu population (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 149). Rutayisire criticises the 
manifesto for misunderstanding the relationship between the Hutu majority 
and Tutsi minority. He contends that the document exacerbated ethnic tension 
by focusing too narrowly on the exploitation of Hutu masses, while ignoring 
the social, political and economic injustices experienced by all Rwandans at the 
hands of colonial leaders and Catholic missionaries (NURC, 2011a, p. 368). 
Unlike many authors including Mamdani (1996), Lemarchand (1970) 
and Pottier (2002), Rutayisire does not use the term ‘Social Revolution’ to 
describe the violent events of 1959. It only appears in Histoire du Rwanda to 
condemn the rhetoric used by supporters of Kayibanda’s Parmehutu to describe 
the ‘cohesive ideology’ of all Hutu. Although acknowledging that some Hutu 
intellectuals shared a sense of common ethnic identity, Rutayisire rejects the 
notion presented by other authors that the violence of this period was planned 
or that all Hutu felt oppressed (NURC, 2011a, p. 417). This interpretation 
differs from that discussed earlier in chapter 2 because it does not depict the 
‘Bahutu Manifesto’ authors as having represented the views of other Hutu, 
nor does it highlight the growing anti-Tutsi sentiment associated with the 
monarchic system (Mamdani, 1996, p. 5).
The second ‘bad element’ of history described in Histoire du Rwanda is 
that of ‘bad governance’ in the run-up to the 1994 genocide. The regimes 
of the First and Second Republics, led by Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal 
Habyarimana respectively, are identified by Joseph Jyoni Wa Karega, author 
of chapter 5, as having promoted the anti-Tutsi propaganda and ‘divisionism’ 
that fuelled the 1994 genocide (ibid., p. 427). Jyoni Wa Karega outlines a 
number of conflicts between civilians who became refugees after the 1963 
‘inyenzi invasion’.16 Kayibanda’s regime is blamed for having orchestrated one 
such attack in Gikongoro against Tutsi civilians which resulted in 8,000 to 
16 See chapter 2 for an examination of this particular invasion and its effect on the 
refugee population.
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10,000 deaths (ibid., p. 431). The overall death toll from 1961−8 is estimated 
to be between 25,000 and 35,000. Jyoni Wa Karega highlights the fact that 
no justice was meted out for Tutsi deaths that occurred during this period and 
in 1973 (ibid., p. 453). Repression, violence and impunity are highlighted as 
examples of the ‘bad governance’ of Kayibanda’s regime that killed opposition 
politicians, both Hutu and Tutsi, concentrated political power into a small 
‘mono-ethnic’ group, and put the 1994 genocide’s first acts into practice (ibid., 
p. 451).
A description of how the monopolistic power of the state prospered 
throughout the Second Republic of Juvénal Habyarimana then follows. Jyoni 
Wa Karega depicts Habyarimana’s party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire 
National pour le Développement (MRND) as ‘the centre of all power, centralism 
took precedence over democracy … It soon became an extraordinary machine 
of propaganda of the will of its founder into the corners of the most remote 
areas of the country’ (ibid., p. 459). He highlights discrimination against Tutsi 
as well as Hutu from areas other than Gisenyi in the west and Ruhengeri in 
the northwest of the country during this period. Hutu civilians and officials in 
those two regions were purportedly given preferential treatment as they were 
home to high-powered MRND members (ibid., p. 460). The ‘victor’s narrative’ 
emphasises the ‘bad governance’ and ‘extremist propaganda’ of Habyarimana’s 
inner circle. As stated in the NURC’s 2007 Reconciliation Policy:
During different periods of history, Rwanda has been characterized 
by the bad governance bound to divisionism, ethnical, regional and 
religious segregation, regionalization and oligarchy which have negative 
impacts on the Rwandan society.
Some of those impacts are division of all kinds, exclusion from [the] 
homeland, killings, refugees, war and 1994 genocide. After genocide, 
its ideology and mentality related to any segregation that are still being 
perpetuated by some Rwandans, are the significant hindrance to the 
process of unity and reconciliation of Rwandans (p. 2).
Jyoni Wa Karega identifies many other examples of ‘bad governance’ 
throughout the Second Republic under Habyarimana’s leadership. He points 
to issues of racketeering by members of Habyarimana’s government, the 
monopolisation of land by the rich, economic strife created by the early 1990s 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and the increasing isolation of poor 
civilians who faced significant social disparity (NURC, 2011a, pp. 468–70). 
The inclusion of the SAP in this ‘bad governance’ list transforms a much larger 
international issue into a process belonging exclusively to the Habyarimana 
regime. Jyoni Wa Karega blames Habyarimana’s government for all social, 
political and economic hardships experienced by Rwandans in the run-up 
to the 1994 genocide. He also describes Habyarimana’s failure to repatriate 
Rwandan refugees who had fled during earlier periods of violence (ibid., p. 
472), arguing that, 
RECONCILING RWANDA132
Until 1990, the political class no longer considered refugees as 
Rwandan. The government prevented them from returning and 
destabilized them where they had sought refuge, Kigali wanted them 
to die in extreme poverty and disappear completely. It is the protocol 
on refugees signed in 1993 under the Arusha negotiations that will 
reintegrate all the refugees and their rights (ibid., p. 473).
Jyoni Wa Karega’s assertion that the Habyarimana regime actively prevented 
repatriation, and wanted all Tutsi refugees to die in poverty, contradicts the 
historical interpretations of multiple authors including Kuperman (2004) and 
Sibomana (1999). These authors argue that Habyarimana actively attempted 
to repatriate Tutsi refugees living in Uganda in order to prevent the impending 
RPF invasion in 1990. Jyoni Wa Karega’s interpretation of events justifies the 
RPF’s stated motivations for the invasion on 1 October 1990: eradicate anti-
Tutsi racism; end the ‘bad governance’ of Habyarimana’s regime; and fix the 
‘refugee problem’ that Habyarimana’s regime had allegedly ignored (ibid., p. 
477).
These ‘bad elements’ of the past reached an apex during the 1994 genocide. 
Faustin Rutembesa, author of chapter 6 in Histoire du Rwanda, depicts the 1994 
genocide as a highly organised pre-planned massacre of the Tutsi population. 
He describes how representatives of Habyarimana’s government distributed 
arms to Hutu civilians under the pretense of ‘civil self-defense’ (ibid., p. 531). 
Rutembesa also explains the role of elite manipulation, particularly by MRND 
and CDR party members and military officials, in mobilising civilians to 
participate in the massacres, as well as the role of anti-Tutsi propaganda and 
‘genocide ideology’:
Ideology had produced such a demonization of the Tutsi that when 
the RPF took control of most of the country, those who had conceived 
and coordinated the genocide became intertwined with those who had 
no specific role in the violence. This diluted the consciences of those 
responsible for the genocide and allowed for the continuation of the 
genocidal dynamic (ibid., p. 532).
He also discusses the UN’s refusal to use the term ‘genocide’ in relation to the 
1994 massacres and highlights the role of France and Opération Turquoise in 
the continued warfare (ibid., pp. 546–8). Rutembesa describes the extreme 
violence of that time and repeatedly defines the roles of ethnicity, propaganda, 
‘genocide ideology’ and ‘bad governance’ in this devastating period of Rwanda’s 
history. He does not however, place any blame on the RPF for civilian deaths 
or retaliative acts during the 1994 genocide, as discussed by authors including 
Kuperman (2004) and Des Forges (1999).
The ‘positive elements’ of unity and ‘national reconciliation’
The ‘bad elements’ outlined in Histoire du Rwanda: ‘divisionism’ institutionalised 
during the colonial period, anti-Tutsi ideology and ‘bad governance’ serve to 
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highlight the disparity between Habyarimana’s regime and the RPF’s political 
interests in the run-up to, during and after the 1994 genocide. The most 
immediately identifiable difference between the RPF and Habyarimana’s 
regime is anti-Tutsi sentiment. Others identified by Jyoni Wa Karega include 
the RPF’s alleged interest in ‘real power-sharing’ (ibid., p. 487).17 This stated 
goal is repeated in the ‘victor’s narrative’ as an apparent attempt to legitimise the 
RPF’s invasion in 1990, but is contested by authors including Kuperman, who 
points instead to the RPF’s interest in securing ‘significant’ political control 
during the civil war and the 1994 genocide (2004, p. 69). This interpretation 
is consistent with the RPF creating an executive presidency within the GNU 
in 1995. The RPF’s activities during this period are explained multiple times 
in Histoire du Rwanda. For instance, Jyoni Wa Karega justifies its decision to 
break the ceasefire agreement with the MRND in February 1993, ‘The RPF 
took up arms to force the government to respect the right to life. The renewed 
fighting is not the cause but the consequence of the violation of the agreements 
of ceasefire [by government forces]’ (2011a, pp. 503−4).
Rutembesa applies the same logic to his explanation and justification of 
the RPF’s political and military manoeuvres during the 1994 genocide. In 
particular, he highlights the success of RPF military tactics in ending the 
violence, restoring order and saving the lives of tens of thousands of Tutsi 
civilians (ibid., p. 570). Rutembesa contends that the RPF began to battle 
against the negative forces of ‘negationism’ and ‘revisionism’ after it had secured 
the capital and ended the 1994 genocide. He contrasts the RPF’s ‘positive’ steps 
towards peace with ‘negative’ acts of denial by those who supported the 1994 
genocide. These ‘genocide deniers’ evaded responsibility by referring to the 
events of that year not as genocide but as unplanned violence resulting from 
the RPF invasion in 1990, and describing the brutality as a ‘double genocide’ 
against Tutsi and Hutu civilians (ibid., pp. 575–80). Rutembesa states, ‘The 
negationist propaganda is based on multiple strategies and techniques: the 
denial of facts, changing the pattern and circumstances, blurring the details, 
mixing truth and lies, camouflaging, and misinterpreting and generalizing. 
Doing this creates false truths and is anti-historical’ (ibid., p. 576).
In spite of these challenges, Charles Kabwete Mulinda, author of chapter 
7 in the textbook, highlights and expands upon the purportedly ‘positive 
elements’ of unity and ‘national reconciliation’ after the 1994 genocide, 
depicting these achievements as belonging to the programming the GNU had 
17 ‘Real power-sharing’ is used here in reference to the 1993 Arusha Accords. Jyoni Wa 
Karega stipulates that the RPF rebels sought a power-sharing agreement that would 
restrict the MRND’s political power by preventing the president from maintaining 
‘excessive power’ (ibid., p. 487). This political control would instead be spread 
among all parties except the CDR.
RECONCILING RWANDA134
created and implemented. The GNU stated its commitment to rebuilding the 
country by outlining an eight-point plan in July 1994 including:
Restoring a climate of security and peace;
Organizing the Central Government, the prefectures of Commons, 
Sectors and Cells;
Restoring and consolidating national unity;
Reintegrating refugees and returning property to displaced people;
Improving the living conditions of the population and solving social 
problems resulting from the war and genocide; 
Revitalizing the national economy;
Redefining foreign policy;
Consolidating democracy (ibid., p. 589).
Mulinda describes the GNU’s approach to restoring national unity as having 
been shaped by the desire to teach the people of Rwanda how to live together 
peacefully (ibid., p. 597).
One of the first ‘positive steps’ towards ‘national reconciliation’ highlighted 
by Mulinda is the GNU’s removal of ethnic identities from identification cards 
(ibid., p. 600). This represents an early move towards the de facto banning 
of ethnic identities from public discourse. Mulinda highlights the NURC’s 
creation in 1999 as a great benefit to the official reconciliation process. He also 
extols the virtues of the GNU’s approach to unity and ‘national reconciliation’, 
one example being the pursuit of maximal justice. Mulinda justifies the arrests 
of 120,000 civilians in the years after the 1994 genocide as vital to prevent 
further injustice. He recognises the dearth of judicial support after the deaths 
and exile of magistrates during the 1994 genocide, yet condemns criticism of 
the justice system by academics and human rights activists as ‘malevolent and 
irresponsible’ (ibid., p. 603). He makes no reference to the ‘life-threatening 
overcrowding and appalling treatment’ of Rwandan prisoners after the 1994 
genocide (HRW, 1995, p. 1).
Mulinda describes gacaca as a step towards restorative justice that includes 
the participation of the entire population. Gacaca courts, he argues, were 
expected to produce positive results including ‘truth about the genocide’, 
speedy trials, popular participation, an end to impunity and a stronger sense 
of national unity (ibid., pp. 605–6). These anticipated results closely resemble 
the objectives stated by the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ).18 
Mulinda quashes further criticism of the system, including that of victor’s 
justice employed by such authors as Waldorf (2010), Tiemessen (2004) and 
Sarkin (2001) to criticise the RPF’s approach to justice at gacaca. He contends 
that this perspective errs in its assumption that RPF members ought to be tried 
18 See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the objectives of gacaca as stated by the 
NSGJ.
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for crimes of vengeance, arguing, instead, that acts of genocide committed by 
Hutu civilians cannot be compared with crimes against humanity allegedly 
perpetrated by individual RPF members (NURC, 2011a, p. 604).19
Other achievements in unity and ‘national reconciliation’ include the 
repatriation of 23,658 Rwandan citizens in 2000 and 2001 and the resettlement 
of refugees who returned to find their homes occupied or destroyed (ibid., p. 
646). Mulinda describes the formation of FARG and its positive impact on 
increased access to primary, secondary and university education for survivors. 
He also outlines the benefits of healthcare, the imidugudu resettlement 
programme, and of offering support towards repairing survivors’ homes. He 
does add, however, that many survivors continue to complain about housing 
problems and the lack of adequate aid and access to scholarships (ibid., p. 648). 
Mulinda’s depiction of survivors’ opinions pales in comparison with concerns 
expressed by Mary Kayitesi-Blewett, founder of the Survivors Fund (SURF), 
who outlines the many challenges survivors faced such as trauma, extreme 
poverty and chronic housing shortages (2006, p. 320).
Histoire du Rwanda provides a comprehensive description of the detrimental 
effects of ‘bad governance’ and the GNU’s stated commitment to unity and 
‘national reconciliation’ following the 1994 genocide. Although rich in detail, 
this historical rendering fails to touch on some important issues discussed by 
other authors. The first is the growth of a highly inequitable economic system 
during the pre-colonial period. As previously discussed in chapter 2, Prunier 
makes a connection between the development of cattle clientage and political 
stratification in pre-colonial Rwanda. He describes ‘a centre versus periphery 
affair’ with reference to the disproportionate amount of political power held by 
a small minority of civilians with elite Tutsi status (1995, p. 21). Conversely, 
the pre-colonial cattle clientage systems are depicted in Histoire du Rwanda as 
voluntary contracts that benefited both the land-owners and those who worked 
the fields, supporting the assertion that unity existed between all Rwandans 
during the pre-colonial era, as described in the ‘victor’s narrative’.
Multiple Histoire du Rwanda contributors provide extensive information 
concerning the RPF’s supposed intentions in the lead-up to the October 1990 
invasion, as well as during and after the 1994 genocide. They also discuss RPF 
actions during these periods and the outcomes of conflicts between the rebels 
and government forces between 1990−4. Although it is briefly indicated that 
some individual RPF members may have perpetrated crimes against humanity 
during the 1994 genocide, no details or numbers related to these attacks are 
provided and there is no indication that punishment was meted out in such 
cases (NURC, 2011a, p. 574).
19 This document is the first to refer to RPF crimes committed in 1994 as crimes 
against humanity. They are more commonly referred to as individual crimes of 
vengeance.
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Similarly, the accounts of the Kibeho tragedy and conflict in eastern Zaire/
DRC do not discuss the crimes committed by RPA members against civilians. 
Mulinda, author of chapter 7, justifies the RPA’s entry into the Kibeho camp for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 1995 as a concerted effort to close what 
had allegedly become ‘the sanctuary of criminals’ (ibid., p. 597). He clarifies 
that although the RPF laments the 300 civilian deaths that it recognises, the 
much higher calculations of 4,000 to 8,000 deaths are grossly overestimated 
by ‘critics of the Kigali regime and the RPF in particular’ (ibid.). Amnesty 
International (AI) gauged in 1996 that upwards of ‘several thousand’ IDPs 
were killed by the RPF’s military wing, the RPA, during this tragedy (1996, 
p. 18).
Interestingly, neither Mulinda, nor AI (1996), nor the UN (1995) uses 
the term ‘Hutu’ to describe the victims of the 1995 Kibeho massacre. If the 
RPF considered the IDP camps to be a ‘sanctuary of criminals’, as Mulinda 
contends, it is likely that most if not all IDPs at Kibeho were Hutu (NURC, 
2011a, p. 597). The lack of ethnic identifiers in these reports may serve to 
legitimise the RPA’s attack by making it appear to be an attempt to prevent 
genocide rather than the systematic massacre of Hutu civilians. Mulinda states 
that the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Kibeho tragedy rejected 
the accusation that the massacre was a planned attempt to exterminate Hutu 
civilians (ibid.). Launched by the GNU, the commission included members 
of the Rwandan government, the UN, the African Union and representatives 
from countries such as Canada, France and the UK (UN, 1995, p. 6). 
Amnesty International criticised this commission for its failure to comply 
with international standards of investigation, and to determine the number 
of victims. Amnesty also found fault with the investigation’s conclusion that 
the deaths had been caused by the actions of both RPA soldiers and armed 
militants inside the camp (1996, p. 18).
Mulinda justifies the RPF’s role in the Second Congo War as one of ‘vital 
interest to safety and survival, more obvious and intense than in neighbouring 
DRC. This justifies the role of Rwanda in this war, and by extension, the actual 
weight of other actors whose roles were often exaggerated’ (NURC, 2011a, p. 
630). Although Mulinda does discuss the RPF’s role in toppling Mobutu, he 
does not provide evidence of it having committed any wrongdoing − there is 
no reference, for example, to the RPA having extracted or plundered natural 
resources from Zaire/DRC. Similarly, he justifies the RPF’s actions and 
commends the group’s military achievements in increasing safety and security 
as well as facilitating the repatriation of 1.5 million Rwandans. ‘If we had not 
attacked Zaire, the refugee issue would have remained insoluble forever’ (RPA 
chief of staff, as quoted in NURC, 2011a, p. 635). Unlike the ‘Report of the 
mapping exercise’, published by the UN in 2010, which documents human 
rights abuses perpetrated in Zaire/DRC between 1993−2003, Mulinda does 
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not mention any crimes against humanity committed by the RPA during the 
war (UNHRC, 2010).
The similarity between Mulinda’s depiction of the RPF/RPA’s actions 
in DRC and the ‘victor’s narrative’ demonstrates the singular nature of the 
history curriculum described in Histoire du Rwanda. Freedman et al. discuss 
the difficulties of encouraging critical thinking with regard to the RPF’s official 
historical narrative in Rwanda’s public school system. In their assessment of the 
intervention project on teaching history in Rwanda, led by the University of 
California Berkeley Human Rights Centre, they discuss the tension between 
the RPF’s education policy and the implementation of democratic teaching 
styles that promote critical thinking and debate (Freedman et al., 2008, pp. 
664–5):20 
In this study, we saw how the victory of one political side – a group 
that represents a minority population in the wake of the genocide – 
created a set of tensions that inhibited curricular reform. The inability 
to discuss issues of ethnic identity, the distortions of a history that the 
government wishes to tell, the constraints against teaching students how 
to be critical thinkers, and above all, the fear of productive conflict have 
profound implications for the establishment of a progressive history 
curriculum and a healthy democracy (Freedman et al., 2011, p. 309).21
This conflict originates in the education policy’s stipulation that only the 
official historical narrative may be taught in schools. This restriction precludes 
analysis and impedes discussion about the government’s rendering of events. 
For instance, it fails to address the continued use of ethnic labels in Rwandan 
society as well as persistent fear of ethnic violence (ibid.; Mgbako, 2005, p. 
220; interview with son of returnee, 7 April 2009). 
The NURC’s foray into public school history lessons includes many of the 
major elements repeated in government-sponsored reconciliation discourse: 
20 The intervention project on teaching history in Rwanda arose from an expression 
of interest made by the Rwandan Ministry of Education (Mineduc) for help with 
creating secondary-level teaching materials on Rwandan history (Freedman et 
al., 2008, p. 664). The project involved collaboration between the University of 
California’s Berkeley Human Rights Centre, the National University of Rwanda 
(NUR), and the Rwandan National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) 
of Mineduc, with support from the American NGO Facing History and Ourselves 
(FHAO) (ibid.). 
21 Bianchini found that students training to become secondary history teachers at 
the Kigali Institute of Education were divided about whether they ought to 
employ more democratic teaching styles. Of the 165 students who completed 
questionnaires, 44% favoured a democratic approach to teaching that facilitated 
the discussion of identity and divergent narratives of history. A marginally lower 
percentage (40%) of respondents would prefer to ‘restore accurate history with a 
new course’. ‘Accurate history’ refers to the RPF-sponsored narrative of Rwandan 
history, the ‘victor’s narrative’ (2012, pp. 230−1). 
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the detrimental effects of ‘bad governance’ and ‘genocide ideology’ and the 
beneficial ones of RPF leadership, gacaca and restoration of social cohesion that 
allegedly thrived during the pre-colonial era. The RPF’s assertion that there is 
only one ‘accurate’ version of events creates difficulties in encouraging critical 
thinking and debate about national history in Rwanda’s public schools. Once 
Histoire du Rwanda is officially launched, the curriculum in public schools will 
be dominated by the only official version of history available, that of the RPF.
Conclusion
The restoration of ingando and itorero camps is rife with contradictions in 
relation to promoting ‘national reconciliation’ after the 1994 genocide. The 
size and structure of these camps facilitates the coming together of large peer 
groups to engage with matters related to social and cultural values, identity 
and development. Protrais Musoni, the former Minister of Local Government, 
stated with reference to itorero, ‘the programme was initiated to facilitate the 
healing of broken hearts of many people through promoting culture, fighting 
genocide ideology and fostering the reconciliation process’ (New Times, 13 
January 2008). Both of these camps are guided by an overarching education 
remit that seeks to promote unity and ‘national reconciliation’, while restricting 
critical analysis, free discussion and divergent conclusions about identity, 
ethnicity and the nation’s history. 
The contradictions inherent in this remit may begin with the very notion that 
all Rwandans must change their minds with regard to unity and reconciliation. 
Ingando and itorero, guided by NURC-designed syllabi, teach the population 
about the government’s vision of unity and ‘national reconciliation’. As such, 
the stated commitment to reeducating the nation facilitates the top-down 
dissemination of government-sponsored historical narrative, one that bolsters 
support for the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme and the current 
RPF regime more generally. The sense of the population’s ‘mass ignorance’, in 
conjunction with the lack of critical analysis and multiple historical narratives 
transforms both camps into powerful indoctrination tools. 
Itorero ry’igihugu is in a particularly influential position with regard 
to facilitating discussion and critical analysis of national unity, ‘national 
reconciliation’ and identity. It brings together far larger and more varied 
groups of participants than the ingando camps do, allowing them to live 
among their peers and learn about the culture and values that supposedly 
come from Rwandan history. This focus on values and cultural taboos gives 
the intore insight into the government’s historical narrative and conceptions 
of unity and national identity. Itorero, like ingando, fails to provide a forum 
in which participants may openly question and criticise these notions. Free 
discussion and divergent conclusions about identity and unity are particularly 
important in light of the government’s de facto banning of ethnic terms from 
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public discourse and government documents. Significantly, itorero’s focus 
on the singular nature of identity in Rwanda precludes analysis of the reality 
that ethnic terms and identities still exist in Rwandan society. The public 
identification of the best and worst performers at itorero further discourages 
intore from disagreeing with the ‘victor’s narrative’ and values taught at itorero.
The textbook, Histoire du Rwanda: des origins à la fin du xxe siècle, published 
by the NURC in cooperation with the National University of Rwanda, provides 
a detailed description of the country’s history from the early pre-colonial era 
up to the presidential elections of 2003. Shaped by a stated commitment to 
promote unity and ‘national reconciliation’ through teaching the youth about 
their nation’s history for the first time since 1994, it misses the opportunity to 
foster critical debate about such important events as colonisation, the 1959 
Social Revolution, the RPF invasion, the civil war and the 1994 genocide. 
In fact, it deliberately limits critical understandings of Rwandan history and 
RPF actions. Once it is officially adopted, Histoire du Rwanda will do little 
more than disseminate the ‘victor’s narrative’ to an extensive audience. As 
such, ingando, itorero and Histoire du Rwanda meet the broadest goal of the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s education remit: to change 
the minds of all Rwandans by teaching the population about the government’s 
vision of unity and ‘national reconciliation’. However, they fail to promote 
more nuanced elements of ‘national reconciliation’ including critical analysis 
and open discussion, both camps’ stated commitments, and relationship 
rebuilding, the cornerstone of the government’s conception of ‘horizontal 
reconciliation’. Instead, both camps and Histoire du Rwanda actively silence 
opposition, legitimise state programming including Vision 2020, and bolster 
support for the current RPF regime.

Chapter 6
The functions of ‘national reconciliation’: political images of 
Rwanda
On 9 August 2010, Paul Kagame secured a second consecutive term as the 
President of Rwanda. Approximately 97.5 per cent of the population voted 
in the election that won the incumbent president a majority of 93 per cent 
(BBC News, 11 August 2010). In the preceding weeks, pro-RPF slogans, songs 
and chants rang through the streets of Kigali. On 18 July 2010, I joined the 
40,000 supporters packed into Rwanda’s national Amahoro stadium, wearing 
RPF t-shirts and cheering in excitement for Kagame and the RPF. As millions 
of Rwandans visited the polls, the RPF faced heated criticism from journalists, 
Figure 6.1. President Kagame’s name spelled out by supporters at an RPF election rally, 
Amahoro Stadium, Kigali (author’s photo, 18 July 2010)
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political opponents and international NGOs accusing the current regime of 
consolidating its power by undermining democracy (BBC News, 9 August 
2010).1
The RPF has dominated the Rwandan political arena since it seized control 
of the capital in July 1994. This power was initially exerted under the guise of the 
GNU and subsequently expanded through the 2003 and 2008 parliamentary 
elections, and the 2003 and 2010 presidential elections.2 Throughout this 
period, the RPF has bolstered its political control inside the country and 
secured its position in the international community through positive relations 
with foreign donors and membership in the East Africa Community (EAC) 
and the Commonwealth.3
Successfully establishing a strong central state apparatus has shaped the 
RPF’s leadership of Rwanda. The government initially sought to legitimise 
itself at both the domestic and international levels by agreeing to follow the 
Arusha Accords guidelines (Hayman, 2007, p. 16). In the years following the 
establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the RPF has 
continued to promote its own priorities, programmes and agendas at both 
the national and international level. The National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme plays an important role in maintaining political control and 
fostering the party’s nation-building and development goals.
The government’s official reconciliation programme functions as a 
normative and legal framework through which the RPF successfully constructs 
and projects two interrelated political images of Rwanda to the domestic 
population and the international community of donors, investors and NGOs. 
The term ‘political image’ refers to the image of the nation projected by both 
the RPF and the government’s own leadership. Both of these images reflect the 
RPF’s successes and its vision of Rwanda, guided by stated commitments to 
‘good governance’, nation-building, ‘national reconciliation’ and development. 
This definition builds on Edelman’s description of the construction of images as 
essential to maintaining public and private power relations. Murray Edelman, 
a political scientist, argues that powerful images stem from established political 
1 See HRW (2010) for a chronological summary of the RPF’s alleged attempts 
to silence political opponents, restrict political space and inhibit democratic 
participation in the elections.
2 This understanding of political dominance is influenced by Lukes’ conception of 
the three-dimensional view of power. Lukes’ examination uncovers the ways in 
which power constrains the interests of those who are dominated by others. For 
instance, his understanding includes the notion of ‘latent conflict’, which describes 
the opposition between the interests of those exercising power and those whose 
interests are excluded. This inequitable distribution takes place regardless of whether 
the excluded group is aware of or able to express these interests (2005, p. 28). 
3 Rwanda joined the EAC in 2007 and the Commonwealth in 2009.
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and economic relationships (2001, p. 13). As such, these images bolster the 
interests of groups seeking to gain or maintain political control (ibid., p. 15).
The normative and legal aspects of the RPF’s official reconciliation 
programme give shape to these political images. Normative elements include the 
‘victor’s narrative’, which, as discussed in chapter 4, legitimises RPF leadership 
and programming by creating a prescriptive path upon which national unity 
may be achieved. Other key normative concepts include ‘divisionism’ and 
‘genocide ideology’, which restrict political space and criticism of the current 
government. They are particularly prominent due to having been defined and 
institutionalised by legislation. The 2001 Law, ‘Prevention, suppression and 
punishment of the crime of discrimination and sectarianism’, is applied to 
the criminalisation of ‘divisionism’ acts. The 2008 and amended 2013 Law, 
‘Punishment of the crime of genocide ideology’, define the parameters of, and 
punishment for, acts of ‘genocide ideology’. Other pertinent forms of legislation 
include strict registration processes for political parties and candidates as well 
as for journalists and newspapers. The actions of political parties, journalists 
and even domestic and international NGOs are further limited by the fact that 
police approval is required for gatherings of more than five people (Longman, 
2011b, p. 1). Such restrictions protect the political images of Rwanda and its 
leadership from criticism by silencing individual voices and preventing groups 
who oppose the current government from gathering. As such, the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme is a highly effective framework through 
which positive images of the nation and its government are projected at home 
and abroad, despite the political reality inside the country.
Political image: national audience
State-legitimacy and nation-building
At the national level, the RPF’s official reconciliation effort functions as an 
umbrella programme under which a wide variety of policies and projects are 
grouped together and are administered in a strictly top-down manner. As we 
have seen, these projects include civic education, gacaca, repatriation and 
reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants, and development. The Rwandan 
government has used the programme’s stated achievements in all of these areas 
to solidify political support, legitimise state programming, and construct 
a nation built upon government-mandated values and a singular national 
identity (Melvin, 2012, p. 3). According to a 2009 NURC evaluation of official 
reconciliation work in Rwanda, the programme’s stated achievements are both 
plentiful and pertinent. They include: growth of harmony and trust among 
the population; the successful release and reeducation of 70,000 convicted 
genocide perpetrators at ingando civic education camps; and the coordination 
of various official reconciliation projects at both the district and national level 
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(NURC, 2009b). The RPF’s successes have purportedly coalesced into a single 
sense of hope, dignity and pride for all Rwandans, as described by President 
Kagame at a reception hosted by Pierre Prosper, the former Ambassador-At-
Large in the Bush administration for war crimes, in Los Angeles (speech, 28 
April 2014).
These stated achievements are transformed into powerful political rhetoric 
when combined with the RPF’s assertions of its own commitment to ‘good 
governance’. The latter term has different meanings with reference to the 
RPF’s projection of its leadership to the Rwandan people and the international 
community of donors and investors. It appears throughout the 2003 
Constitution, as well as presidential speeches and evaluations conducted by 
the NURC. ‘Good governance’ is not explicitly defined in the NURC’s 2007 
Reconciliation Policy; its definition can instead be deduced as the antithesis of 
‘bad governance’ described below:
During different periods of history, Rwanda has been characterized 
by the bad governance bound to divisionism, ethnical, regional and 
religious segregation, regionalization and oligarchy which have negative 
impacts on the Rwandan society. Some of those impacts are division of 
all kinds, exclusion from homeland, killings, refugees, war and 1994 
genocide. After genocide, its ideology and mentality related to any 
segregation that are still being perpetuated by some Rwandans, are the 
significant hindrance to [the] process of unity and reconciliation of 
Rwandans (p. 2).
This account of the ‘poor governance’ of past regimes serves several political 
functions. Firstly, it supports the current government’s denunciation of what 
it defines as ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’. Secondly, the RPF adds 
significant moral value to its own leadership by reducing the causes of the 1994 
genocide to relatively obtuse concepts and connecting these negative acts to 
previous regimes and colonial leaders. Thirdly, the RPF leadership’s moral value 
exonerates its members of wrongful acts they may have committed during the 
civil war, and during and after the 1994 genocide in both Rwanda and DRC. 
This sense of ‘moral value’ is accentuated by the RPF’s emphasis on its dual 
role in seizing the capital in July 1994 and founding the official reconciliation 
programme. As discussed in chapter 4, Pottier uses the term ‘moral guardians’ 
to describe the RPF’s singular narrative of their role as ‘victors’ in July 1994 
(2002, p. 207). Pottier employs this term to illustrate the ways in which the 
RPF manipulates the historical narrative to its own advantage with reference 
to the international community, a point that will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.
The official reconciliation programme’s top-down structure safeguards the 
‘victor’s narrative’ and protects the rebel group-turned political party from 
prosecution at gacaca. As chapter 3 discussed, the restoration of gacaca is the 
most substantial manifestation of the government pledge to pursue justice for 
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crimes committed during the civil war and 1994 genocide. Gacaca courts across 
the country made approximately 1.2 million judgments between 2005−12. 
The court parameters were limited, however, to offences constituting the act of 
genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated between 1990−4. As the RPF 
vehemently denies having carried out any crimes of either type, its members 
were impervious to conviction at gacaca. Should Rwandan citizens wish to accuse 
RPF members of any crimes committed inside the country, they must pursue 
the accusations at the Military Tribunal at their own expense (Bikesha interview, 
20 July 2010). Moreover, violations of international humanitarian law allegedly 
perpetrated by the RPF could not be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR). In fact, the RPF actively obstructed ICTR investigations 
into crimes it may have committed (Waldorf, 2007, p. 431).4
The fact that the RPF is not held culpable for any of its crimes not only 
promotes impunity at gacaca and the ICTR, but also legitimises the violence 
inflicted upon civilians by this rebel group. For instance, the RPF’s invasion 
in October 1990, which led to nearly four years of civil war prior to the 1994 
genocide, has been used in presidential speeches and campaign websites to 
bolster political support for the current regime:
The liberation was about rescuing ourselves from a pre- and post-
independence leadership that fostered and promoted hatred, 
sectarianism and genocidal ideologies – culminating in the decision to 
exterminate its own citizens.
This created a legacy of bad politics, poor governance, disastrous social 
development philosophies and practices, and an economic system that 
entrenched a vicious cycle of poverty and dependency.
These pre-liberation governments largely ignored the country’s most 
precious resource – its people – through substandard education and 
health policies, and sidelined productive enterprise in favour of a 
system of cronyism within subsistence agriculture that failed to benefit 
the ordinary Rwandan.
It was these circumstances that inspired us to liberate our country and 
begin the journey of building a nation worthy of our people (Kagame 
speech, 4 July 2009).
This quotation conflates the ‘liberation invasion’ of 1 October 1990 with the 
‘Liberation Day’ of 4 July 1994, considered to be the 1994 genocide’s final day. 
This relatively narrow review of the four bloodiest years in Rwanda’s history 
constructs the RPF’s political image as not only victors but also liberators, rather 
than an invading rebel group. The RPF’s rhetorical use of the term ‘liberator’ 
thus transforms the current government into a symbol of valour, morality 
and peace (Edelman, 1998, p. 2). Furthermore, reframing the October 1990 
invasion and the ensuing civil war as a ‘liberation struggle’ absolves the RPF of 
4 See chapter 2 for further discussion about the RPF’s interference in the ICTR.
RECONCILING RWANDA146
any responsibility for violence inflicted by the rebels during this period, and of 
provoking the 1994 genocide as suggested by Alan J. Kuperman (2004, p. 62).5
‘Genocide ideology’ and restricted political space
The National Unity and Reconciliation Programme functions to legitimise 
the current leadership’s policies, programmes and political images as well as 
to restrict perceived criticism of these programmes and the RPF. As discussed 
in previous chapters, journalists face intimidation, harassment and threats of 
violence if they publish work that is critical of the government or perceived to 
be ‘divisionist’. The RPF further restricts independent media through imposing 
rigorous regulatory procedures overseen by the Media High Council.
Politically motivated accusations of ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ 
impede democracy by intimidating potential political opposition and silencing 
dissenting viewpoints of civilians and domestic NGOs.6 Accusations of 
‘divisionism’ need not pertain to acts that appeal to the perceived divisions 
between the ethnic groups. Instead, the term may refer to acts the accuser 
perceives as simply ‘dividing’ the nation in some way. For instance, Bernard 
Ntaganda, the PS-Imberakuri party president, was found guilty of ‘divisionism’ 
and threatening state security in 2011. Amnesty International alleges that 
these convictions relate to speeches he gave in 2010 criticising RPF policies 
(2012, p. 2). The term’s vague nature facilitates the RPF’s use of ‘divisionism’ 
to justify arresting political leaders, editors and journalists who are critical of 
the government and its programming. Indeed, when asked about the 2010 
presidential elections, a Rwandan respondent who had worked in various 
projects related to the official reconciliation programme stated that ‘divisionism 
and genocide ideology are his weapons. He [Kagame] doesn’t want discussion 
or democracy. He wants to stay in power’ (interview, 19 July 2010).
5 Kuperman proposes an alternative narrative for the RPF rebel group’s role during 
the civil war that begins with its invasion of Rwanda from across the Ugandan 
border in October 1990. He argues that current literature about the 1994 genocide 
fails to take into account RPF actions beyond the initial invasion, and that the 1994 
genocide was foreseeable and could have been prevented if the RPF had agreed to a 
ceasefire and compromised its political goals. He argues that the rebels’ failure to do 
so created a genocidal backlash against Tutsi civilians (2004). 
6 The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) highlighted these human 
rights violations along with legal issues related to gacaca in its 2009 assessment of 
Rwanda’s application to join the Commonwealth. The Initiative argued that the 
‘monopolistic role of the state’ in constructing and disseminating Rwandan history 
and restricting the rights of free speech, expression and media impeded democracy. 
As such, CHRI recommended that Rwanda not be admitted to the Commonwealth 
(2009). Rwanda was officially granted membership of the Commonwealth on 29 
November 2009 (The Telegraph, 2009).
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Rwandan NGOs face pressure to promote official reconciliation discourse 
and government policy. Political scientist Timothy Longman maintains that 
the RPF achieves this goal by ensuring that NGOs fill their leadership positions 
with government supporters (2011b, p. 1). He explains that NGOs must also 
register with the Ministry of Local Government (Minaloc). The Law on Non-
Profit Making Organisations, published in 2000, gives Minaloc legal power to 
interfere in the internal processes of domestic NGOs (Tengera, 2010, as cited 
by Longman, 2011b, p. 1). Longman also contends that these organisations 
face threats of violence, intimidation and assassinations from the government 
made in order to force compliance (ibid.). Human Rights Watch (HRW) also 
collected reports of intimidation involving human rights defenders in Rwanda 
(2012, p. 3).
Members of NGOs and domestic media outlets face threats of jail time 
if they are found guilty of promoting ‘divisionism’ or are perceived to be 
harbouring ‘genocide ideology’. At the centre of this series of constraints is 
Law no. 18/2008 of 23/07/2008 Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide Ideology, which seeks to stamp out the spread of ‘dangerous ideology’ 
and ‘divisionism’ in order to prevent a recurrence of genocide (Parliament, 
2008b). The concept of ‘genocide ideology’ that informs the law is particularly 
convoluted. It is defined in the NURC’s 2008 ‘Training manual on genocide 
ideology’ as:
Ideally, a ‘genocide ideology’ is hardly conceivable since no group 
of people (party) would claim solving the problems of its society by 
exterminating another group of the same society. But, shit happens, as 
they say! Some parties, when not properly checked, may envision that 
‘final solution’ as they euphonically and cynically call genocide. CDR 
in Rwanda, for instance, pretty much hinted to that when it used to 
sing that ‘its sole enemy is the Tutsi’ (2008c, p. 7).7 
Being found guilty of propagating ‘genocide ideology’ can lead to a hefty 
punishment including fines and/or life imprisonment if the accused has 
previously been convicted of the crime (Parliament, 2008b). The vague 
parameters of this law provide a framework through which politically 
motivated accusations may be made as it targets not only actions, but also 
thoughts perceived by the accuser(s) to support ‘genocide ideology’.
An amended version of the ‘genocide ideology’ law was officially adopted 
in October 2013, which includes a more precise definition of the crime and 
requires evidence of the intention to promote this form of ideology. The 
maximum sentence has also been reduced from 25 years to nine (HRW, 2014, 
p. 158). The Assistant Attorney General stated that, ‘The new law is clear, spells 
7 Coalition pour la Défence de la République (CDR), a Hutu extremist party, was 
allied with the Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement 
(MRND), led by Juvénal Habyarimana.
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out elements of the crime and their punishment, so no one should claim that 
they are being victimized if they are charged with the crime’ (Rwanda Focus, 5 
August 2013). As HRW has warned, the amended law still contains language 
that could be used to limit free speech (ibid.).
Several high-profile accusations of  ‘genocide ideology’ were made prior to the 
2008 law being adopted in 2003 against domestic NGO, the Ligue Rwandaise 
pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LIPRODHOR), and 
against AI in 2004 (2010b, p. 27).8 Similar accusations have also been made 
against opposition party members such as Victoire Ingabire, the FDU-Inkingi 
leader, who was prevented from registering for the 2010 Rwandan presidential 
election.9 Ingabire was charged with ‘genocide ideology’, minimising the 
genocide, and collaborating with a terrorist group in 2010 (ibid., p. 21). These 
accusations stem primarily from the speech she gave at the Gisozi Genocide 
Memorial in April 2010 during which she called for investigations into war 
crimes allegedly committed by the RPF (ibid.). Ingabire was arrested in 
October 2010 on charges of forming a terrorist organisation (The Telegraph, 14 
October 2010). This arrest relates to accusations that Ingabire met with FDLR 
officials in DRC intending to create ‘her own militia group’ (AI, 2010a, p. 2). 
Rwanda’s Supreme Court upheld Ingabire’s conviction in December 2013 and 
raised her sentence to 15 years (BBC News, 13 December 2013). 
Peter Erlinder, an American ICTR defence lawyer who was representing 
Victoire Ingabire, was arrested in Rwanda in May 2010 on charges of genocide 
denial, ‘genocide ideology’ and threatening state security (The Guardian, 3 July 
2010). He was released from prison in Rwanda on 18 June 2010, following 
significant international pressure from the ICTR, the UN and US government 
(The Guardian, 30 June 2010). Erlinder was officially removed from his 
position at the ICTR in April 2011 for failing to appear in court on several 
occasions, citing threats to his life as the reason. The ICTR has denied such 
threats existed (The New York Times, 27 April 2011).
Accusations of various crimes against the state other than ‘genocide ideology’ 
have been made against a number of former government officials who have 
publicly criticised the RPF. They include the senior government officers and 
former RPF members, Faustin Nyamwasa, Patrick Karegeya, Gerald Gahima 
and Théogène Rudasingwa, who were tried in absentia by the Rwandan military 
8 A parliamentary commission also accused LIPRODHOR of ‘divisionism’ and 
collaborating with the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain opposition party. 
The commission recommended that the organisation be dissolved and its members 
arrested. Nine members of the group fled Rwanda in 2004. LIPRODHOR still 
operates in Rwanda with a new board of directors (International Federation for 
Human Rights, 14 April 2005)
9 The FDU-Inkingi and Democratic Green Party were not able to acquire the security 
clearance necessary to organise the public meetings required for official registration 
in the 2010 presidential election (AI, 2012, p. 2).
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court in January 2011 and are all now in exile. The men were found guilty of 
endangering state security, destabilising public order, ‘divisionism’, defamation 
and forming a criminal enterprise. Karegeya and Gahima received 20-year jail 
terms while Nyamwasa and Rudasingwa were given 24-year sentences (BBC 
News, 4 March 2011). 
The RPF alleges that Lieutenant-General Nyamwasa was connected to the 
grenade attack in Kigali in January 2011 that killed two people and left 28 
more injured (ibid.; Reuters, 29 January 2011).10 In June 2010, Nyamwasa was 
shot in the stomach in Johannesburg, South Africa, in an attack his wife said 
had been orchestrated by President Kagame. Nyamwasa survived (BBC News, 
19 June 2010). Three Rwandan citizens and three Tanzanians pleaded guilty to 
their role in the failed assassination attempt (Rwanda News Agency, 19 March 
2012). The RPF has denied any involvement in the shooting (BBC News, 
19 June 2010). In May 2011, the Metropolitan Police Service warned two 
Rwandan exiles living in London that they were in danger of being assassinated 
by a hit man allegedly hired by the RPF government. Both men, who have 
publicly criticised President Kagame, belong to political groups opposed to the 
current regime (BBC News, 21 May 2011). The Metropolitan Police warned 
a third man of a similar threat in August 2011. The Rwandan government has 
denied the allegations (BBC News, 2 August 2011).
Nation-building through development
Vision 2020’s stated goal is to transform Rwanda into a middle-income 
country by raising the per capita income from approximately US$220 in 2000 
to US$900 by the year 2020 (Minecofin, 2000, p. 3).11 The programme is 
structured around six interwoven pillars deemed to promote the development 
envisioned by the government. They include: ‘skilled human capital’; ‘vibrant 
private sector’; ‘world-class physical infrastructure and modern agriculture and 
livestock’; and ‘good governance and efficient state’, all of which are focused 
on increasing Rwanda’s activities in regional and global markets (ibid., p. 2).
‘Good governance’ in this context refers to the RPF’s stated obligation to be 
accountable to the Rwandan people and behave transparently and efficiently, 
particularly in relation to the country’s natural resources.12 It also refers to a 
10 Rwanda (Kigali, in particular) has seen a spate of grenade attacks since 2010. These 
blasts are commonly blamed on FDLR members or supporters.
11 The per capita income was US$638.70 in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). 
12 The 2006 ‘Environmental profile of Rwanda’, financed by the European 
Commission, warns of ‘serious pressure’ on Rwanda’s natural resources including: 
soil degradation; overexploitation and inappropriate farming systems; deforestation, 
migration and uncontrolled charcoal and firewood production; pressure on 
wetlands related to swamp clearing; and water contamination due to a lack 
of clean drinking water systems and waste water treatment. The report makes a 
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stated commitment to promoting democratic structures and processes as well as 
the rule of law and the protection of human rights (ibid., p. 12). This definition 
combines elements of two forms of ‘good governance’ to which the RPF has 
stated an obligation. The first relates to ‘political governance’, which is defined 
in opposition to the ‘bad governance’ of Habyarimana’s regime as outlined in 
the 2007 Reconciliation Policy discussed earlier in this chapter. This definition, 
constructed by the RPF government, includes the regime’s stated adherence 
to rule of law, democratic structures and the protection of human rights as 
declared in the 2003 Constitution. 
The second form refers to ‘technocratic good governance’, a key element 
of the political image of Rwanda and its leadership disseminated by the RPF 
to the international community (Marysse et al., 2006, p. 13). This form 
includes the RPF’s stated commitment to transparency and accountability 
with particular reference to economic resources and public programmes, an 
approach to leadership that has purportedly played a major role in attracting 
international aid and foreign investment (Reyntjens, 2010, p. 28). This chapter 
will pick the issue up again later with reference to implications of conflating 
these two forms of governance within Vision 2020 for ‘national reconciliation’, 
development, and constructing political images of Rwanda.
Vision 2020 outlines challenges facing Rwanda’s post-conflict economy 
and describes short-, medium- and long-term development goals. It also 
disseminates the RPF’s commitment to unity and ‘national reconciliation’. 
For instance, this plan is mandated to reduce aid dependency by encouraging 
private investment, transforming the agrarian economy into one that is 
knowledge-based, and unifying the population (Minecofin, 2000, p. 3):
It is important to emphasize the point that this Vision is not only for 
government. Vision 2020 is a shared purpose for all Rwandans. We 
need to constantly remind ourselves how our work – in our individual 
capacities, communities, business and public institutions – contributes 
towards realizing this Vision. Like all achieving societies whose success 
is generally inspired by a shared purpose, our Vision 2020 constitutes 
a bond that holds Rwandans as a people determined to build a better 
future (ibid., p. 2). 
According to Leonard Rugwabiza, then director general of national 
development, planning and research at the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (Minecofin), development programming such as Vision 2020 
promotes unity in two ways. The first is to provide citizens, once divided by 
ethnicity or their experiences of the 1994 genocide, with the chance to work 
together (Rugwabiza interview, 14 July 2010). Such an opportunity may be 
created through cooperating on private development projects or through 
number of recommendations with regard to improved environmental management 
(Twagiramungu, 2006, pp. 44−5). 
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government-sponsored programming. The latter set of projects includes 
development schemes that fall within National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme parameters. Umuganda, for instance, is a mandatory unpaid one-
day community work programme completed once a month by all citizens over 
the age of 18 living in Rwanda. Its stated goal is to give citizens the opportunity 
to work together on reconstruction projects that are of individual and national 
interest such as repairing roads, planting trees and building health centres 
(Mukajiranga interview, 9 June 2009).13 
Umuganda reflects the ubiquity of RPF political dominance, a control that 
is disseminated through the work’s mandatory nature as well as through the 
meetings between government representatives and community members held 
after each session. They provide a forum for discussing issues related to the 
community from which the central government can relay messages to citizens 
across the country (Rugwabiza interview, 14 July 2010). 
Government-sponsored development programming is also used to 
promote the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’ by stimulating individual 
and national pride. According to Rugwabiza, rapid development makes 
citizens proud and brings them together, an experience so powerful that 
people purportedly ‘see development and start to forget the division’ (ibid.). 
This quotation illustrates the projected influence of development on the 
population and connects it to the RPF’s nation-building agenda. Vision 2020 
is an integral part of this process as it states the government’s commitment to 
promoting ‘national reconciliation’ and building a nation that is competitive 
in regional and global markets (Minecofin, 2000, p. 2). The relationship 
between development, ‘national reconciliation’ and nation-building is further 
demonstrated in the Republic of Rwanda motto, ‘unity, work and patriotism’, 
described in the first chapter of the 2003 Constitution (MOD, 2003, p. 2). 
Political image at the international level
Development features heavily in the image of Rwanda the RPF projects to the 
international community of donors, NGOs and foreign investors, one which 
relays the country’s readiness to provide the type of ‘pro-business environment’ 
that purportedly appeals to foreign financiers (Kagame speech, 2 November 
2009). This readiness is illustrated by the RPF’s portrayal of Rwanda as stable 
and secure with strong political leadership that does not tolerate corruption 
and is committed to technocratic ‘good governance’ (Claver Gatete, Growth 
Week Conference, 21 September 2010). Official reconciliation’s primary 
function within the construction and dissemination of this image is to portray 
Rwanda as an attractive place to invest: ‘Without successful reconciliation, 
13 A ‘Global Umuganda’ was launched on 29 March 2014 to commemorate the 1994 
genocide’s 20th anniversary. Events were planned in countries including Canada, 
Malaysia and India (New Times, 28 March 2014).
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political stability and security, private investors will not develop confidence 
in the country’ (Minecofin, 2000, p. 8). This assertion fails to demonstrate 
the complex nature of the relationship between political stability, development 
and the government’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’. Instead, ‘successful 
reconciliation’ appears as one of a list of boxes that must be ticked in order to 
please donors and investors.
In reality, donor countries, the UN and many national and international 
NGOs are far more involved in the RPF’s pursuit of ‘national reconciliation’ 
than indicated in the quotation above. Firstly, international governmental, 
non-governmental and multilateral organisations have played an important 
role in funding, supporting and monitoring the RPF’s official reconciliation 
programme since its inception in the late 1990s. Secondly, the international 
community’s support of the RPF’s official programme follows the highly 
inadequate international intervention to prevent or end the 1994 genocide. 
This issue has impacted the power dynamics between the government and the 
donor community, and features prominently in the ‘victor’s narrative’. Thirdly, 
reference to the 1994 genocide and the RPF’s role in Rwanda’s post-conflict 
reconstruction has afforded the government ‘exceptional status’ from donors 
(Zorbas, 2011, p. 106). This increases the amount and types of aid instruments 
given to Rwanda, alleviates pressure from donors for fully transparent 
democracy, and prevents what Zorbas describes as ‘critical thinking as to why 
such an exception should be maintained or for how long’ (ibid.).
Relations, roles and power dynamics with regard to aid after 1994
The early post-conflict period starting from 1994 saw a major upsurge in aid 
sent to Rwanda by international donors. In fact, Rwanda received three times 
as much aid in 1994 as it had in the early 1990s (Marysse et al., 2006, p. 
15).14 This rise is made all the more significant following a drop of per capita 
GDP from US$251 in 1990 to US$152 in 1994 (ibid., p. 22; World Bank, 
2009). Economic growth was stifled in 1994 by a combination of challenges 
that predated the genocide and new obstacles caused by the violence including 
high population growth, land shortages and limited natural resources. The 
large number of deaths, damage to infrastructure and the creation of vulnerable 
groups − such as widows, child-headed households and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in that year − compounded these problems (Hayman, 2007, 
p. 5).
Aid took differing forms in Rwanda during the period immediately 
following the 1994 genocide. Minimal financial support was given directly to 
the transitional government in Kigali. Hayman explains that the inadequate 
support from donors for government-led reconstruction and reintegration 
14 Rwanda received approximately US$30 per capita in aid in the early 1990s (Marysse 
et al., 2006, p. 16). 
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programmes led to considerable bitterness from the RPF (2009, p. 584). This 
friction was exacerbated by the support multilateral organisations and NGOs 
gave to refugee camps in other Great Lakes countries sheltering civilians as 
well as genocide perpetrators (Kumar et al., 1996, cited in Hayman 2009, p. 
584; Baaré et al., 1999, cited in Hayman 2007). For instance, an HRW Africa 
report, published in December 1994, states: 
The new government of Rwanda inherited little but debts from its 
predecessor. Clearly unable to mount an effective administration with 
so few resources, it called upon donor nations for aid in funds and 
personnel. Although the international community has responded 
generously to the needs of Rwandans in refugee camps outside the 
country, with the United States alone contributing approximately half 
a billion dollars, it has not yet delivered any substantial aid to the new 
government. According to well-placed sources within the European 
Union, France initially made clear an intention to block any significant 
assistance from that body. Other donors hesitated as well, many of 
them concerned about how representative the new government was 
and about reports of human rights violations by the RPF (p. 19). 
Aid began to flow to GNU, the newly formed government, from countries 
including the US, the Netherlands and Denmark towards the end of November 
1994 (ibid.). In the first few years following the 1994 genocide, a significant 
proportion of aid was donated to promote programmes related to justice, 
with donors allotting money for the ICTR, the domestic legal system and 
gacaca (Oomen, 2005a, p. 895). Gacaca received funding and institutional 
support from a variety of governmental donors from the US, Canada, France, 
Norway and Switzerland, as well as from multilateral organisations such as 
the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Gacaca also received 
assistance from several international NGOs of which 141 were operating in 
the country in late 1994 (ibid., p. 896).
International donors’ readiness to fund gacaca reflects a larger interest in 
supporting programmes related to promoting the RPF’s vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’. Donor willingness to participate in the coordination and 
monitoring of gacaca in the late 1990s may have been impacted by several 
trends related to development, peacebuilding and reconciliation at the 
time. The first reflects the conflation of development with the promotion 
of justice in the post-conflict context, possibly due in part to the perception 
of justice as apolitical and a more affordable investment than military or 
diplomatic interventions by the international community (ibid., p. 892). The 
1997 ‘OECD guidelines for peace, conflict and development cooperation’ 
and the 1998 UN Secretary General’s report on ‘Priorities for post-conflict 
peacebuilding’ reflect a further shift towards promoting political and social 
change through donorship and investment in development. For instance, they 
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place ‘good governance’, justice, security and reconciliation firmly at the top of 
the development agenda (UNSG 1998 report, as cited by Uvin, 2001, p. 178). 
The 1997 OECD guidelines state that:
Post-conflict reconstruction is much more than just repairing 
physical infrastructure. When civil authority has broken down, the 
first priority is to restore a sense of security. This includes restoring 
legitimate government institutions that are regarded by citizens as 
serving all groups and that are able to allay persisting tensions, while 
carrying out the challenges and costly tasks of rebuilding. Efforts by 
developing countries and international assistance must fit within the 
context of a sound, even if rudimentary, macroeconomic stabilization 
plan. Post-conflict situations often provide special opportunities for 
political, legal, economic and administrative reforms to change past 
systems and structures which may have contributed to economic and 
social inequities and conflict. Initiatives for participatory debates and 
assessment of the role of the military in relation to the state and civil 
society have been productive in post-conflict settings. In the wake 
of conflict, donors should seize the opportunities to help promote 
and maintain the momentum for reconciliation and needed reforms 
(Development Assistance Committee, 1997, p. 3). 
The GNU’s stated commitment to promoting justice and ‘national 
reconciliation’ would have made Rwanda particularly attractive to donors 
operating with similar priorities. The transitional government’s stated 
prioritisation of ‘good governance’, justice and stability provided benefactors 
with the opportunity to invest in a country in transition. Filip Reyntjens 
describes two further trends that emerged in the relationship between the 
GNU (and later RPF) and foreign donors. The first is the donors’ sense that 
significant leeway ought to be given to a government facing the challenge of 
rebuilding a country decimated by war and genocide. Secondly, Reyntjens 
points to the donation of aid without conditions regarding state behaviour as 
proof to the RPF that it could act with impunity (2004, p. 179). Benefactors 
from the international community may have granted this ‘liberty’ as a form 
of compensation for its failure to intervene during the 1994 genocide, an 
inaction all the more poignant given the UN and donor countries’ awareness 
of systematic massacres as they took place in 1994.
On 21 April 1994, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted to withdraw 
all but 270 of the 2,500 UNAMIR troops stationed in Kigali since October 
1993 (Jones, 2006, pp. 232–3). This withdrawal took place following 
numerous warnings of impending genocide in the run-up to April 1994, and 
despite the vote having been held amidst protest from UNAMIR Commander 
Major-General Roméo Dallaire following the deaths of Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana and the ten Belgian peacekeepers protecting her (ibid., pp. 
232, 238). Following the decision to extract Belgian troops posted at Ecole 
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Technique Officielle in Kicukiro, approximately 5,000 Tutsi hiding in the 
complex were massacred on 7 April 1994 (Augustin interview, 7 April 2009). 
As discussed in chapter 2, the US played an integral role in discouraging 
international intervention in the 1994 genocide. The Clinton administration’s 
refusal to use the term ‘genocide’ reflected geopolitical interests that 
outweighed the desire to intervene in another conflict (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 
97). As we have seen, Herman and Peterson offer an alternative interpretation 
of international inaction during the 1994 genocide and the civil war that 
preceded it. They point to a neoliberal conspiracy in which Washington 
actively supported Kagame during the civil war and prevented the deployment 
of adequate UN forces during the 1994 genocide. If Herman and Peterson are 
correct, this arrangement could have had significant benefits for both parties, 
as it would have allowed the Rwandan government freedom to eradicate its 
political and military enemies without damaging its international reputation. 
For the Americans, it could have granted them the opportunity to usurp their 
Western rivals in terms of US influence in former European colonies and access 
to mineral wealth in Zaire, now DRC (Herman and Peterson, 2010, p. 61).
The UN’s decision not to intervene in the 1994 genocide has greatly impacted 
the relationship between the RPF and the donor community. The damage may 
have been caused not by the notion that the international community did not 
do enough, but that its inaction actively exacerbated the situation on the ground 
(Kagame speech, 22 April 2014). The RPF has allegedly used ‘genocide credit’, 
stemming from this failure to act, to manipulate the guilt and humiliation 
purportedly felt by the international community in several ways (Reyntjens, 
2004, p. 199). The first has been to maintain significant control of how donor 
money is spent in Rwanda.15 The connection between international inaction 
in 1994 and RPF dominance in post-conflict Rwanda is evident in this excerpt 
from President Kagame’s speech given at Tufts University on 22 April 2014:
What we have learned as Rwandans is that people must ultimately be 
responsible for their own fate; if you wait for help to come, you will 
just perish.
Similarly, if you wait for outsiders to tell you how to rebuild your 
country, you may find their instinct is to reconstruct the same flawed 
structure that just collapsed, because they have no other blueprint.
Genocide credit has also been used to mute criticism or what Johan Pottier 
refers to as ‘awkward questions’ from outsiders (2002, p. 156). One of the 
most pertinent is: what role did the RPF/RPA play in civilian deaths during 
15 See Zorbas (2011) and Hayman (2009) for detailed analyses of how the 2005 ‘Paris 
declaration on aid effectiveness’ has promoted the joint ownership of development 
strategies by national governments and international donors. Both authors 
discuss how the RPF has gained more control over the definition of development 
programmes and how resources have been used since 2005.
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the 1994 genocide and in the post-conflict era in eastern Zaire, now DRC? 
The second has been to reproach international criticism of the current regime. 
President Kagame went so far as to lay partial blame for the 1994 genocide 
on the international community. At the 15th Commemoration of the 1994 
genocide at the Nyanza Memorial Site on 7 April 2009, he stated, ‘well, there 
are people who are guilty, no question. Those who abandoned people they had 
come here to protect and left them to be murdered, left them to the dogs … 
aren’t they guilty?’
More recently, the RPF has used the UN’s inaction in 1994 to discredit 
the 2010 UN ‘Report of the mapping exercise’, which documents abuses 
of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in DRC 
including crimes the RPF/RPA allegedly committed between March 1993 and 
June 2003 (UNHRC, 2010). It responded to the leaked draft of the ‘Report’ 
in these terms: 
It is immoral and unacceptable that the United Nations, an organisation 
that failed outright to prevent genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent 
refugee [sic] crisis, a direct cause for so much suffering in Congo 
and Rwanda, now accuses the army that stopped the genocide of 
committing atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rwanda 
News Agency, 29 August 2010).
The RPF then rejected the document and threatened to withdraw its troops 
from peacekeeping duties in Darfur if it was published (BBC News, 29 August 
2010). When the report was published later on, however, the RPF agreed to 
keep its troops in Sudan (BBC News, 27 September 2010). The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Minaffet) has since criticised the report for 
‘rewriting history’, reigniting conflict between Rwanda and DRC, employing 
flawed methodology and undermining peace and stability in the Great Lakes 
Region (Rwanda News Agency, 30 September 2010, p. 3).
International donors have responded to accusations of human rights abuses 
and violations, perpetrated by the RPF/RPA in Rwanda and DRC, in a variety 
of ways. Although most donors were not deterred by criticism of the RPF’s 
alleged attempts to undermine democracy in the run-up to the 2010 elections, 
some did respond to the RPF’s various military incursions across the border 
between 1999−2009 (HRW, 2011b, p. 1).16 Norway suspended bilateral aid in 
1999 until the RPF officially withdrew from DRC in 2002 (Hayman, 2007, 
p. 16). The UK and Sweden delayed payment of aid in 2004–5 following 
allegations that Rwandan troops were present in DRC. Norway and Sweden 
suspended financial support to the RPF in 2009 following renewed tension 
16 HRW’s ‘World Report 2011’ states that some donor governments privately 
expressed concerns about the ‘crackdown’ on political space and media freedom 
prior to the 2010 presidential elections, but these did not translate into decisive 
action from donors (HRW, 2011b, p. 1).
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in eastern DRC and allegations of the RPF’s support of Congolese Tutsi rebel 
group Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) led by Laurent 
Nkunda (Hayman, 2009, p. 592).
The RPF had been accused of supporting Nkunda and using the CNDP to 
fight a proxy war against the Hutu FDLR after the RPF’s military branch, the 
RPA, officially pulled out of DRC in 2002 (BBC News, 23 January 2009; BBC 
News, 19 October 2007). Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda on 22 January 2009 
following significant pressure from international donors, particularly the US 
and the UK (The Telegraph, 23 January 2009). He remains under house arrest 
in Kigali. Attempts to bring his case to court have reportedly been blocked by 
the RPF (HRW, 2012, p. 4; BBC News, 5 June 2014).
The RPF government faced new allegations of supporting unrest in DRC in 
2012. An addendum to a report by a UN Group of Experts accused the RPF of 
violating the arms embargo and sanctions against its neighbour by actions such 
as providing weapons, military supplies and Rwandan recruits to the Congolese 
rebel group M23 (UNSC, 2012, p. 2). The M23 rebel group comprised 600 
former CNDP rebels who had defected from the Congolese Armed Forces in 
April 2012 (BBC News, 27 June 2012).17 The defection was allegedly led by 
‘The Terminator’ Bosco Ntaganda against whom the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for alleged war crimes including the 
recruitment of child soldiers (BBC News, 28 May 2012; BBC News, 15 May 
2012). Ntaganda turned himself over to the US embassy in Kigali in March 
2013 and appeared before the ICC later that month. The case against him was 
set to move to trial in July 2015 to face 18 counts of war crimes and acts against 
humanity (Reuters Africa, 9 June 2014; ICC, 22 April 2015).
Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo responded to the report 
draft leaked in mid June 2012 with a warning: ‘In our corner of the world, words 
quickly become deeds and anti-Rwanda rhetoric carries grave consequences ... 
More hateful attacks can be feared as calls for Congolese worldwide to “kill 
the Tutsis” are being propagated over the internet’ (New Times, 28 June 2012). 
Tension continued to rise between Kabila’s government and the RPF amid 
further accusations of Rwandan and Ugandan support for the M23 rebels. 
In October 2012, a second report by a panel of UN experts accused Rwanda 
of partially funding the rebellion with profits acquired through smuggling 
and exporting Congolese minerals (Reuters, 16 October 2012). The RPF has 
faced long-standing accusations of benefiting from the plunder of minerals 
conducted by Rwandan soldiers and militias fighting inside DRC. The 2010 
UN ‘Report of the mapping exercise’ describes an instance in Walikale territory 
when Rwandan soldiers are alleged to have purchased coltan from FDLR rebels 
17 The CNDP was integrated into the Congolese Army following a peace agreement 
between Rwanda and DRC in 2009 (BBC News, 28 May 2012).
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against whom they were at war (UN, 2010, p. 352).18 This account and the 
October 2012 UN report reflect accusations of ‘predatory behaviour’ made by 
the international NGO, Global Witness, regarding Rwanda’s alleged history 
of benefiting from plundering and exporting hundreds of millions of dollars 
worth of Congolese minerals (Reuters, 18 September 2012) .19
M23 rebels entered Goma and seized the capital of North Kivu Province in 
mid November 2012 (BBC News, 21 November 2012). In Uganda, several days 
later, President Kabila met with the presidents of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, 
together with Foreign Minister Mushikiwabo. The leaders urged the rebels to 
withdraw from Goma and cease their threats of seizing power from Kabila 
(BBC News, 24 November 2012). The rebels withdrew from Goma, but later 
reentered. Approximately 800,000 civilians were displaced amid violent clashes 
between the M23 rebels, rival factions within the group and the Congolese 
Armed Forces (BBC News, 31 July 2013; BBC News, 25 February 2013). In 
late July 2013, 3,000 UN soldiers attempted to calm clashes of various rebel 
groups including M23 in eastern DRC. The UN gave the groups in Goma 
until 31 July to disarm, at which time it would use force if necessary (BBC 
News, 31 July 2013). The M23 rebellion ended on 5 November 2013 when 
the group surrendered following a joint mission between the Forces Armées de 
la République Démocratique du Congo and the Force Intervention Brigade, a 
specialised contingent of MONUSCO troops (UNSC, 2014a, p. 6). President 
Kabila authorised an amnesty law in March 2014 for acts of insurgency, war 
and political crimes committed by members of armed groups in DRC between 
18 February 2006 and 20 December 2013. The law excludes cases of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross human rights violations. Former 
M23 rebels in Rwanda would need to return to DRC to receive this amnesty 
(UNSC, 2014b, p. 4; BBC News, 5 June 2014).
Accusations made about the RPF having supported the M23 rebels resulted 
in limited suspensions of aid by international donors. The EU part-suspended 
aid to Rwanda in late September 2012 following similar actions by the US, 
Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands (The Guardian, 27 September 2012). 
The fact that major benefactors partially and temporarily suspended aid 
between 1999 and 2009, and again in 2012, may be explained by growing 
18 See the UN ‘Report of the mapping exercise’ for further discussion of the 
relationship between the economic agendas of Congolese and Rwandan rebels, 
as well as Rwandan, Ugandan and Congolese government forces, and continuing 
violence related to the control of mineral mines in DRC (2010). 
19 In November 2011, Rwanda returned 82 tonnes of minerals that had been smuggled 
out of DRC over the previous five months. Although this handover indicates 
that minerals were being smuggled across the border between both countries, 
the Rwandan deputy director of natural resources, Michael Biryabarema, denied 
allegations of plunder and illegal trade of minerals by the RPF (BBC News, 3 Nov. 
2011).
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consensus in the international community that regional instability is a primary 
threat to financial investments and diplomatic relations made in Rwanda in 
the post-conflict period (Zorbas, 2011, p. 112). Since these aid restrictions and 
suspensions have been applied inconsistently, they have had little effect overall 
(ibid.). For instance, in September 2012 the UK resumed its donation of £16 
million to Rwanda after temporarily suspending aid in July 2012 following 
the accusations made in the leaked UN report that the RPF had supported 
the M23 rebels (BBC News, 13 November 2012). Justine Greening, the 
international development secretary, froze the £21 million budget payment 
due to be delivered in December 2012, citing Rwanda’s breach of the principles 
which underline its donor partnership with the UK (Reuters, 30 November 
2012).20 President Kagame responded to a question about the suspension 
following his keynote address at the Said Business School, Oxford, by denying 
Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict and asking, ‘How long will Rwanda be 
made responsible for problems in another country?’ (speech, 18 May 2013). 
Rwanda has since been accused of protecting 500 former M23 members in a 
camp inside the country. Those ex-combatants who have been in the camp for 
more than a year must return to DRC to be eligible for amnesty for crimes 
committed during the rebellion (BBC News, 5 June 2014).
‘Victor’s narrative’, ‘national reconciliation’ and development
The RPF’s reaction to the leak and subsequent release of the UN ‘Report of 
the mapping exercise’ demonstrates a decisive attempt to protect the political 
image it has created of Rwanda and its leadership. Accusations of RPF war 
crimes allegedly committed in DRC, and the use of the term ‘genocide’ with 
reference to these crimes, contradict the RPF’s stated commitment to both 
technocratic and political ‘good governance’.21 These allegations may question 
the portrayal of Rwanda as safe, stable and ready for foreign investment. The 
RPF’s vehement condemnation of the report also signifies the propagation of a 
single narrative about its role during the 1994 genocide and in the post-conflict 
period: ‘On the international scene, we don’t negotiate. On Rwanda we don’t 
negotiate’ (Rugwabiza interview, 14 July 2010). Kagame attempted to preserve 
the image of ‘good governance’ inside Rwanda by lashing out against critical 
voices from the international community, particularly human rights activists 
20 Britain’s Department for International Development has stated a commitment 
to disbursing £83 million per year to Rwanda until 2015 (Reuters, 30 Nov. 
2012). 
21 The ‘Report of the mapping exercise’ does not directly accuse the RPF of 
committing genocide against Hutu civilians in DRC, but rather states that, 
‘the apparent systematic and widespread attacks described in this report reveal a 
number of inculpatory elements that, if proven before a competent court, could be 
characterised as crimes of genocide’ (UNHCR, 2010, p. 24). 
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and international NGOs. In a speech at the National Dialogue Council, Kigali, 
on 15 December 2011, he stated,
There are voices that originate from outside the country where you hear 
people say that there is progress in Rwanda but at the end, they add 
‘but’. Where does the ‘but’ come from? The most common accusation 
from these people is that there is no freedom of speech in Rwanda. 
This can only mean three things; that Rwandans are mute, or someone 
is physically preventing them from speaking, or they have nothing to 
say. …
People say that there is no political space – there is no bigger space than 
this one. Actually, the only space lacking is the one that is occupied by 
these intruders. This nonsense from outside is occupying our space. 
These teachers of political space, press freedom are the same ones who 
give freedom to murderers of our people. It has taken 17 years for them 
to try Bagosora22 and try the case so badly. They also have been letting 
those who worked with him to kill our people go scot free and yet they 
come here to lecture us on freedoms? They are jokers. …
We cannot be seen to be making all this progress and at the same 
time be so bad in terms of democratic government or freedoms – it 
doesn’t add up. These people have their own problems that they need 
to address. 
The image projected to the international community mirrors that 
disseminated to the Rwandan people. In the international context, however, 
the RPF’s portrayal as the ‘good guy’ who ended the 1994 genocide and is 
actively ‘reconciling’ the people of Rwanda functions to promote development 
through donorship and direct foreign investment (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 179). 
In the development context, the RPF’s ‘good guy’ image is portrayed through 
its stated commitment to high standards of technocratic governance (Marysse 
et al., 2006, p. 25). This type of ‘good governance’, unlike the form of 
political governance discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is not an RPF 
construction. It does not exist in opposition to the ‘bad governance’ of earlier 
regimes, nor does it serve the same political function. Instead, it represents 
a criterion of governance that seemingly appeals to international donors and 
investors (ibid.). 
Wil Hout defines the technocratic approach to governance as ‘the way 
in which the public sector is managed’ (2004, as cited by Marysse et al., 
2006, p. 25). In particular, Hout draws attention to government policies’ 
positive features: legality, accountability and transparency (ibid.). Paul Collier 
emphasises how important excellent governance and economic policies 
are in helping governments of developing countries to make the most of 
opportunities and capabilities within their reach, such as bilateral aid (2007, p. 
64). Although aid as a percentage of total government spending dropped from 
22 See chapter 2 for an account of Théogene Bagosora’s role in the 1994 genocide.
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85 per cent in 2000 to 45 per cent in 2010, Rwanda remains highly dependent 
on international donors (ActionAid, 2011, p. 8). The country’s dependence on 
aid is compounded by structural and geographical constraints to development, 
which include a history of conflict, a landlocked location between neighbouring 
countries with slow rates of economic growth, and resource-scarcity (Collier, 
2007). Arguably, the most vital opportunity available to Rwanda is attracting 
donorship and foreign investment (Collier, Growth Week Conference, 21 
September 2010).
According to Marysse et al., the RPF’s high standard of technocratic 
governance successfully reestablished the provision of aid shortly after the 1994 
genocide and has continued to attract interest from foreign donors and investors 
(2006, p. 17). Part of this attraction may stem from what Hayman describes as 
the RPF’s ability ‘to speak the language of international development’ (2007, 
p. 18). She points to the government’s stated commitment to pursue neoliberal 
development strategies and poverty reduction projects, as well as participatory 
programmes such as gacaca (ibid.).23 Vision 2020 exemplifies this obligation as 
it outlines the RPF’s stated goals of stabilising the economy by implementing 
macroeconomic reforms and wealth-creation projects, transforming the 
agrarian economy into one that is primarily knowledge-based, and fostering 
entrepreneurship and a flourishing middle class (Minecofin, 2000). The 
stated goal for the period 2014−20 includes a focus on creating jobs through 
economic and agricultural sector reform (Kagame speech, 11 March 2014). 
This commitment to ‘good governance’ and rapid development is repeated 
in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2 (EDPRS 
2), which outlines the government’s plans for transforming the private sector 
and alleviating constraints to growth over five years (2013–18). The EDPRS 
2 is described as the final push towards achieving goals set out in Vision 2020 
(Minecofin, 2013, pp. viii, 1). This document follows the first iteration of 
the strategy, EDPRS 1, which resulted in a ‘perfect developmental “hat trick” 
… of sustained economic growth, poverty reduction and lower levels of 
income inequality’ (ibid., p. ix). The EDPRS 2 promulgates the government’s 
commitment to new strategies and older policies such as the ‘National Human 
Settlement Policy’, launched in 1996,24 which was mandated to guide the 
resettlement of refugees returning from the Great Lakes Region amidst a land 
scarcity crisis created by the 1994 genocide (IRIN, 5 October 2004). It stated 
that all Rwandans living in rural homesteads must move into government-
constructed imidugudu or village settlements. HRW criticised the programme 
23 See Harvey for a detailed historical description of the development of neoliberalism. 
Harvey contends that neoliberal economic reforms function to restore or enhance 
class power of the ruling elite. He rejects the ‘failed utopian rhetoric’ of neoliberalism 
and posits the alternatives of open democracy, social equality, and economic, 
political and cultural justice (2005, p. 206). 
24 This policy was amended in 2004, 2006 and 2009 (Minaloc, 2013, p. 1).
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in 2001 for benefiting some returnees and survivors while forcing others, both 
Hutu and Tutsi, to leave their homes, some of which were destroyed without 
compensation (2001, p. 2). It is described as a key strategy in EDPRS 2 as it 
promotes quality housing, a strong regulatory framework and the resettlement 
of families living in high-risk zones. In 2012, 53.1 per cent of households in 
rural areas were living in this type of village (Minaloc, 2013, p. 2). 
The EDPRS 2’s overarching goals of speeding progress towards middle-
income status and improving quality of life for all Rwandans will purportedly 
be met by achieving sustained growth of 11.5 per cent and by reducing the 
percentage of the population living in poverty to less than 30 per cent (ibid., 
p. 1). Private sector growth is key to meeting these targets (Kagame speech, 
11 March 2014). As such, the RPF has paid particular attention to fostering a 
‘pro-business environment’ for the benefit of investors interested in Rwanda’s 
development: ‘We are painstakingly building the confidence of domestic 
and foreign investors to put their money into our hotels, energy projects, 
agriculture, the construction industry, and ICT on the basis of transparent 
government and predictability’ (Kagame speech, 21 September 2009). This 
stated commitment to transparency and predictability is being pursued through 
institutional reforms aimed at bolstering technocratic ‘good governance’ and 
public services through the anti-corruption agenda, Public Sector Reform 
and the National Decentralisation Policy (UNDP, 2007, p. 66). Adopted in 
2000, the latter policy outlined the process through which district mayors 
would be made responsible for implementing the government’s development 
programme,25 and which was informed by the same commitments to good 
technocratic governance seen in related documents. Meanwhile, it seeks to 
maintain transparency and political stability with the addition of giving local 
populations more say in government programming. 
Imihigo, a purportedly pre-colonial practice in which leaders publicly stated 
their commitment to achieving particular goals, was reinvented in 2006 in the 
form of performance contracts to ensure mayoral accountability (Scher and 
MacAuley, 2014, p. 1). The contracts follow consultations with community 
council and vice mayors and the development of one-, three- and five-year 
action plans that seek to meet imihigo targets for economic growth, governance 
and social welfare (ibid., p. 5). Each mayor’s achievement of these targets is 
analysed according to performance metrics resulting in an individual score. 
The accountability promoted by this form of measurement and evaluation is 
redoubled by public scrutiny. District mayors and President Kagame publicly 
sign the imihigo in a televised broadcast and all documents related to the 
25 District leadership plays an important role in local government. These financially 
and legally independent entities oversee local-level development projects, such as 
agriculture and medium-sized enterprises, and coordinate the delivery of services 
including hospitals (Chemouni, 2014, p. 248). 
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targets are available online (ibid., p. 6), a process that has been commended 
for encouraging the delivery of results locally and ensuring that state-level 
policies are implemented at the lowest levels (Chemouni, 2014, p. 251). It 
has, however, been criticised for resulting in ‘cooked’ numbers that falsely meet 
strict imihigo targets, retaining state control over local objectives and creating 
non-partisan local elite who remain loyal to the RPF (ibid., p. 253).
With regard to promoting investment, the RPF has significantly reduced 
the barriers that businesses once faced in Rwanda. Reforms related to acquiring 
construction permits, protecting investors and paying taxes, among others, 
resulted in Rwanda’s ranking in the ‘Ease of doing business worldwide’ 
category in the World Bank’s 2014 ‘Doing Business Report’ improving from 
54th position the previous year to 32nd. The report also named Rwanda as the 
second most improved country and the second easiest African country in which 
to do business (World Bank, 2014; Rwanda Development Board, 2013). Rapid 
reforms over the past several years have translated into direct investment by 
several large international companies including Visa and Heineken NV, which 
owns 75 per cent of Rwanda’s largest beer maker, Bralirwa (The Economist, 
25 February 2012; Bloomberg News, 15 March 2012). Global chief economist 
at Renaissance Capital, Charles Robertson, explains the benefits of foreign 
investment for Rwandans: ‘the Rwandan government is producing growth 
and that’s very positive for the Rwandan people and eventually for Rwandan 
human rights and Rwandan democracy’ (ibid.).
Robertson’s prediction of the long-term benefits is ambitious, given the 
uneven nature of the development it promotes. ‘Uneven development’ is 
defined here as the inequitable distribution of ‘intentional development’ 
benefits to citizens such as international aid, direct foreign investment, and the 
implementation of development projects, policies and programmes (Cowen and 
Shenton, 1998, p. 50, as cited by Bebbington, 2004, p. 726). Development in 
Rwanda has been particularly uneven with regard to the least advantaged. For 
instance, ‘pro-poor growth’, a stated commitment articulated in Vision 2020, 
has been negatively impacted by issues of land scarcity, institutional constraints 
facing small-scale peasant farmers, and enhanced opportunities for larger 
commercial farms (Ansoms, 2007). Vision 2020 describes development as a 
common interest and benefit to all Rwandans yet, as Zorbas argues, the RPF’s 
development strategy ‘does not fundamentally improve the lot of the poor and 
vulnerable, nor does it alter the conditions of structural violence’ (2011, p. 
114). This failure is reflected in inequality levels in Rwanda. Whereas they have 
fallen in recent years with the gini coefficient − the measurement of the degree 
of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country − shifting from 
0.52 to 0.49 between 2005−6 and 2010−11, Rwanda was labelled East Africa’s 
most unequal country by the Society for International Development (SID). 
According to SID’s State of East Africa report, published in November 2013, in 
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2011, the richest 10 per cent of the population earned 3.2 times more income 
than the poorest 40 per cent (2013, p. 83).26
It is encouraging that, in 2012, the RPF set new targets for Vision 2020 
that include reducing poverty by 20 per cent by 2020 (Rwanda Focus, 12 
March 2012).27 However, this revised goal does not detract from the damaging 
consequences of uneven development for genocide survivors. Although they 
receive support from several non-governmental advocacy groups including: 
the Association of Widows of the Genocide; IBUKA (meaning ‘remember’ 
in Kinyarwanda); and the Survivors Fund (SURF), many continue to face 
significant challenges. In January 2012, HRW reported that survivors 
continued to have limited access to economic and social services across 
Rwanda. For instance, the ubuhede income-generating programme did not 
create sufficient opportunities for survivors in need of financial support. Most 
families of survivors did not have adequate housing or safe drinking water. 
Survivors faced ‘discrimination’ with regard to accessing bank loans and 
economic opportunities. Many of them also feared violent reprisals as several 
victims in Northern Province who had testified at gacaca had been attacked 
(HRW, 2012, p. 3). The progress Rwanda has made in the past 20 years was 
commended in SURF’s 2013/14 annual report, although it does raise concerns 
that justice will never be fully served since the compensation awarded at gacaca 
has still not been delivered to survivors (2014a, p. 4).
The problems outlined above have not deterred international aid or 
foreign direct investment. High standards of technocratic governance often 
outweigh good political governance in attracting donor interest. Kauffman et 
al. argue that international benefactors are far less sensitive to issues of ‘voice 
and accountability’ with regard to those to whom they allocate aid (Kauffman 
et al., 2005, as cited by Marysse et al., 2006, p. 26).28 The insignificance of 
those issues is particularly evident in the Rwandan context since the country 
continues to receive significant foreign aid amidst restricted civil and political 
rights and impunity for RPF crimes allegedly committed against civilians in 
Rwanda and DRC.29
26 The report was met with criticism from Kigali. The government is reported to have 
questioned the methodology and the data, which dates from 2006−11 and was 
collected from several government agencies including the Rwanda National Bureau 
for Statistics and the Ministry of Education (The East African, 7 Mar. 2014). 
27 Other revisions include increasing life expectancy to age 66, which is 11 years 
greater than the previous target set in 2000 (Rwanda Focus, 12 Mar. 2012). 
28 ‘Voice and accountability’ is one of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators 
against which countries are ranked according to their levels of technocratic good 
governance. The others are: political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (Clark et al., 
2008, as cited by M.A. Thomas, 2009, p. 33). 
29 Rwanda’s net Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to US$1,081.10 
million in 2013 (OECD-DAC, 2015). 
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Donors’ readiness to overlook issues of impunity and alleged human 
rights violations takes us back to the relationship between the RPF’s vision of 
‘national reconciliation’ and development in Rwanda. The RPF has justified 
the silencing of domestic and international NGOs, political opponents and 
journalists as an appropriate approach to eradicating ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide 
ideology’ inside the country. The elimination of both ‘negative ideologies’ 
appear as stated goals of the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme, 
with particular reference to the promotion of national unity (NURC, 2007, p. 
3). Impunity, on the other hand, was guaranteed at gacaca for crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed by the RPF in Rwanda. Gacaca is integrally 
connected to the promotion of justice within the RPF’s official reconciliation 
programme and has received significant funding and support from the 
international community with regard to coordination and monitoring. 
The political image at the centre of the relationship between the RPF and 
the international community of donors and investors depicts a secure and stable 
country guided by strong leadership. The National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme has several functions within this relationship. The first is to attract 
donors through stated commitments to ‘national reconciliation’ and the creation 
of a pro-business environment. The second is to provide a framework through 
which donors as well as NGOs fund and participate in the coordination and 
monitoring of specific projects inside the country, such as gacaca. The intricacy 
of this association supports the construction and dissemination of an image 
promoting development, and overshadows the negative effects of the RPF’s 
official reconciliation programme on the freedom of speech, association, press 
and political participation.
Conclusion: the impact of national and international political 
images of Rwanda
The National Unity and Reconciliation Programme was created and 
implemented during a period of transition and transformation in Rwanda. The 
top-down political construction that emerged has been shaped by government 
priorities, power dynamics, and the evolving relationship between the RPF and 
the international community. It has produced differing, but interconnected 
political images of Rwanda for the domestic population and the international 
audience of donors, NGOs and investors. Their construction and dissemination 
have had similar impacts in both the national and international context. Inside 
Rwanda, the utilisation of the official reconciliation programme to portray 
the country as safe, stable and prosperous has yielded both legitimising and 
constraining results. It has bolstered political support, legitimised government 
policy and programming, and pushed forward the nation-building agenda. 
However, it has greatly restricted free speech and media and provided a 
framework through which opposition members and NGOs deemed to be 
‘divisionist’ or purveyors of ‘genocide ideology’ have been silenced.
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The image of Rwanda and the RPF projected to the international 
community, like that disseminated to the national audience, is informed by the 
‘victor’s narrative’ of history and shaped by the prioritisation of development 
that is primarily uneven. The ‘victor’s narrative’ and international guilt have 
been used to silence criticism and awkward questions inside and outside of the 
country, albeit somewhat unsuccessfully with regard to the release in 2010 of 
the UN ‘Report of the mapping exercise in DRC’. It has succeeded, however, in 
attracting donor and investor interest through high standards of technocratic 
governance. This dynamic image is underpinned by the relationship between 
the RPF and the international community and the inaction of donor countries 
and multilateral organisations during the 1994 genocide.
As with the image projected at the national level, its most severe effects have 
been upon the people of Rwanda. For instance, the international community’s 
grossly inadequate response during the 1994 genocide has limited its capacity 
to publicly criticise RPF leadership about its alleged role during the 1994 
genocide, and also in the violent conflict in DRC (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 199). 
Moreover, donor support and international NGO participation in constructing 
and implementing gacaca supported an institution that ensured RPF impunity 
for crimes allegedly committed against civilians. Lastly, international donors 
and investors have participated in advancing the uneven development that 
has failed to benefit the most marginalised. As such, the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme has succeeded in constructing and disseminating 
political images of Rwanda that do not reflect its social, political or economic 
reality. Images of the RPF as a government pursuing an official reconciliation 
programme that promotes a singular narrative, limited freedom of expression 
and uneven development would certainly be more fitting.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Constructing a national reconciliation programme was not an early priority 
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which governed under the guise of the 
transitional Government of National Unity (GNU). After the genocide ended 
in July 1994, the GNU sought to prosecute all citizens suspected of having 
committed acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, a pursuit which led to 
the mass arrest of more than 120,000 civilians and officials in former President 
Habyarimana’s government. Despite pressure from the UN to create a formal 
process, the GNU did not pursue any form of official reconciliation until a 
‘comfortable’ environment had been created following military interventions 
in eastern Zaire and the arrest and expatriation of Hutu political opponents 
(Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2005, p. 103).
The official National Unity and Reconciliation Programme that emerged 
followed a growing trend of countries shifting away from traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms focused on retributive justice (Kritz, 1996, p. 128). 
The programme includes mechanisms that promote this form of justice, 
but is also shaped by projects mandated to promote restorative justice, civic 
education, development and ‘national reconciliation’. It is a complex socio-
political process, shaped by the political interests, actions and dynamics of the 
government that constructed it and continues to oversee it. The RPF government 
has stated multiple commitments to advancing its ‘national reconciliation’ 
vision including: eradicating ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’; educating 
Rwandans about unity; and promoting a culture of peace, ‘good governance’, 
national pride and human rights. These obligations are repeated in legislation, 
official discourse, radio broadcasts and presidential speeches, but the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme is far from an exercise in equality and 
engagement with legacies of past violence. Instead, it promotes the current RPF 
government’s continued dominance, the manipulation of historical discourse, 
and impunity for the ruling party. In essence, the RPF’s official reconciliation 
programme functions as a nation-building and state-legitimisation project that 
secures the current RPF regime’s political control.
This concluding chapter outlines the analysis and summarises the research 
findings presented throughout the book, results which shed light on how 
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the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme functions in social and 
political practice. The programme’s ‘internal logic’ informs the analysis, as 
dictated by the GNU’s and RPF’s stated commitments to promoting ‘national 
reconciliation’. This ‘logic’ is also informed by policy, legislation and official 
documents related to the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. The 
chapter brings together three major themes pertinent to the official programme 
− justice, nation-building and the ‘victor’s narrative’ − considering relevant 
concepts including ‘genocide ideology’, ‘divisionism’, ethnicity and national 
identity. This discussion also highlights concepts in the broader literature 
relevant to the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’. Finally, a brief overview 
is given of the particular contribution this book makes to the wider sociological 
studies of reconciliation and human rights.
Concepts and themes
The RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’ is shaped by a variety of concepts, 
many of which were constructed by the GNU and RPF. The RPF government 
did not formally define the terms ‘national unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ until 
the National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation was published in 2007. As 
chapter 4 demonstrated, this definition, although relatively unclear, outlines 
the attributes purportedly shared by all Rwandans, including a single shared 
nationality, which in this context relates to the Banyarwanda’s singular national 
identity. The concept is particularly salient in official reconciliation discourse 
as it supersedes the ethnic identities that purportedly divided the nation prior 
to and during the 1994 genocide. More specifically, the shared identity of the 
Banyarwanda is an integral part of the RPF’s conception of national unity and 
its wider nation-building agenda. The latter theme pervades the entire National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme. For instance, Vision 2020, published in 
2000, declares that all Rwandans share a common vision of the future. It also 
points to the perceived necessity of constructing a singular identity when it 
asks, ‘[h]ow do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they 
want to become? How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan 
identity?’ (Minecofin, 2000, p. 1).
The national identity of the Banyarwanda is posited as a safeguard against 
a return to genocide (chapter 4). The government devised this association 
between ethnicity, ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’. As a result of 
the vilification of ethnicity the ethnic terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were de 
facto banned from public discourse and official documents. Integral to the 
RPF’s official reconciliation programme’s ‘internal logic’ are the concepts of 
‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’. This logic is shaped by the programme’s 
overarching aim to eradicate history’s ‘bad’ elements that purportedly led to 
the 1994 genocide, and to promote the ‘good’ ones of unity and ‘national 
reconciliation’. The bad elements include ‘bad governance’, ethnicity, 
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‘sectarianism’, ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’, the latter three of which 
have been codified as criminal offences punishable by significant fines and 
prison sentences (chapter 2). The good elements the government has identified 
include truth, justice, commonality, ‘good governance’ and national identity. 
The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ constituents of Rwandan history are described in great 
detail in the ‘victor’s narrative’, one that includes events from the pre-colonial 
period to the present-day. It highlights social cohesion’s alleged existence prior 
to the arrival of colonial rulers, the ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ of 
previous regimes, and the current government’s attempts to promote its vision 
of ‘national reconciliation’. The commitment to disseminate this narrative is 
clearly stated in the textbook, Histoire du Rwanda: des origines à la fin du xxe 
siècle, published by the NURC in 2011 (chapter 5). This book exemplifies the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme’s education remit: to correct 
the ‘mindset, bad behaviour, bad practices’ of the Rwandan people (NURC, 
2011a, p. 1). 
The ‘victor’s narrative’ had a significant impact on the pursuit of justice at 
community gacaca courts. As chapter 3 showed, the theme of justice shaped 
the early post-conflict period since it led to gacaca courts being restored to 
speed the prosecution of these cases. The ‘victor’s narrative’ states that the RPF 
did not commit acts of genocide or crimes against humanity. As such, gacaca 
promotes a type of victor’s justice as it prevents crimes perpetrated against Hutu 
civilians by RPF members being prosecuted and fosters a sense of collective 
guilt among the Hutu population.
The analysis
This book seeks to provide a detailed, theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme in post-conflict Rwanda from 
a broad sociological perspective. The overarching aim of the research was to 
shed light on how the programme functions in social and political practice. 
I attempted to meet this aim by examining how the official reconciliation 
programme was constructed and implemented in the social, economic and 
political contexts in which it was created and continues to function. I also 
considered the wider historical context that informs the normative and legal 
framework of the RPF’s official reconciliation programme, with particular 
emphasis on the concepts of social cohesion, ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide 
ideology’ (see chapters 2 and 6). This context includes the arrival of colonial 
rulers, the 1959 Social Revolution, the 1990 RPF invasion, and the events 
of the civil war and 1994 genocide. As Rwanda is a landlocked country, 
influenced by events outside its borders, I have discussed several pertinent 
conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, focusing on the impact of political and 
military interventions led by the RPF, and the effects of violence and refugee 
movement on political stability in Rwanda. Relevant conflicts include the 
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1972 genocide in Burundi, anti-Tutsi violence in Uganda, the Second Congo 
War and ongoing violence in DRC’s North and South Kivu provinces.
In order to uncover the function of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme, it was vital to understand the RPF’s ‘national reconciliation’ vision. 
In doing so, I evaluated the official programme’s ‘internal logic’, as depicted 
by stated commitments, policy and legislation related to it. I used Crocker’s 
spectrum of ‘thin’ to ‘thick’ concepts to dissect and examine the RPF’s stated 
commitments to ‘national reconciliation’. Crocker describes ‘thin’ reconciliation 
as resembling little more than peaceful coexistence. The middle range includes 
such elements as representation of both sides of the conflict in national debate 
and public policy as well as communication between perpetrators and survivors 
of the conflict. The ‘thickest’ conception, most commonly pursued by truth 
commissions, includes acts of mutual forgiveness, healing, restoration and 
creating a shared vision of the future (Crocker, 2000, p. 108).
This evaluative tool was particularly useful for analysing individual concepts 
that shape the Rwandan government’s stated obligations. It also facilitated 
the discovery of contradictions inherent in the government’s description of 
‘national reconciliation’ theory and practice as well as the analysis of changing 
priorities over time. As the introduction demonstrated, the GNU prioritised 
reintegration and non-violence in the early years after the 1994 genocide, 
priorities that can be located at the ‘thin’ end of the spectrum. Reintegration 
and non-violence are a far cry, however, from the stated objective to create a 
shared vision of the future, as outlined in Vision 2020. The latter conception 
of reconciliation merges stated commitments to promoting national unity, 
national identity and development, and most closely resembles Crocker’s 
definition of ‘thick’ reconciliation (2000, p. 108).
This analysis was also informed by a number of relevant positions in the 
wider body of reconciliation literature. For instance, Lederach’s description 
of it as a peacemaking paradigm was fundamental to my understanding of 
‘national reconciliation’ as both a theory and a practice in post-conflict Rwanda. 
Lederach also describes reconciliation as the ‘meeting point between realism 
and innovation’ (1997, p. 25). So too is the RPF’s official programme. This 
‘meeting point’, as it were, is evident in the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme’s mix of pragmatic and ideological goals, which include: fighting 
‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’; prioritising citizenship and the common 
interests of all Rwandans over ethnicity, family relationships and religious 
groups; respecting the law and human rights; healing moral wounds by 
revealing the truth, asking and giving pardon; and preventing the recurrence of 
genocide (NURC, 2007, pp. 4–5).
The literature about post-conflict reconciliation converges on three concepts 
representing dominant responses to collective violence: truth, justice and 
forgiveness (chapter 1). Several authors, including Allen (1999), Borer (2006), 
Lederach (1997) and Minow (1998), argue that truth is an integral element 
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of reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm, an argument which formed the 
framework for my examination of the role of dialogue between survivors and 
perpetrators in the process of rebuilding relationships in Rwanda (chapter 3). 
I also utilised it to analyse the opportunities for discussion about issues related 
to identity, unity and experiences of the 1994 genocide at ingando and itorero 
ry’igihugu camps (chapter 5).
As discussed above, the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’ is shaped 
by a number of different concepts that it has constructed. Two of these 
were devised to describe relationship rebuilding in the post-conflict context. 
‘Vertical’ reconciliation refers to rebuilding trust between civilians and the 
state and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation relates to the rebuilding of connections 
between citizens (introduction and chapter 3). Lederach’s account of the role 
of rebuilding relationships after mass conflict informed my analysis of the 
reconciliation theory, both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’. Lederach states that 
acknowledging the past through acts of telling and hearing the truth validates 
the emotions of those who experienced the conflict, acts which represent the 
first steps in rebuilding associations damaged by violence (1997, p. 2).
Like Lederach, Clark argues that rebuilding relationships is vital to 
reconciliation after mass conflict, discussing this process in the context of 
gacaca. He asks, ‘[t]o what degree then should Rwanda pursue reconciliation 
and what degree of reconciliation is possible through gacaca?’ (2010a, p. 334). 
Clark’s definition of reconciliation between individuals and groups closely 
resembles that of the RPF’s ‘horizontal’ concept. He does not, however, include 
an analysis of connections between individuals, groups and the state. As such, I 
built on his initial question, to analyse whether gacaca did in fact promote the 
government’s vision of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ reconciliation.
The analysis of gacaca’s potential to promote both forms of reconciliation 
was shaped by the work of a number of different authors (introduction). The 
examination of the government’s pursuit of justice at gacaca in this book is 
informed by Kiss’s conception of restorative justice as a process that includes 
both restorative and retributive elements such as compensation for victims 
and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict. She also argues 
that restorative justice provides victims with an opportunity to share their 
experiences of the conflict (2000, p. 83). Although gacaca did give victims the 
chance to tell their story, this dialogue was often ‘forensic’ in nature as it was 
guided by case parameters (Wilson, 2001, pp. 36–7).
I also engaged with the concept of forgiveness in the context of gacaca 
courts (see chapter 3), analysing the potential impact of the perceived pressure 
to forgive on the rebuilding of damaged relationships between victims and 
defendants. Minow (1998) and Arendt’s (1958) descriptions of forgiveness as 
being unpredictable informed my understanding of the concept. The perceived 
expectation of being forgiven at gacaca is antithetical to Minow’s argument that 
others cannot claim forgiveness as a right. Instead, those who have been wronged 
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ought to have the freedom to choose whether they will forgive those who have 
perpetrated crimes against them (Minow, 1998, p. 17). Beyond the confines 
of gacaca, forgiveness does not feature prominently in official discourse − it 
does not appear in the official definition of national unity and reconciliation in 
the 2007 Reconciliation Policy or in the government’s definitions of ‘vertical’ 
and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation. As such, this book’s conception of forgiveness 
is similar to Worthington Jr.’s, who states that it is not necessary in order to 
rebuild relationships damaged by conflict (2006, p. 221). 
As outlined in the introduction, Wilson argues that an examination is 
necessary of the ways in which state strategies guide the politics of punishment 
and the construction of a new official memory towards creating a new 
hegemony after conflict (2001, p. xvi). In the Rwandan context, it is vital to 
understand how state strategies shape the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme. As such, I employed a social constructionist lens to my analysis 
of the RPF’s stated commitments to promote ‘national reconciliation’ within 
their social, economic, and political contexts. This particular approach allowed 
me to be critical of the ways in which political interests, dynamics and actions 
inform the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme.
Official reconciliation discourse is repeated at live-in ingando and itorero 
ry-igihugu camps, radio broadcasts, presidential speeches and in the history 
textbook Histoire du Rwanda: des origines à la fin du xxe siècle (chapter 5). 
In order to distinguish between rhetoric and reality, I examined whether the 
official programme meets its own stated commitments and goals, an evaluation 
which helped to identify the gaps between the political representations of 
Rwanda projected by the RPF and reality on the ground. Such images are 
projected to the national population as well as to the international community 
of NGOs, donors and foreign investors (chapter 6). I also applied a wider 
framework of international human rights standards to determine who does and 
does not benefit from the official programme. I looked closely at the violation 
of civil and political rights, as they are particularly relevant to the political 
landscape in Rwanda (chapter 5). Furthermore, I examined the implications of 
the RPF’s stated commitment to development on one of the most marginalised 
groups in society: genocide survivors.
The results
A number of different aims shaped this research. Its primary aim was to 
determine how the RPF’s official reconciliation programme functions in social 
and political practice. In order to meet this overarching objective, the research 
examined a number of other issues related to the programme’s function. As 
discussed above, one of these aims was to determine how the RPF government 
conceives of ‘national reconciliation’, which the research suggests is not 
straightforward. Official discourse, policy, legislation and interviews depict it 
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as both a theory and a practice. The former describes ‘national reconciliation’ 
as the rebuilding of relationships between citizens, as well as between citizens 
and the state (‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ reconciliation). As chapter 4 showed, 
the definition of national unity and reconciliation outlined in the 2007 
Reconciliation Policy conflates the two terms. However, they refer to separate 
concepts, with national unity being closely related to the RPF’s nation-building 
agenda. ‘National reconciliation’ is also conceived as a practice shaped by a 
number of stated commitments and priorities that have developed and changed 
over time including the pursuit of justice, civic education and development 
combined with eradicating ‘bad’ elements of history, and promoting the ‘good 
elements’ of national unity and reconciliation. This process is put into practice 
through the de facto banning of ethnic identities from official documents and 
public discourse, reeducating the population about the RPF’s conceptions 
of national unity and ‘national reconciliation’, restoring gacaca courts and 
promoting development.
The research met its aim of contextualising the construction and 
implementation of the official reconciliation programme by examining how it 
was informed by the RPF’s military and political role during the civil war, 1994 
genocide and post-conflict period. The findings suggest that the RPF’s role 
during the civil war and 1994 genocide impacted this process in several ways. 
The RPF’s invasion in 1990 and the ensuing civil war added to economic strife 
and political tension gripping Rwanda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both 
events incited anti-Tutsi propaganda and added to growing violence in the run-
up to the 1994 genocide (chapter 2). The 1990 ‘liberation invasion’ continues 
to play an important role in official reconciliation discourse, which is used to 
depict the RPF’s role in 1990, the civil war and during the 1994 genocide. 
As chapter 6 demonstrated, reference to the group as ‘liberators’ in official 
discourse, transforms the current government into a symbol of valour, morality 
and peace (Edelman, 1988, p. 2). In practical terms, the RPF’s ‘liberation’ of 
the capital in July 1994 ended the violence of the 1994 genocide and led to a 
mass exodus of Hutu into neighbouring Zaire.
The RPF’s political and military endeavours in the early post-conflict 
period had a significant impact on the official reconciliation programme’s 
design and implementation. An executive presidency was created, which 
consolidated the RPF’s power within the GNU and ensured that RPF interests 
and actions guided the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme. 
The mass expatriation of Hutu civilians, discussed above, created a need to 
implement a repatriation and reintegration programme shortly after the 1994 
genocide ended. The stated commitment to preventing invasions by Hutu 
militias hiding in eastern Zaire legitimised the RPF’s two military interventions 
across the border. Inside Rwanda, the GNU’s pursuit of maximal justice after 
the 1994 genocide put tremendous pressure on the country’s judicial system. 
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Consequently, the inability to process cases quickly led to the restoration of 
gacaca community courts.
Gacaca represented a major element of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Programme. As discussed in chapter 3, gacaca was mandated 
to: reveal the truth about 1994 genocide events; speed genocide trials along; 
eradicate impunity; promote unity and reconciliation; and prove that 
Rwandans can solve their own problems (NSGJ, n.d.(b), p. 1). As such, the 
book has assessed the potential of gacaca to promote ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
reconciliation, as defined by the government. It suggests that gacaca’s ability to 
do so may have been impeded by the ‘victor’s narrative’ of the 1994 genocide, 
RPF impunity, failure to adequately compensate survivors, and unrealistic 
expectations of forgiveness perceived by both survivors and defendants. The 
analysis does suggest, however, that gacaca may have created the opportunity 
for continued dialogue between individuals by providing a forum in which 
perpetrators, survivors and community members could discuss experiences of 
the civil war and 1994 genocide through testimonies and rebuttals.
The ‘victor’s narrative’ had a significant impact on gacaca and the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Programme more generally. As such, the research 
sought to determine the implications of this narrative on the RPF’s vision of 
national unity and ‘national reconciliation’. This book has examined the ways in 
which this narrative is disseminated at live-in ingando and itorero camps as well 
as in Histoire du Rwanda: des origines à la fin du xxe siècle (chapter 5). The research 
found that the camps missed valuable opportunities to promote critical analysis 
and open discussion about such issues as identity, ethnicity and experiences of the 
1994 genocide − stated commitments made by the NURC. One interpretation 
is that the pursuit of pro-RPF indoctrination rendered the camps unable to 
promote dialogue. The research also found that the NURC’s history textbook 
(2011a) did little other than serve to legitimise the RPF’s approach to governance 
in the post-conflict context.
Itorero camps are particularly pertinent to the study of ‘national 
reconciliation’ as they actively promote the RPF’s nation-building and 
development agendas. The former is closely related to the RPF’s conception 
of national unity. The research suggests that this agenda and the government’s 
conception of national unity create a highly prescriptive path that dictates 
how both priorities ought to be pursued (chapter 4). This path transforms the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Programme into a conduit through which 
the government constructs its own vision of the people and the Rwandan 
nation, one which depicts the country as a prosperous and united nation ruled 
by the RPF. The government achieves this by promoting the programme’s end 
goals before they have been achieved, thus precluding it from being analysed 
and criticised. Interestingly, this attempt to build the nation and unite the 
people limits the possibility of achieving the government’s own conceptions 
of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation by failing to provide the time and 
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space necessary to rebuild relationships damaged by the conflict. These may 
be further damaged by the RPF’s failure to fulfil its stated commitments 
to promoting social welfare, equal rights and open dialogue, as outlined in 
the 2003 Constitution. Amidst these obstacles, the nation-building agenda 
successfully secures RPF political control by constructing a singular national 
identity that legitimises state programming and equates political opposition 
and criticism of the regime with ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’.
The research also suggests that the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Programme produces two interrelated images of Rwanda and the RPF 
government, one of which is projected to the domestic population, while 
the other is aimed at the international community of NGOs, donors and 
foreign investors. The one constructed for the domestic audience portrays the 
country as safe, stable and developing rapidly, while the image projected to the 
international community is shaped by the relationship between that audience 
and the RPF government. This association attracts donorship and investment 
while quashing international criticism of the RPF’s actions during the civil war, 
the 1994 genocide and interventions in DRC.
The RPF’s economic reforms and technocratic approach to governance have 
garnered numerous accolades from both investors and donors. The innovation 
and speed of this development overshadows the inadequate social welfare and 
civil and political rights, a major obstacle in the RPF’s pursuit of ‘national 
reconciliation’. There is still value in the notion of reconciliation, however, 
amidst these inequalities, much of which stems from individual ingredients 
that comprise not only the RPF’s vision of ‘national reconciliation’, but also the 
broader concept as discussed in the wider literature.
Speaking and hearing the truth, addressing conflict experiences and 
achieving justice have moral and legal import after violence. Some of these 
actions − confession, apology, truth-telling and rebuilding relationships − may 
have taken place without the formal establishment of an official reconciliation 
programme in Rwanda. Although I argue that we ought to be sceptical of 
the political interests, dynamics and actions that guide how programmes are 
constructed, reconciliation is still a useful paradigm through which we may 
analyse how individuals, groups, communities and nations move forward 
after conflict and genocide. With this in mind, my analysis of the social and 
political functions of the RPF’s official programme leads to the conclusion that 
it is best understood as a nation-building and state-legitimisation project that 
secures the continued political dominance of the RPF government under Paul 
Kagame’s presidency. 
Contribution 
This book makes a significant contribution to the broad sociological study 
of reconciliation and human rights. It provides a case-specific analysis of 
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the National Unity and Reconciliation Programme according to its own 
logic, international human rights standards, and the theory and practice of 
reconciliation as a peacemaking paradigm using such evaluative tools as 
Crocker’s spectrum of reconciliation (2000). In so doing, it applies a social 
constructionist framework to the complex socio-political programme in an 
attempt to uncover the dynamics, interests and interactions that shape how it is 
constructed by its creators and how it functions in social and political practice. 
This framework may be useful for further analyses of the social construction 
of human rights and reconciliation. The book will be beneficial to existing 
research on reconciliation theory and practice as it considers the complexity 
of constructing and implementing a government-led programme following 
the civil war and genocide in Rwanda. It will also contribute to the study of 
other post-conflict reconciliation processes as it analyses the particularly salient 
concepts of unity, identity and development in the context of post-conflict 
governance.
This book opens the door to several new directions for research including 
comparative studies of official reconciliation programmes in Burundi and 
Rwanda. The analysis could examine the stark differences in official discourse 
and the construction of ethnic identities in these neighbouring countries. 
Furthermore, the book may also support the analysis of recent conflicts in 
the Great Lakes Region, including the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC, from 
a broad sociological perspective. This particular direction may facilitate in-
depth investigations of the social and political functions of such conflicts. 
Furthermore, it may also assist in examining the potential impact of foreign 
aid to Rwanda being partially frozen, and in assessing how the violence and 
political uncertainty in DRC has affected the RPF’s efforts to promote its 
development programme and vision of ‘national reconciliation’.
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  unity, nationality and state control
In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) set out to stabilise and 
secure Rwanda, a country decimated 
by genocide.  This mandate was later 
extended to include the herculean task 
of promoting unity and reconciliation 
to a population torn apart by violence.  
More than two decades later, these goals 
appear to have been achieved.  
Beneath the veneer of reconciliation 
lies myriad programmes and legislation 
that do more than seek to unite the 
population – they keep the RPF in power.  
In Reconciling Rwanda: Unity, Nationality 
and State Control, Jennifer Melvin analyses 
the highly controversial RPF and its vision 
of reconciliation to determine who truly 
bene ts from the construction of the new 
post-genocide Rwanda. “How does a country reconcile in the wake of genocide? In Rwanda 
in 1994 neighbour killed neighbour; 
dehumanising propaganda stirred up 
unresolved grievance, and one in ten of 
the population died. Melvin examines 
how the Rwandan government has tried 
to eradicate impunity while nurturing 
national unity. Her understanding of 
the gacaca process, where courts based 
on traditional justice provided swift 
justice, is ground-breaking. Her objective 
analysis shines a much-needed light on 
a modern challenge: how do fractured 
and traumatised societies come to terms 
with individual responsibility for atrocities 
while  nding a shared truth?
Rebecca Tinsley, founder of 
Waging Peace
“Jennifer Melvin’s meticulous critical analysis of the post-genocide Rwandan 
regime’s policies for national unity, 
reconciliation and justice shows that 
in reality they served rather di erent 
functions. It deserves to be widely read.
Martin Shaw, author of What is 
Genocide?
Jennifer M
elvin
Spectators listen to testimonies given by defendants 
at gacaca in Burema, Kigali Province, Rwanda, 
5 May 2009
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